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INTRODUCTION
At a time when the natural theology prevalent in the eight¬
eenth century withered under concentrated attack, when the deism of
Tindal and Toland, as well as the theism of Locke, Butler, and Paley,
were being abandoned as tenable religious philosophies, a somewhat
different "natural theology" came into being in Scotland, It stood at
first only on the fringe of the Christian revelation, serving as a
halting introduction to revealed truth. Under various influences, however,
this Scottish natural theology was expanded into fully developed theistic
philosophies variously relating themselves to historical Christianity,
This development, which took place mainly in the nineteenth century, is
the concern of this study.
If any one factor may be singled out as marking the distinctive
character of Scottish natural theology and theism, it is the central place
given to human nature. David Hume had set a pattern. His Treatise on
Human Nature was probably the most significant single work on philosophy
ever to appear in Scotland. Its importance in the development of British
empiricism has long been recognized. What seems to be overlooked generally
is its paramount importance as a work of Scottish thought, and as the hard
anvil upon which later Scottish thinkers down through the nineteenth
century hammered out their own distinctive doctrines. By and large, Hume's
successors were not sceptics, but theists who held that a religious, and
specifically Christian, view of life has sound foundations that are dis¬
coverable by reason. Principal Tulloch, writing late in the nineteenth
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centuiy could point out, with considerable justice, that Hume "in his
native country ... never carried before him the drift of speculation ...
as he did in England;" and further, that "his limits have been understood
in Scotland as in Germany; and, acknowledged to be impregnably strong on
his own ground, the measure of this ground has yet been noted and pointed
out,"1 That is to say, Hume's views on philosophy and religion goaded
Scotsmen to the rational defense of their beliefs at a time when, in
England and elsewhere, the conviction was growing that Hume had given the
coup de grace to any rational exposition of religion. The resulting
natural theology differed from the eighteenth centuiy English version in
that it began with the human nature discovered at the center of all
scientific thinking by David Hume. The eighteenth-century interest in
"nature" as it had been triumphantly "naturized" by Newton was placed in
subordination to the "science of man." And the further development of
Scottish theism throughout the nineteenth century owes much of what dis¬
tinctive teaching it may be said to possess to its discernably anthropo-
centric outlook. While this changed outlook altered the theistic argument
significantly, it nevertheless claimed the highest credentials possible to
human reason. The main body of Scottish theistic writing, with several
conspicuous exceptions, may therefore be characterized as demonstrative
in this general sense.
Demonstrative theism, then, was a rationally developed natural
theology based upon man as part and center of nature. It was concretely
exemplified in a number of diverse works by Hume's Scottish successors
down through the nineteenth century. Some regarded themselves primarily
as theologians, others as philosophers. Demonstrative theism was in no
1* Modern Theories in Philosophy and Religion, p. 433#
-3-
sense the work of a single school of theological or philosophical doctrine.
No one individual gave it a definitive expression. It made no claim to
be a self-consciously national development: indeed, in its later phases,
any uniquely Scottish elements tended to submerge themselves in a more
cosmopolitan current of thinking. The cultural climate of the nineteenth
century was not favorable to the development of a clearly defined and widely
acceptable body of theistic doctrine. And such agreement as did exist
among Scottish theists is easily lost amid their more labored statements
of disagreement. At times disagreement seems to be the dominant character¬
istic of the Scottish mind and is perhaps the most formidable obstacle to
any study of main tendencies and movements of theistic thinking in Scotland.
Nevertheless, an important minimum of agreement and supplementary doctrine
make the undertaking worthwhile.
The nineteenth century was an age of spiritual and intellectual
ferment in Scotland, as in England and in the rest of Europe—a ferment
expressing itself in dissatisfaction with old ways of life and thought,
and in a persistent effort to arrive at new, and more adequate beliefs.
This was, of course, only one aspect of that larger flux, seen variously
in intense scientific curiosity, the growth of industrialism, the spread
of social unrest, pressure for political change, the flowering of art and
literature, and the sporadic appearance of religious revivals.Many, if
not all, facets of this complex scene found brilliant notice in the tortuous
social and metaphysical outbursts of Garlyle, and indirectly in the
Romanticism of Scott. But at the core of the troubled mass of national
"L* For general historical background I am most indebted to the following
works: P. Hume Brown, History of Scotland. Vol. Ill; G. M. Travelvan,
History of England: J. H. Randall, Jr., The Making of the Modem Mind.
This last is a valuable study of the history of thought since the
Renaissance.
vitality lay a critical spiritual problem that dominated serious thought,
both literary and academic. Whom or what shall men worship? Is there a
God worthy of adoration, and can He be known? Or is nature ultimately a
spiritless vortex of matter, a "huge, dead, immeasurable Steams-engine,
rolling on, in its dead indifference, to grind 'man' limb from limb?"
Have righteousness, truth, beauty, so valued by the human spirit, any
meaning or foundation in a truly spiritual reality? David Hume had had
a leading part in bringing about the crisis of thought that made such
questionings inevitable. Hence it was no longer possible for Scotsmen
to stand aloof from the discussion of these basically religious problems
as they had during the Deistic Controversy of the eighteenth century.
Scottish thought was thus drawn into the general quest for religious
certainty. Interestingly enough, the century-lcng movement of research
among academic theologians and philosophers followed the general path
taken by Carlyle in his passionate search for God. It began with the
doctrines of God and man embodied in the confessions and theological ex¬
positions of the stricter Scottish Calvinistsj then it traversed a barren
and circuitous road of uncertainty in order to meet the challenge of Hume's
somewhat sceptical viewsj but at last it escaped Doubting Castle and moved
toward a new kind of religious philosophy in alliance with German Idealism.
At the end of the nineteenth century, Scottish theism was largely dominated
by German influences, but did not lose entirely the marks of its origin as
a distinctively Scottish natural theology.
This study cannot pretend to be an exhaustive account of the
movements and counter-movements that affected Scottish religious philosophy
in the nineteenth centuiy, but by focusing on a few representative figures
may indicate their general result. Little interest has been shown in the
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beginnings of Scottish natural theology, or in the relation of this
growth to the later works on theism by Robert Flint, Campbell Fraser,
A. S. Pringle-Pattison, and their contemporaries-- who were largely in¬
fluenced by French and German thinking. Scotsmen themselves have been
content to acknowledge the failure of their countrymen to make striking
contributions to the development of a "rational theology" or "religious
metaphysic."^" And histories of philosophy, generally written in the
shadow of Kant and German Idealism, attribute little or no significance
to what pronouncement Scottish "Common Sense Philosophy" did make on
questions of natural theology. The usual verdict on the development of
Scottish thought subsequent to Hume is deprecatory: it failed to see the
point of the Sceptical onslaught on natural theology, appealing to the
vulgar consciousness of the common man to sustain belief in God and the
2
soul's immortality. It is true, of course, that Scotland did not feel
the germinating influence of the Kantian revolution in thought until late
in the nineteenth century. The charge of provincialism can justly be
made against the majority of the Common Sense school, with the conspicuous
exception of Sir William Hamilton. But, the rationale of Scottish doctrine
from Thomas Reid to the inception of the Idealistic movement in Scotland
*
E.g. Professor Campbell Fraser had occasion to note: "Natural or
Rational Theology, as the higher branch of Metaphysics, is almost unknown
in Scotland—a very different study having usurped the name. (Essays in
Philosophy, p. 205.) J. H. Leckie in his life of Fergus Ferguson. P.P.
remarks that with the exception of McLeod Campbell's The Nature of the
Atonement. Scottish theology and philosophy was simply a reflection of
movements originated elsewhere. Cf. Introductory chapter.
The judgment is that of Kant himself, made in his Prolegomena, evidently
before seeing the later, more acute works of Thomas Reid. (Cf. the illu¬
minating chapter on "The Fate of Reid" in 0. M. Jones, Empiricism and
Intuitionism in Reid's Common Sense Philosophy; Princeton, 1927). This
judgment is variously repeated by Kant's intellectual descendants, among
whom may be listed the historians Ueberweg, Weber, and Windelband. E. g.,
cf. Windelband, A History of Philosophy (tr. by J. H. Tufts; New York,
1893), pp. 4-59-60, 482-3.
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has been widely misunderstood. And truer information needs to be placed
in the general histories of thought. Professor Andrew Seth (Pringle-
Pattison), in his small book on Scottish Philosophy, compared the Scottish
and German answers to Hume, not entirely to the detriment of his country¬
men. But being himself an ardent Idealist, he was not inclined to work
out the relations obtaining between Scottish philosophy and the theology
that provided it with an "ontology. He shared to some extent the general
assumption that the Scottish failure to elaborate a religious metaphysic
was simply a defect of rational acumen, rather than the evidence of a
non-rationalistic doctrine with some foundation in principle. By Professor
Pringle-Pattison's time, Scottish thought had moved far from the original
position of Thomas Reid, although his older and younger contemporaries,
Campbell Fraser2 and A. J. Balfour, had considerable sympathies with the
"mediating philosophy" that Reid labored to establish—the "mediating
philosophy" that may be used as a touchstone of Scottish "natural theology."
Although the verdict of triumphant Idealism upon the worth of the Scottish
development must ultimately be taken into account, there is room for
historical interest in the actual growth of this somewhat provincial
-*-• Cf. Scottish Philosophy, pp. 213-16.
2# In his brief work on Thomas Reid. Professor Campbell Fraser sums up
the development of Scottish thought from the time of Reid, much in the
spirit of the "mediating philosophy": "The alternatives presented to this
generation—either agnostic pessimist despair or univeral science in which
man is in some sense identified with God—final nescience versus final
omniscience—ultimate and universal problem of existence taking the place
of a Reid's science of human mind—represent the unending struggle between
sceptical distrust of the Universal Power, ignorantly worshiped, and
reasonable ethical faith in the Universal power, with consequent hope for
men. It is in Scotland a new form of the war with David Hume to which
Reid's life was given." (pp.155-6.)
doctrine, before it came into closer alignment with religious philosophies
originating mainly in Germany, And this study is dominated by just this
historical interest. It is perhaps not entirely out of place at a time
when the triumph of Idealism is widely suspect among philosophers, and
the rationalistic assumptions of philosophy in general are repudiated by
influential theologians, Scottish natural theology came into being under
circumstances comparable to these, when rationalism of the eighteenth
century was in decline, and theologians of the older Scottish tradition
were content to "rub salt in the philosophers' wounds." The parallel may
perhaps prove instructive.
The historical problem, in other words, cannot be dissociated
from the theological problem which has to do with the truth of theistic
reasonings. While it is not the purpose of this study to interpose
critical judgments on doctrines of the Scottish theists to be considered—
judgments formed by movements of current thinking, it is impossible to do
justice to the history of the matter without bearing in mind constantly
that there is truth at stake. To rehearse ideas and doctrines of the past
with no regard for their inward urgency as realizations of truth is to
falsify history. An adequate method must therefore set the details of
nineteenth century Scottish theism in what might be described as a
historical space of which theology is the fourth dimension—in a historico-
theological continuum. What was then, and is still, being sought was a
knowledge of God and of God's relation to reality in all its aspects. The
means of search with which this study is concerned was human reason
primarily, employed by successive thinkers to criticize previous con¬
clusions and arrive at more satisfactory results. Those results, as has
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already been indicated, may be classified together as forms of demonstra¬
tive theism. They gave varying expression to the belief that the ultimate
reality is one supreme Being, who relates Himself in a vital way to the
human spirit or personality; whose completeness and perfection are somehow
set over against the incompleteness and imperfection of all other reality,
and whose existence is more than a postulate of theoretical reason—it is
the surety of human knowledge. The statement and restatement of the so-
called theistic proofs is consequently at the heart of the historico-
theological problem. The positive significance attached to the proofs
distinguishes demonstrative theism from doctrines drawn wholly from the
chief theistic religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism."*"
The definition of demonstrative theism thus vaguely suggested is per¬
haps the best that can be offered by way of introduction. In more recent
discussion, the term "theism" has been variously defined, as, for example,
by Professor A. 2. Taylors "We shall probably not depart far from the
implications of current language if we agree to define theism as the
doctrine that the ultimate ground of things is a single supreme reality
which is the source of everything other than itself and has the characters
of being (a) intrinsically complete and perfect and (b), as a consequence,
an adequate object of unqualified worship. ... The suggested definition
in fact coincides with the famous formula of St. Anselm, that God is id
quo maius cogitari non potest, 'the being than which none greater can be
thought.'" (Article on "Theism," Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and
Ethics. Vol. XIIJ, p. 261.) It would not be in keeping with serious
historical interest, however, to impose a definition upon those who lived
within the period in question.
The term"demonstrative theism" was not employed by any of the Scottish
theists to be considered, and seems to have a very limited history. It
appeared in a work by Prof. Alfred Caldecott entitled, The Philosophy of
Religion in England and America, and was there used to designate theistic
systems depending mainly on deductive arguments. By misconception he in¬
cludes Robert Flint in this classification, and places Thomas Chalmers,
John Tulloch, and John Caird—who will figure largely in this thesis—in
other classifications. None of these in fact understands "demonstration"
in the limited sense given it in deductive logic, but use it more in the
etymological sense of "showing" or "pointing out" the Divine reality by
the unfolding of a logic deemed appropriate to the subject or to the
limited powers that human reason can bring to the subject. The presence
of the theistic proofs in some positive form is the general criterion to
be used hereafter in constituting the company of demonstrative theists.
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It is of first importance to note at the outset that the use
of the theistic proofs is not in itself an indication of a thoroughly-
rationalistic approach to the study of religion. Because they are given
a place in the philosophy of Thomas Reid and the natural theology of
Thomas Chalmers does not mean that these Scotsmen were simply echoing
the strains of eighteenth century rationalistic theism, or were ignoring
the fact that David Hume had lived and passed hostile judgment upon any
attempt to establish the existence and attributes of God by the exercise
of reason. Had the Deistic controversy not raged in England, it is very
unlikely that Scotsmen would have taken the interest they did in natural
theology. The indebtedness is obvious. But this must not be allowed to
obscure the possibility that natural theology was transformed by trans¬
lation into an intellectual environment long hostile to the very axioms
of rationalism. It is this possibility that the historians of thought
have not taken seriously enough, and in consequence the Scottish develop¬
ment of the proofs has seemed to have little or no significance. Now, it
can be shown that a transformation did take place. which led to a rein-
terpretation and re-evaluation of the proofs. But first, it is necessary
to characterize the rationalistic theism of the eighteenth century, in
which the problem of natural theology was forcefully raised for the modem
mind. To this, the remainder of the introduction will be devoted.
For much of Europe, the eighteenth century was preeminently the
Age of Reason, and England led in exalting it. Confidence in the faculty
of rational insight had a considerable history before John Locke gave
definitive form to widely held beliefs—the form that was to mold English
thought down to the nineteenth century. The application of reason to
religious matters, for example, had since the time of Lord Herbert of
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Cherbury held promise of providing a final resolution of differences
between warring Christian sects. Rational theologians and Christian
philosophers had come forward, particularly at Cambridge, to urge the
reverent use of reason, instead of the sword, to determine the fundamental
articles of religious belief. Fully in the spirit of this tradition,
Locke wrote his work on The Reasonableness of Christianity, claiming as
qualifications for the task only the piety and fairness of mind that must
characterize a reasonable man. This amounted to the large and critical
assumption that an essential and universal human "faculty," reason, can
determine the essence of religion—which is tantamount to saying that
reason can determine for all practical purposes the realities with which
religion is concerned, as well as the nature of that concern. Just how
this primary axiom was developed in the Age of Rationalism can perhaps be
indicated best by noting its presence in the characteristic doctrines of
Locke which constitute his philosophical rendering of Christianity. Though
modified in significant respects by Samuel Clarke, Bishop Butler, and
William Paley, Locke*s formulation was sufficiently catholic in its day
to be used by his successors as the authoritative statement of the problem
of religious thought. Significantly enough, deists as well as theists,
claimed Locke as their own, though there is no doubt he would have sided
with the theists generally in the celebrated Deistic Controversy.
In The Reasonableness of Christianity. Locke recognizes two
independent sources of religious knowledge—two distinct origins of the
idea of God, and with it of the idea of man's responsibilities in the
sight of God. The first is supernatural revelation, authenticated as
revelation through the performance of miracles by the bearers of the Divine
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truth, and through the fulfillment of prophecies by those favored
messengers. The second is necessary inference from the facts of inner
perception by anyone who studiously fulfills the requirements of valid
inference. For the majority of Europeans, the revelation contained in
the Scriptures of Christianity occasions the first clear and distinct
ideas of Deity, worship, and ethics. But at the same time, Locke main¬
tains that an immediate and coercive demonstration of ultimate realities
is possible universally for every mind that devotes itself attentively to
its own rational nature and considers what that nature implies. As for
practical effectiveness in disseminating religious knowledge, he holds
that revelation is by far the more important and "authoritative" of the
two. Rational demonstrations give only fragmentary glimpses of man's
whole duty to God and his neighbor. Revelation gives the comprehensive
picture. For the great majority, historical-dogmatic considerations must
take precedence over the philosophic. But at the same time, when Locke
considers the truth of religion, and seeks appropriate reasons for com¬
mending Christianity as true faith, he reverses the order and gives
precedence to the theistic knowledge inferentially derived. The norm of
H**'
all that is to be accepted as true and acted upon as trustworthy is ulti¬
mately the knowledge that is obtained by man's native faculty of reason.
Before its bar, revelation as well as the miracles and fulfilled
prophecies that authenticate it must stand. Hence, Locke defines the
relation of reason and revelation for the eighteenth century in this way:
Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal Father of
light and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind
that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of
their natural faculties: revelation is natural reason enlarged
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by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately;
which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs
it gives that they come from God. So that he that takes away
reason to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both.-'-
In other words, the content of revelation and the means of apprehending
it—which is faith—are wholly dependent upon the industry of reason.
Locke is obviously the inheritor of the Cartesian revolution. If in
medieval rationalism there was room to acknowledge two equally valid
sources of religious truth—faith and reason, it is apparent that in
Locke faith is completely overshadowed by reason. ~ Revelation is to be
accepted not as faith-inspiring truth, but because it is accompanied by
amazing irregularities about which it is possible to reason, seemingly in
the same way that a Newton can reason about the amazing regularities of
the solar system. Miracles, like masses in motion, compel rational con¬
sideration. The question then arises as to the character and extent of
the religious knowledge to be obtained by reason. And the answer involves
some basic tenets of Locke's philosophy, but chiefly his doctrine of the
"three-fold knowledge of existence." "I say ... that we have the knowledge
of our own existence by intuition; of the existence of God by demonstration;
and of other things by sensation.It is to be understood, of course,
that Locke's view reflects Descartes' celebrated three-league journey from
doubt to certainty, and that Locke adopts as his own several important
Cartesian axioms. He retains the doctrine of the duality of substances-
mental and material, and the consequent notion of their relation to one
another through the medium of "representative perceptions." He accepts
the criterion of "clear and distinct ideas" as the mark of true knowledge,
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Fraser's Edition), Bk. IV,
Chap. XIX, Sect. 4: (Vol. II, P. 431). Quotes from this source hereafter
will give reference in this same order, omitting "Book," "Chapter," and
"Section."
2* Ibid. IV, IX, 2 (Vol. II, p. 304).
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adding only that sense experience contributes necessarily to any and all
such ideas. According to Locke, there are two kinds of experience:
"sensation" and "reflection"—external and internal sense—-the data
presented to the mind by the five senses and the mind,s notice of its
own operation upon those data. Out of these materials, his empirical
philosophy is built, and the doctrine of the threefold knowledge of ex¬
istence is furnished. Because the knowledge of self and of external things
plays a significant part in the demonstration of God's existence, it is
necessary to take all three stages into account.
(a) Knowledge of self, according to Locke, is intuitive, immedi¬
ate, and indisputable. So certain is it that it neither needs nor is
capable of formal proof. The mind thinking, reasoning, doubting, perceives
the necessary relation of the idea of "self" with the idea of "real ex¬
istence"—for knowledge he defines as perception of agreement or disagree¬
ment of ideas given in sensation and reflection—and thus reaches an
unimpeachable knowledge of its own existence. What Locke does not attempt
in working out his doctrine of the "self" is to lift the concept above the
level of "popular indefiniteness," although for the purpose of theistic
argument, he treats it as equivalent to a "clear and distinct idea." The
self somehow holds sensation, perception, and reason in feej but reason—
or the intellectual "faculty" —is dominant, and the most characteristic
function of the self. The somewhat cramped and frigid intelleetualism
that grew out of this teaching in the eighteenth century was, of course,,
destined to produce a sharp reaction in the Romantic Movement.
Locke's doctrine of the "self" is important at the moment only
because it is a crucial step in the direction of the second known
existence—that of God.
Though God has given us no innate ideas of himself ... yet
having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed
with, he hath not left himself without witness; since we have
sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof
of him, as long as we carry ourselves about us.1
In this sentence Locke foreshadows generations of introspective analysis
in the interest of higher philosophy. Scottish philosophy took its cue
from Locke in this respect. But David Hume and the Common Sense Philoso¬
phers after him took more seriously the suggestion that the empirical
"self" be made the center and foundation of philosophy—the "self" that
is actually known in experience rather than an idealized rational entity
centered upon an inconceivable substance.
(b) In a chapter treating "Of Our Knowledge of the Existence
of a God," Locke sets out his promised demonstration, whose solidity he
holds "equal to mathematical certainty." Here there are two matters of
the first importance; on the one hand, the actual demonstration itself,
and on the other, the equation of this reasoning with mathematical reason¬
ing. Locke and his eighteenth century disciples lived in the shadow of
Descartes' mathematical philosophy and Newton's Princinia with its extra¬
ordinary mathematical synthesis; both molded their ways of thinking.
Locke's demonstration is basically the proof to which Kant would
attach the term "cosmological": it turns upon a principle of causation.
Summarized, it may be stated in this way. (i) That something actually
exists every man knows from the certainty of his own self-existence, (ii)
Nonentity cannot produce any real thing: therefore, from eternity there
has been something—an eternal Being, (iii) This eternal Being must be
most powerful to be the source and original of all existing powers, (iv)
The most powerful, eternal Being must also be most knowing to be the source
1* Ibid.. IV, X, 1 (V. II, p. 306).
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of the knowledge and reason which man finds in himself—it being held
impossible that "incogitative" matter should produce a "cogitative" being,
(v) The summary inference is that there is an eternal, most powerful, and
most knowing Being—a necessarily existing eternal Mind, "which whether any
one will please to call God, it matters not. The thing is evident.""*" "It
is plain to me we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a God,
than of anything our senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I
presume I may say, that we more certainly know that there is a God, than
2
that there is anything else without us." In the light of voluminous sub¬
sequent criticism, it is clear that numerous exceptions can be taken to this
formulation of the argument. There will be occasion presently to consider
Hume's criticisms. What is implicit at each successive step of the argument,
however, is the universal and necessary validity—the a priori validity—of
the principle that every existing thing given in experience must have a
cause, from which it is distinguished as an effect, and to which it never¬
theless owes its distinctive character.
In the light of this principle, the most important theological
consequence of treating nature as a realm of effects is the conception of
a God who is external to His creatures, but at the same time is like them
in power and in knowledge. In the Deistic Controversy that resulted from
Locke's teaching, the two aspects of his use of the causal principle played
a vital part. But while the element of externality has been stressed as
characterizing the deistic notion of God—the great First Cause and Creator
of all things—it was the assumed conformity of Divine knowledge to human
Ibid., IV, X, 6 (Vol. II, p. 309).
2* Ibid.. IV, X, 6 (Vol. II, p. 310).
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knowledge, and of Divine powers to human powers that bore up the contro¬
versy. Man's rational nature is homogeneous with its Cause and the
reproduction of it. While God is immeasurably greater than His creatures,
and not subject as they are to the distortions of passion and "enthusiasm,"
reason retains the stamp of man's likeness to God in the midst of unlike-
ness. In its purity, It is "natural revelation;" human knowledge is
consequently the counterpart and index of Divine knowledge; and human
creativity mirrors God's own creative work. On such premises as these,
both deists and theists were at one in holding that all knowledge essential
to religion is obtainable by reading human reasonings and powers back into
the First Cause. Moral reasonings are placed alongside the theoretical,
for Locke and his followers thought moral order a direct extension of
rational order. God is thus seen to be the Moving Spirit of moral and
rational orderliness. He is worshipped most worthily by extracting His
thoughts from His creation and thinking them sifter Him, without the dis¬
tortion of passion or "enthusiasm." And in a future state, He may be
expected to apportion rewards and punishments in the measure that men have
seconded or hindered His cosmic order. This minimum of natural religious
knowledge was common ground in the Deistic Controversy. But the theists
went beyond their opponents by holding in addition that man's interest in
God is returned by Him; and that on occasion He has imparted certain
knowledge not readily accessible to human reason, which it is nevertheless
capable of receiving and approving. In the spirit of Locke, therefore,
Bishop Butler commends Christianity,
First, as a republication, and external institution, of natural
or essential Religion, adapted to the present circumstances of
mankind, and intended to promote natural piety and virtue: and
secondly, as containing an account of a dispensation of things
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not discoverable by reason, in consequence of which, several
distinct precepts are enjoined us. For though natural Religion
is the foundation and principal part of Christianity, it is not
in any sense the whole of it,-*-
The second important matter to be considered in connection with
Locke's theistic "demonstration" is the claim that it is equivalent to
mathematical certainty. Given the idea of man's rational self, he holds
it possible to pass by an intermediate series of related ideas to the
notion of a God who exists and is the Supreme Being. "Those intervening
ideas, which serve to show the agreement of any two others, are called
proofs: and where the agreement and disagreement is by this means plainly
and clearly perceived, it is called demonstration; it being shown to the
understanding, and the mind made to see that it is so." Mathematical
reasoning is demonstration par excellence. Its method had seemed to
Descartes the only one worthy of philosophy, and Spinoza made a strenuous
effort to prove him right. For Locke, mathematical reasoning and mathe¬
matical demonstration are normative. He evidently holds that the ideas
and relations entering into the five main stages of the theistic proof
sufficiently approximate the abstract relations and notions of quantity
employed in mathematics to yield a theistic inference of equal certainty.
The matter is to be decided by the purest logical operation of the intellect.
To know God, the only prerequisite is sufficient rational acumen to determine
The Analogy of Religion. Pt. I, Ghap. I, Sect. 4 (J« H. Bernard's
Edition, pp. 139-40). Acute moral sensitivity is recognized as the out¬
standing mark of all Butler's thinking, for which he still deserves to
be studied. He is also typical of the many enlighteners for whom the
moral rather than the theoretical issue was primary. But Butler leaves
no doubt that his moral doctrine and Christian expositions have the
boldest kind of rationalistic presuppositions.
2» Locke, op. cit., IV, II, 3 (Vol. II, p. 179.)
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the idea of self and to apply the a priori notion of causation,"*" Not
only so, but to have the ideas of self and God clearly in mind is,
ideally, to have the elements necessary for the further demonstration
of moral principles, and therefore to know man's responsibilities in the
sight of God,
The idea of a supreme Being, infinite in power, goodness, and
wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and
the idea of ourselves, as understanding, rational creatures,
being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly con¬
sidered and pursued, afford such foundations of our duty and
rules of action as might place morality amongst the sciences
capable of demonstration: wherein I doubt not but from self-
evident propositions, by necessary consequences, as incontestible
as those in mathematics, the measures of right and wrong might
be made out.^
Locke, of course, did not make a careful distinction between the"cos-
mological" proof and the "ontologies!" proof, or recognize any dependence
of one upon the other. He was unimpressed by Leibnitz' argument from the
idea of a Being whose "essence implies existence," But while doubting the
force of an "ontological" argument, he does not dismiss it entirely. And
there is perhaps reason to believe that Locke provided the germ of Samuel
Clarke's celebrated a priori proof. Ibid,, IV,X, 7 (Vol. II, pp. 310-12),
Nevertheless, the eighteenth century as a whole did not follow Clarke,
With Butler and Pale^ it shifted its attention from "efficient" to'final"
causes. While the argument is given in analogical form, it is thought a
coercive demonstration because it has its beginning in the datum of a
mathematically precise world-machine, patently designed! Cf. Paley's
Natural Theology. Chapter XXIII.
2* Ibid.. IV, III, 18 (Vol. II, p. 208). This mere suggestion of Locke
was also worked out after a fashion by Samuel Clarke. The other side of
Locke's ethical doctrine—his nascent utilitarianism-with its more em¬
pirical approach to morals—was variously elaborated by Butler and Paley.
But, while different schemes of motivation were expounded to explain how
imperfect human nature is to be brought into alignment with the perfect
moral order, established by God, the sovereign Being of God is the key¬
stone in the moral arch, and this is established by rational demonstration.
Bishop Butler would not agree that the imperative character of moral
demands springs from logically coercive proofs, but the Being of God is in
some sense the presupposition of his doctrine of conscience, and "A religious
conception of the universe and man is always for him an ultimate axiom,"
(Cf. W. R. Matthews, Introduction to Butler's Three Sermons on Human
Nature. p. xxiii.)
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On such a view, to which Locke himself could not hold consistently, moral
and religious imperatives are variant forms of rational coercion, of which
mathematical demonstration is the plainest example. Thus the diversity of
human knowledge is brought to a single focus,—-or so it would seem.
Actually, Locke's avowed empiricism, which is the chief interest of his
philosophic writings, placed a number of obstacles in the way of a con¬
sistent rational theology. One such difficulty must be mentioned in connection
with the third and final stage of man's "three-fold knowledge of existence."
(c) Knowledge of all "other things" beside self and God is said
to come by sensation. And this foim of knowledge stands on a lower plain
than that derived from intuition and demonstration. Sensation vouches for
the existence of particular things, but only at the moment of experience,
and only by means of faculties which in part reveal and in part conceal
what it is that exists. This element of uncertainty is enlarged when the
moment of experience is gone and the idea of the particular thing has
passed into memory, for there is even less guarantee that the idea retained
in the mind corresponds to anything existing in actual fact. Thus, Locke
is led to the conclusion that sensation gives a very imperfect form of
knowledge. And for this reason, observational sciences of all kinds can
do no more than systematize a body of knowledge, which possesses only a
high degree of probability. Strict scientific demonstration in this area
of research is beyond reach, and probability is the only available guide.
This teaching affects Locke's theistic "demonstration" because it is to
sensation that he traces any and all "ideas" arising in the mind—from the
simplest to the most complex. And the all-important notion of causation,
which embodies the principle on which the demonstration turns, is explained
in the fashion of a thorough-going sensationalism. Locke teaches that the
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idea of cau3e-and-effect is an inference from the repeated experience of
natural events.
In the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude
of things, we cannot but observe that several particular, both
qualities and substances, begin to existj and that they receive
this their existence from the due application and operation of
some other being. From this observation we get our ideas of
cause and effect.
But clearly the resultant idea of causation does not amount to the a priori
assertion that every existing thing given in experience must have a cause.
It is at best an imperfect induction from the multitude of particular
changes the senses record. And, Locke leaves the matter at this, without
reconciling his divergent account of causation. The two views represent
two strains in his thinking which his successors were to find radically
inconsistent, and they would seek to rectify the inconsistency by moving
either toward a more consistent rationalism or a more consistent empiricism.
British thought eventually was to take the latter alternative, shaped suc¬
cessively by the Irish Bishop, George Berkeley, and the Scottish Sceptic,
David Hume. But until Hume's Treatise of Human Nature appeared, Englishmen
lived in the blaze of a confident rationalism that molded literature, art,
society, and general mores, as well as theology and science. Even Newton's
success in formulating physical principles of wide application was made to
serve the spirit of the Age of Reason. The crowning proof of the merits
of a systematic empiricism thus seemed to yield the concept of a precisely
ordered nature of absolute regularity, whose successions, causes, and
effects might ultimately be determined with demonstrative certainty. In
that event, Locke's "probability" would be displaced by scientific demon-
stration, and thus the dissorient note that empirical principles introduced
1#
Op. cit., II, XXVI, 1 (Vol. I, p. 433.)
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into the structure of his philosophy would be eliminated—leaving only
the harmonious symphony of reason."1'
To what, then did Locke's philosophy and influence direct the
religious thinking of the eighteenth century? Clearly, to a thorough¬
going rationalistic theism which would construe all religion—Christianity
included—in accordance with thought-forms reached by philosophic "demon¬
stration." Though positive revelations afford the majority of mankind the
fullest and most accessible account of religious truth, it is the task of
philosophy to vindicate it as truth. Revelation is certified by reason,
which moves irresistably from self to God, and from self and God to moral
principles. By virtue of this achievement, it assumes responsibility for
directing the instruction of all who come to religious truth by the devious
and much less arduous approach of Christian faith. Such rationalism
assumes that the highest truth is within the reach of philosophy: intellect
unclouded by passion is able to reach it. Every line of possible knowledge
has its focus in the human mind, for science, ethics, the study of man and
society, as well as religion, have each their fixed orbit in the solar system
of reason. All is one law, one Providence, one rationality. Hence, Locke
prompted his eighteenth century followers to believe that man is by nature
the heir of all truth—though reason has yet to assert his claim to the
whole inheritance. But this it can do, approximating more and more to the
knowledge possessed by Divine Reason, with which it is by nature in full
accord. No impassible barrier separates a rational mind from the truth
which awaits man's solemn declaration of possession.—A marked tendency
toward dispassionate intellectualism and the assumption of a practically
For the growth of the conception of a "Newtonian world-machine" and an
undeviating "system of nature," cf. J. H. Randall, Jr., op. cit.. pp.
253-279.
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limitless scope and competence for human reason—which may be termed its
"gnostic tendency"-*-—were implicit in the representative theism of the
eighteenth century. These were deeply rooted characteristics of the writ¬
ings and controversies that raised the issue of "natural theology" for the
modern mind.
That English rationalistic theism was a primary source of
Scottish natural theology is a fact established by abundant evidence. No
work professing to vindicate the truth of religion by rational proof was
published in Scotland until Reid and the Common Sense School introduced a
form of theistic "demonstration" in reply to Hume. Though Scotsmen were
acquainted with deistic writings, they published few refutations, and none
by means of a counter-rationalism. Professor Archibald Campbell of St.
Andrews wrote an answer to Matthew Tindal's Christianity as Old as
Creation, tending to deny the reality, or at least the importance of
natural religion. The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland speedily
called upon him to answer for the assertion held contrary to the letter and
spirit of the Westminster Confession. Eventually the prosecution was
dropped, and with it any public consideration of the character and meaning
-*-• Prof. Campbell Fraser uses the term "gnosticism" to designate the
tendency in various eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophies toward
a "universal science in which man is in some sense identified with God"
and toward a "final omniscience." Cf. his Thomas Reid (Famous Scots
Series), esp. pp. 156-8, Though there are historical objections to
Fraser's usage, the term seems the best available. "Gnosticism" and
"gnostic tendency" will therefore be understood to designate "the as¬
sumption of a practically limitless scope and competence for human reason,"
especially in determining religious truth.
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of natural religion by the leaders of Scottish religious thought."'" Hence,
there was no Scottish counterpart to the literature of the English Deistic
Controversy. Scotsmen later acquiring a concern for the problems of
natural theology readily turned to the abundant theistic literature pro¬
duced by their southern neighbors. Reid worked out his "demonstration"
by criticizing Locke's. Text-books on theology, such as Principal George
Hill's Lectures in Divinity, referred students to the English theists to
supplement brief treatments of natural theology. And Thomas Chalmers,
whose Natural Theology was the first sustained treatment of the subject
by a Scot, acknowledged great indebtedness to various champions of rational¬
istic theism—particularly Bishop Butler. Something of the dispassionate
intellectualism of English rationalism was taken over directly into the
style and method of the Scottish theists, and, in Chalmers for example,
at times obscures the passionate moral imperative that is in fact the
cornerstone of his theistic doctrine.
There was no Deistic controversy in Scotland. Confessional control
of religious thought was effective, and was the chief factor in exclud¬
ing deistic opinions. Confessional censorship insured that no deistic
books were published in Scotland, that no deistic thinker occupied an
academic chair in any of the universities, and that no deistic opinions
enjoyed free public advertisement. Censorship, of course, could not
prevent the deistic influence from reaching an interested few. One of
unmistakably deistic opinions was William Dudgeon, the tenant of a large
farm near Coldstream, on the border of England. He published several
works of a deistic flavor in London. Charges of heresy were entered
against him in Scottish church courtsj they seem to have come to nothing.
(Cf. James McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy, pp. 111-113! Mc^osh mistakenly
gives him the Christian name "David.") Dudgeon died at an early age, and
his writings aroused little more than the shrewd suspicion that he was a
confirmed heretic. Apart from him, there seems to have been no other
notable example of full-fledged deism in Scotland, not withstanding J. M.
Robertson's judgment to the contrary. (A Short History of Freethought.
II, pp. 15&-9.) It is a calumny on (deism to make it responsible for all
defections from Scottish orthodoxy.
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English rationalism was the primary source, or resource, of
Scottish natural theology. But at least one of its major assumptions
was not acceptedj that is, that human reason—or "natural reason"—
may take possession of truth as it issues from the mind of God simply
by the orderly and dispassionate exercise of its powers. That reason
is an essential "faculty," or even the essential "faculty," of human
nature, the Common Sense theologians were not concerned to deny. But
on various grounds they entertained the possibility that this associ¬
ation of reason with human nature may involve a humbler estimate of its
scope and a more chastened confidence in its powers than rationalism
accorded it. While recognizing as inevitable the attempt of human reason
to acquire time knowledge outside the sphere of its acknowledged competence,
they resisted the impulse to make rational demonstration the criterion
of all truth—and notably, of religious truth. With Thomas Reid, they
endeavored to render secure a "mediating position," which would do
justice to Locke's "confident" philosophy, and at the same time incorpo¬
rate the undeniable insights of David Hume's antithetical doctrines,
Hume raised issues that Scottish theologians could not ignore, and
incorporated in his doctrine positions deeply rooted in the heritage of
Scottish Calvinism. No clear understanding of the "mediating position"
is possible, therefore, without fi^st bringing Hume into view, and
determining his place in the development of Scottish religious thought.
It is not likely that this can be done to the complete satisfaction of
all students of Hume. Something, nevertheless, must be said.
CHAPTER I
DAVID HUME AMD SCOTTISH CQNFESSIONALISM
If the David Hume who wrote the Treatise and Enquiries be
taken at his word, he somehow was able in his own mind to reconcile the
system of "modified scepticism" developed in these works with the relevant
articles of Scottish Confessional orthodoxy. The necessity of making a
reconciliation was, of course, imposed by Confessionalists, who in many
practical ways controlled the Scottish mind during the first half of the
eighteenth century. Hume averred on numerous occasions that his thought
was not hostile to religion, and this claim has caused difficulty for his
interpreters ever since. He worked out the substance of his philosophy
most fully and uncompromisingly in the Treatise, whose thesis is outlined
in the following passage;
'Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or
less, to human naturej and that however wide any of them may seem
to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another.
Even Mathematics, Natural philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in
some measure dependent on the science of MANj since they lie under
the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and
faculties.
The distinctive mark of Hume's account of human nature, which he boldly
makes the foundation of all the sciences, is his contention that "passion,"
rather than reason, determines human knowledge. As recent studies have
_ . ____________
"Introduction", p. xix. (All references are from the Selby-Bigge
edition, 1896.) Cf. also p. 275.
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siiovm,^ the sceptical side of his thought has its most characteristic
expression in the principle that "Reason is and ought to be the slave of
the passions"—the term "passions" being construed in a quite particular
sense. The resultant idea of human nature associated with this principle
is such that important limitations are placed upon the solidity and truth
of all scientific knowledge acquired by man—with the exception of demon¬
strations in the abstract sciences of arithmetic and algebra. A rational
account of natural religion—such as Locke's theistic demonstration aspired
to be—'must also be subject to these limitations. And in the detailed un¬
folding of this doctrine, Hume gives an account of religious knowledge which,
to his contemporaries and the vast majority of his interpreters since, has
seemed a direct thrust at the heart of religion. Against this is to be set
the fact that Hume denied any such intention, and stood resolutely by the
denial through the most important years of his philosophical development.
Though his later Natural History of Religion and Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion add an undertone of hostility toward the official exponents
of religious doctrine, no new principles are introduced which would alter
his earlier determination of relations between philosophy and religion.
In the light of evidence gleaned from the writings and general
biography of this rather enigmatic Scotsman, it may be argued that Hume
was completely in earnest when he repudiated any anti-religious
_
Cf. Basil Willey, The Eighteenth Century Background, chapter VII
and especially, Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume. The
interpretation of Hume offered here has been suggested by Professor
Kemp Smith's reappraisal of Hume's philosophy in the light of Francis
Hutcheson's moral philosophy. The attempt to reinterpret Hume's thought
in closer relation to his Scottish inheritance is paralleled by an attempt
to reinterpret Hume's personality in closer relation to his Scottish en¬
vironment. Cf. Ernest Campbell Mossner's The Forgotten Hume, Le bon
David (New York, 1945).
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intention,"*" and that this repudiation was not the result of failure to
see the logical implications of his own doctrine. It is clear, of course,
that Hume meant to overthrow the rationalistic account of religious knowledge:
he rejected in part its inteilectualism and its "gnostic" tendency in toto.
But hostility toward rationalistic theology must not be construed simply
to imply hostility toward theology in general, or toward what elements of
-*-• The evidence that Hume's convictions were not hostile to religion in
general and Scottish theology in particular is the following: (a) State¬
ments in the Treatise and Enquiries to this effect, or asserting that faith
is the proper ground of religious conviction; Treatise, p.250f; pp. 409-11;
p. 653, n, 1; etc. Enquiries (all references are from the Selby-Bigge
edition, 1902), p. 97; pp. 129-51; pp. 147-8. (b) Hume was on two occasions
a candidate for chairs of philosophy—in 1744 for that of "Ethics and
Pneumatic Philosophy" in Edinburgh; and in 1751 for that of "Logic" in
Glasgow. Subscription to the Westminster Confession was a requisite for
holding any University chair; on both occasions Hume declared his readiness
to accept it, and to teach nothing contrary to the Confession. His candi¬
dacies were met with animosity, distrust, and even contemptuousness by many
clergymen. They attached to him the epithets "infidel" and "atheist,"
which he repudiated. It is understandable, therefore, why Hume's attitude
toward the clergy was not dispassionate, and was to a large degree distorted.
For this, his friends among the Moderates called him to task. (Cf. E. C.
Mossner, The Forgotten Hume, pp. 107-111.) (c) In Hume's private corres¬
pondence, particularly that connected with his attempts to gain a university
chair, he insistently denied any hostility of his views to the doctrine of
the established church. (Cf. Burton, J. H., Life and Correspondence of
David Hume, Vol. I, pp. 16; 165-8; 178-9(7); 331-536. Vol. II, pp. 5-16.
(d) There are incidental events—his "pious" attitude toward the death of
his mother, his answer to the atheists of the French Salon, and a few others—
which a recent biographer, J. Y. T. Greig (David Hume; London, 1951) either
suspects or rejects outright, largely on the grounds that they are incon¬
sistent with Hume's thoroughly sceptical character. The evidence allowed
to stand in its own right would modify this interpretation of the man. (Cf.
pp. 171, 299. Also, cp. Burton, op. cit., I, pp. 293-4.) (e) Churchmen
who were Hume's intimates, publicly defended him against the charge that
his doctrine undermined faith. Cf. the pamphlet published anonymously by
Dr. Hugh Blair, when an attempt was made to arraign Hume before the General
Assembly of 1755. The pamphlet was entitled, "Observations upon a Pamphlet,
intitled 'An Analysis of the Moral and Religious Sentiments contained in
the Writings of Sopho (i.e., Lord Karnes) ana David Hume, Esq.'" (Cf. also,
on Hume's defense by Robert Wallace, Mossner, op. cit., pp. 118-123.) Dean
Stanley in History of the Church of Scotland (pp. 147—8) summarizes Hume's
positive relations with the Church and its clergy, and concludes against
the ordinary portrait of Hume the scoffer.
-28-
a coherent view of natural theology existed in the Confessional thinking
of his own country. Hume was by no means the first Scotsman to take issue
with cardinal tenets of the religious philosophy outlined by Locke. Ex¬
amination shows that important similarities link Hume's thoughtto that of
orthodox Scottish Confessionalists. These similarities suggest grounds
on which Hume could well have held his teaching consonent with the all-
important doctrinal standards of the Scottish Church. This is far from
saying that he was the great philosophical champion of Scottish orthodoxy
and defender of the faith. It is only to contend that Hume was justified
in seeing himself closer to his Scottish intellectual environment than his
interpreters have been willing to allow. And in this perspective, his chief
service to Scottish religious thought was to show that a "proved" insuf¬
ficiency of natural religion is not the soundest introduction to the sufficiency
of Christian faith, but may with greater probability create an insuperable
obstacle in the way of any theistic belief or religion.
If Hume be taken at his word, it is not only possible to vindicate
his intellectual and moral integrity—which has suffered considerably from
the usual interpretation of his mind, but it is also possible to explain
the new concern with the problems of natural theology that suddenly agitated
the Confessionalist mind of Scotland. While for the study of Scottish
demonstrative theism the latter interest is primary, it cannot be divorced
from the former. On the supposition that Hume was a more thorough sceptic
than he professed to be and that the real bent of his mind was anti-theistic,
anti-religious, and perhaps atheistic, his teaching is hostile toward all
belief in God or in a divine superintendence of human life. He reached a
purely negative conclusion, inimical to faith, and at the same time to
ordinary concepts of physical nature and human nature. In the terms of
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philosophical history, he reduced the empiricism of Locke and Berkeley to
its futile extremityj and having done that, he contented himself with point¬
ing out the inevitable conclusions, all adverse to the claims of faith and
"common sense." On this view, any concessions made to religion—to its
institutional status or its doctrinal standards—must be regarded as only
so many prudent sops to Cerberus, at best sarcastic and at worst cynical.
On the contrary supposition that Hume was in earnest when disowning any
anti-religious intentions or principles, the tributes and memorials of his
closest friends to the loftiness of his mind and character become credible.^
The relations of his philosophy of human nature to his Confessionalist
environment becomes a problem worthy of consideration, which on investigation
5
yields significant information. And the after-development of a Scottish
natural theology takes on the aspect of an intelligent response to a forth¬
right challenge. In short, less violence is done to the development of
"*"* This construction has been put upon Hume's thought, not only by his
"religious opponents," but also by others of decidedly agnostic temper.
Typical of the former sort was Prof. James Orr (David Hume; Edinburgh,
190S), who, while bringing no tailing accusation;' treats Hume's con¬
cessions to Scottish orthodoxy as malicious sarcasm. Typical of Hume's
more agnostic critics were J. S. Mill and Thomas Huxley. (Cf. N. K. Smith,
op. cit.. chap. XXI'?). Greig in his biography (op. cit.) also sees Hume's
allowances for religion and an ecclesiastical establishment as somewhat
hypocritical. (Cf. pp. 237-8.)
2Cf. Adam Smith's impressive tribute to Hume as man and philosopher in his
letter to William Strahan (quoted in N. K. Smith's edition of the Dialogues,
pp. 243-8).
The biographer Greig indicates that Hume's only attitude toward the
religious life of Scotland was one of contempt—a justified reaction to
its bigotry, persecution, cant, and superstition. He omits the possibility
that Hume's first inclination toward "modified scepticism" may have come
from the Scottish church rather than in reaction to it. As a biographer
of Hume, Greig evidently suffers from two serious disadvantages: he is an
Englishman and a rationalist, who tends to recreate Hume as both Englishman
and rationalist.
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thought in Hume himself and among his countrymen when it is seen against
its Scottish background than when it is forced into the alien mold of
Hume's ordinary interpreters. What, then, was the religious, or specif¬
ically the theological, inheritance of Scotland?
While in England the religious and political turmoil of the
seventeenth century ended in the age of enlightened reason and toleration—•
whose guiding light was John Locke, the Settlement in Scotland brought
complete victory to the "spiritual successors of the upholders of the
Covenants," whose faith and national policies were centered in the West¬
minster Confession. The differences between the two countries during the
following half-century—-in temperament, prevailing interest, and intel¬
lectual endeavor—-were as great as the gulf separating Locke's treatment
of religious truth in the Reasonableness of Christianity from the labored
theological precision of the Westminster Confession, which was Scottish by
adoption if not by composition. In the eyes of its proponents, the Con¬
fession had more in common with a party political platform than with the
systematic conclusions of a philosopher: it was a matter for moral and
social action allowing little room for rational speculation. They took it
to be the broad outline of God's policy for His universal Church, of which
they were constituted the executives. To stray from the meaning of its
one hundred and seventy-one propositions—except in the direction of greater
and greater nicety—-would be unthinkable."'" And from these they derived
warrant to suppress, and if possible eliminate, all doctrine contrary to the
— ________________________________________ ______
* An act of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1696 for¬
bade "all ministers and members of the Church to publish by speaking,
writing, printing, teaching, or preaching, any doctrine, tenet, or opinion,
contrary to or inconsistent with the Confession of Faith, or any article,
part, or proposition therein." Quoted in The Church of Scotland Past and
Present. (Ed. by R. S. Story), Vol. IV, pp. 227-8.
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Word of God, as expounded in Calvinist teachings. It was this statement
of faith, therefore, that provided the standard by which Scotsmen measured
the questions raised in the writings of Locke and his disciples.
Examination of the Confession shows a somewhat indefinite view
of the relation between revelation and natural reason, though the tendency
is clearly to teach that Scriptural revelation alone gives a saving know¬
ledge of God and His will, and that "natural light," which is in reason and
conscience, is by contrast wholly inadequate to such knowledge, ill that is
said about the possibility of bringing natural light to bear on the elements
of religion is summed up in the first article of the first chapter, and, in
fact, in the first sentence.
Although the light of nature, and the works of creation and
providence do so far manifest the goodness, wisdom, and power
of God, as to leave man inexcusable, yet they are not sufficient
to give that knowledge of God, and of his will, which is necessary
unto salvation; therefore it pleased the Lord at sundry times,
and in divers manners, to reveal himself, and to declare that his
will unto his church; and afterwards, for the better preserving
and propagating of the truth, and for the more sure establishment
and comfort of the Church ..., to commit the same wholly unto ^
writing; which maketh the holy Scripture to be most necessary....
All that the Confession has to say about natural religion is based, con¬
sequently, upon the pronouncements of Scripture. Its reality among those
' k
who have not received the Hebrew-Christian revelation, and also its
insufficiency. are revealed truths. The Confession nowhere ventures onto
the ground of natural theology, to discover in the name and light of
reason, what knowledge of God is possible apart from supernatural reve¬
lation. It does not attempt to define the insufficiency of natural light
from the side of reason, but sees it in the perspective of the Fall—a
Cf. Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, Vol. Ill, p. 600. The
content of a natural knowledge of God, as mentioned in Scripture—par¬
ticularly in the Psalms and Epistles of St. Paul—is elaborated in chapter
XXI, article 1 (p. 646). Other references; IV, 2; VII, 1; X, 4; XXI, 7.
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revealed doctrinej mankind in the persons of Adam and Eve sinned, and
thereby fell from their "original righteousness and communion with God,"
becoming "wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body,"
Man in his whole being is shown to be alienated from God, and through no
effort of his own—apart from the condescension of God—can he gain an
adequate and saving knowledge of Him.
In principle, the Confession's teaching is plainly antagonistic
to any optimistic rationalism that assumes the sufficiency of natural
reason to decide what is essential in Christianity and necessary for
salvation. But dogmatic statements of theology are not a rebuttal to
philosophical argument, such as Locke's. And there were those in Scotland
during the ascendency of English rationalism who proposed to vindicate
Scottish faith and doctrine in the face of a movement so imposing and
self-confident. To this end, a few Confessionalists within the citadel
of Scottish orthodoxy developed a somewhat negative apologetic. They
elaborated upon the notion of the "insufficiency of natural light," citing
historical and psychological evidence to show that the state of religious
knowledge apart from Christian revelation is anything but the edifying
cultivation of a pure and lofty theism. They defined their views in relation
to Locke's doctrine, thereby setting their own doctrines in sharp relief.
Of those who took this significant step away from the pure
Bibliology of the Confession, Thomas Halyburton is perhaps the most im¬
portant. He was a professor of Theology at St. Andrews briefly from 1710
to 1712. Uilike his successor, Archibald Campbell, he expressed in his
writings views with which the Church of Scotland as a whole could concur.
In many respects, he was the Scottish counterpart of Bishop Butler—-his
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Natural Religion Insufficient corresponding to the Analogy of Religion,
not only in its intention to vindicate revealed religion against deistic
teaching, but equally in the moral intensity and speculative daring of
its argument. This work, and his Essay Concerning the Mature of Faith
which "corrects" Locke's view of revelation, provide an adequate basis
for comparing English and Scottish religious thought before the time of
David Hume.1
The considerable differences separating Halyburton from Locke
appear first of all in what Halyburton conceives to be the primary
question of ns.tural theology, and in his method of seeking a solution to
the question. Locke had, in effect, assumed the complete adequacy of
human reason to reach a definite and normative knowledge of God: his task
is therefore the construction of valid arguments, to which all rational
minds must give assent. For Halyburton, Locke's demonstrations never quite
reach the real crux of natural theology. He admits fully that religion is,
in essence, a matter of rational knowledge:
Until mid-century, the question of natural theology and religion on
which contemporary English religious thought turned had little place in
the writing of Scottish theologians and philosophers. It had none in the
most popular theological work of the era, Thomas Boston's Fourfold State:
the idea that human understanding in its fallen state is totally corrupt
and incapable of a true knowledge of God is developed in an entirely hom-
iletical vein. The question was raised in the works of Halyburton; of
Archibald Campbell, whose Qratio de vanitate luminis naturae appeared in
1733, and The necessity of Revelation in 1739; and of Duncan Forbes of
Culloden, a Lord president of the Court of Session, who in 1735 published,
Some Thoughts Concerning Religion, Natural and Revealed. Among Scottish
academic philosophers, Gershom Carmichael and Francis Hutcheson both wrote
on natural theology. Carmichael's Synopsis theologiae naturalis (1729)
owed more to Aristotle and the later Scholastics than to original thought.
Hutcheson's aesthetic and moral doctrines presuppose certain theistic
assumptions. Nevertheless, only in his Metapbysicae synopsis (1742) does
he consider theistic proofs, and this book was later disowned as hastily
written and foolishly printed. —-Halyburton represents the extreme Con-
fessionalism against which the Moderate Hutcheson was among the first to
protest. Moderatism gained ascendency, however, only at mid-century.
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Nothing is more plain than this, that religion is founded
upon knowledge of the Deity: and that our regard for him
will be answerable to the knowledge we have of him. That
religion therefore which is defective here, is lame with a
witness: and if the light of nature cannot afford such
notices of the Deity, as are sufficient or necessary to beget
and maintain religion amongst men, then it can never with any.
rational man be allowed sufficient to direct men in religion.1
Halyburton can hardly be charged with being an irrational obscurantist, or
"enthusiast" in the worst eighteenth century sense of the term. He admits,
further, that the reality of a natural light common to all men gives sub¬
stance to philosophical speculations concerning the Deity: to deny this—
as did Professor Archibald Campbell—would run counter to the Confession's
g
teachings. But granting that there is some true knowledge of God and His
will in rational demonstrations such as Locke's, Halyburton questions the
"gnostic" assumption, that the knowledge thus reached is adequate to the
ultimate end of religion, which is the worthy service of God as He is in
truth.
Religion ... in general, may be justly said to import that
veneration, respect, or regard, which is due from the rational
creature in his whole course or life, to the supreme super¬
eminently excellent Being,, his creator, preserver, lord or
governor, and benefactor.6
No doubt Halyburton is himself assuming a teleology which has no place in
Locke's system. Be this as it may, he holds that rational beings must
order their actions in a manner appropriate to the end toward which they
are directed. The primary question for natural theology, therefore, is
not whether there is a knowledge of God according to the light of nature,
but—when such knowledge is assumed—whether it can be sufficient to
**•* The Works of the Rev. Thomas Halyburton, p. £94.
Ibid., pp. 304-5. Also, cf. in the "Essay," p. 550.
3* Ibid.. p. £94. Halyburton recognizes lesser ends—the stability of
society, the preservation of moral order, etc.—to which natural religion
may be adequate. But the service of God is the ultimate and critical end,
to which religion is either sufficient or insufficient.
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direct men to the worship and service that are due a Being of infinite
perfections. Whatever the professed foundation of religious knowledge,
its adequacy must be measured by its ability to convey "such a large,
comprehensive, certain, plain, and abiding, discovery, as may have suf¬
ficient force to influence (man) to a compliance with his duty (to God)
in all instances, And so, finally, the problem of natural theology comes
to this:
We are now come to that which seems to be the principal hinge
whereon the whole controversy about the sufficiency of natural
religion turnsj in so far at least, as it is to be determined
by this argument. Now this is, whether the light of nature can
indeed afford such discoveries of God, as are evinced necessary
for the support of religion? ... Now to attempt the decision of
this question successfully, it is necessary that we state it
right. It is not then the question, whether in nature there is
sufficient objective light, as the schools barbarously speak,
that is, whether in the works of creation and providence, which
lie open to our view, or are the objects of our contemplation,
there are such prints of God, which if they were all fully
understood by us, are sufficient to this purpose? For the
question is not concerning the works of God without us. but
concerning us. The plain question is this, "Whether man can
from those works of God alone, without help of revelation, obtain
such a knowledge of God as is sufficient to the purpose mentioned?"2
The fundamental question of natural theology concerns man himself, his
natural powers, and his ability to know God without the instruction of
the Christian revelation.
This formulation of the question is obviously worked out in the
shadow of the Confession's teaching that "man is wholly defiled in all
the faculties and parts of soul and body," because of sin. But this does
not preclude its being treated as a question for philosophy—-that is,
discussed without dogmatic requirements, on a ground that such a one as
Locke might recognize as consonent with his own philosophical principles.
V
* Ibid., p. 297. Halyburton has carefully chosen and defined each of
the adjectives: cf. pp. 296-7.
2
Ibid*, p« 297* The underlining has been added to the text.
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And Halyburton finds this common ground in the application of empirical
principles to the study of human nature and religion. Neither dogmatic
nor speculative considerations are to affect the conclusion, which must
be reached by an impartial study of man in history. "We must upon the
whole give over the business, or inquire into the extent of our ability
1
by experiencej and judge what man can do by what he has done." What
Halyburton professes to do, and what he actually accomplishes, are two
different matters. But he proposes a study that is independent of all
\
sectarian religious presuppositions—Christian presuppositions included—
as to a natural knowledge of God. To achieve this end of an objectivity
as complete as possible, Halyburton stipulates certain general rules. To
exclude Christian bias, the study must be confined to the religious
practices and teachings of those in whom there is no suspicion of Christian
influence. Only the best and most critical representatives of such "pagan"
religions should be considered—to avoid the imputation of viewing them
only in their worst light. The teachings of pagan writers should be
studied in their original context, and each religious opinion interpreted
against the background of belief from which it is taken. On evidence
gleaned in this way, Halyburton chooses to decide the question of natural
theologyj and within limits, he achieves a degree of objectivity. The
conclusion he reaches is aptly expressed in the title of his volume
against the deists s Natural Religion Insufficient and Revealed Necessary
to Man's Happiness in His Present State.
Halyburton»s stipulated rules are, of course, entirely too
meager to ensure anything like scientific objectivity. And clearly, he
Halyburton lists four conceivable methods of approaching the question
concerning the natural religion of man: the first is dogmaticj the second
and third, speculativej the last, empirical. He details his reasonsfor
rejecting the first three. Ibid.» pp. 297-8.
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has no vital sense of history, as it was to be developed some fifty
years later by Hume, Robertson, and others in Scotland and elsewhere.
Nevertheless, Ralyburton's argument is noteworthy in three respects:
(i) it sees natural theology as primarily a question about human nature;
(ii) it eschews rationalist demonstration as inconclusive, turning for
an answer to the examination of historical and factual beliefs; and (iii)
Halyburton's own answer is largely negative in character, finding no
evidence of a rational creed common to all religions—which Christianity
might graciously republish. These three aspects of Halyburton's argument
were evidently genuine facets of the general theological outlook in Scot¬
land, and in one way or another affected the environment in which such a
one as David Hume began his intellectual development. As a conclusive
reply to the deists in particular, Halyburton's views received the highest
endorsement among ministers of the Church of Scotland."'' It may be assumed
that they reached the church as a whole through its clergy.
Halyburton's negative conclusions as to the sufficiency of
natural light and religion are of first importance, because they indicate
the wide area of human experience in which he finds no "large, comprehen¬
sive, certain, plain, and abiding, discovery" of the truth, which can
have some practical effect on human life. He lists eight grounds on which
the insufficiency of natural religion may be shown: (i) "From the insuf-
2
ficiency of its discovery of the Deity;" (ii) "From its defectiveness
-*-• Cf. the "Epistle of Recommendation" attached to the posthumous edition
of the Natural Religion Insufficient, bearing the names of William Carstares,
James Hadow, William Hamilton, William Wisheart, Thomas Black, James
Grierson, and John Fleming. Ibid., p. 254. They represent the effective
leadership of the Scottish Church, and probably to a large extent its
intellectual leadership.
This and the following are the titles of Chapters IV through XI of
Natural Religion Insufficient.
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in directing as to the worship of God;" (iii) "From its defectiveness in
discovering wherein man's happiness lies;" (iv) "From not affording a
sufficient rule of duty;" (v) "From its defects as to sufficient motives
for enforcing obedience;" (vi) "From its insufficiency in discovering the
origin of sin;" (vii) "From its inability to discover the means of obtain¬
ing pardon of sin, or to show that it is attainable;" and finally (viii)
from its "insufficiency ... to eradicate our inclinations to sin, or subdue
its power." Halyburton's method is to exhibit the diverse, and frequently
contradictory beliefs entertained by the "pagans," in contrast to the high
doctrines of Christian faith. He finds no evidence of a clearly defined
core of belief common to all. More important, he finds that what glimpses
of high religion were caught by the noblest of the pagan philosophers were
without power to move the great masses of men and women, or even the
philosophers themselves, to forsake old, brutal, and immoral ways of life
and faith. The ultimate task of religion, for Halyburton, is not to give
a rational explanation of the world, but to move men to obey even their
own highest conceptions of God. The patent and "universal" failure in
obedience is the evidence of sin; and sin is for Halyburton, and Con-
fessionalists generally, the fact upon which the rationalist account of
religion is broken.
Ostensibly, Halyburton establishes his case only from the ob¬
jective survey of man in histoiy, though obviously his thoughts are at
every point formed by his native environment of Confessional thinking. As
a matter of strict logic, his method does not refute Locke's philosophical
analysis, though it does provide a counter-balance to the optimistic
argument ex consensu gentium developed by Lord Herbert of Cherbury, to
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whom eighteenth century rationalists were indebted for their five-point
creed of natural religion. A few of Halyburton's arguments are to the
point, however, and give some argumentative force to his thorough-going
negative conclusions.
Rationalists, and more especially the deists, had explained the
diversities and vagaries of historical religions by attributing them
either to popular ignorance or malicious priestcraft. Halyburton readily
agrees that this was the case—among the pagans, at least."1" But, while
these reasons give a rationally acceptable account of error in religious
belief, practically, they designate grave obstacles in the way of multi¬
tudes' ever reaching a sufficient and saving knowledge of God. The
formulation of an abstract creed does not help the many—the ordinary
souls with little logical ability—to discover the truth for themselves,
or to withstand the proponents of falsehood.
But even more to the point, Halyburton questions the ability of
man to form a notion of God and His attributes, simply by "raising to
infinity" those which a man finds in himself. Take the attribute of
Divine goodness. God's moral Providence does not correspond to human
notions of what is in keeping with goodness and righteousness.
We see that an almost infinite number of things fall out in the
government of the world, which we know not how to reconcile to
divine goodnessj and as many are left undone, which we would be
apt to think infinite goodness would make necessary to be done.
This consideration, if well weighed, would make men very sparing
in determining any thing necessary to be done, in respect of
divine goodness ....
Moreover, Halyburton allows himself to be more "materialistic"
than the English rationalists: he asserts an inability of the human mind
1* Ibid., pp. 457-8.
2
Ibid., p. 465. Hume, of course, was to make a great deal of the avowed
discrepancies between the moral dictates of the human conscience and the
unfathomable ways of Providence.
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to conceive of existence under conditions radically different from those
of its present incarnate existence. The mind can form no notions of man's
own "eternal felicity" as a disencarnate spiritual being—to say nothing
of God's. The fear of death, Halyburton maintains, is fundamentally a
fear of the dissolution of the body. Only the knowledge of the resurrection
of the body can meet this fear. But there is no such knowledge according
to the state of nature, in which man can only experience incarnate felicity,
and the stark reality of death.^ On this evidence alone, he must rely when
no special revelation is given. The fear of death, and the inability of
man to know his own destiny—and therefore his own nature, is for Halyburton
another evidence of the sin that separates man from the Creator and Governor
of his life.
It is the radical nature of sin, ultimately, that sets the
Confessionalist view against the rationalist. In defining sin, Halyburton
sketches with bold strokes his view of life apart from the saving reve¬
lation given to Christian faith.
Sin is a transgression of a law, the highest law, the law of the
supreme and righteous Governor of the world.... Sin contradicts
the great design of man's being; ... for he pleases not God, but
himselfj and this is, what in him lies to frustrate God of the
design he had in his work, and debase the being and powers given
him for the honour of God, by employing them against him.... Sin
misrepresents God.... Sin accuses God of want of wisdom and good¬
ness in appointing laws which were not for his creature's good, and
which he could not obey without detriment.... Finally, to crown
all, sin dethrones God, and sets the creature in his room.
In all this, Halyburton sees the fact of a cosmic rift between man and
God, which affects his entire nature, inflicting a distorting nyopia upon
his vision of God, spending his spirit's energies in attaining false ends,
disqualifying him from communion with God. This, obviously, is a developed
1. - Ibid., p. 466. A lso, pp. 510-20. This is only an incidental argument;
but if developed into a fixed principle, it would be entirely sceptical.
2. Ibid., p. 545-6.
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theological view. Halyburton proceeds, however, as though he could by
the survey of historical evidence establish the case. In this he may
seem not entirely consistent, for his account of sin leaves little ground
for believing that a sinful mind could ever be convinced of truth if it did
not wish to believe. It must be borne in mind, however, that Halyburton
does not disbelieve in the ability of "natural light" to reach the unre-
generate mind, and make possible some glimpse of the truth. The "insuffic¬
iency" of that light does not preclude its being made the basis of an appeal
to the true Light of the World, revealed to Christian faith.
If Halyburton«s account of natural religion has little in common
with that either assumed or elaborately demonstrated by rationalists—■
such as Locke, his view of faith and revealed religion also has little in
common with theirs. This is made quite clear in the Essay Concerning the
Nature of Faith. The performance of miracles and the fulfillment of
prophecies are, according to Locke, the.sure marks of revelation from Godj
and where these are present, faith is bound to give its assent. In the
"full and clear Evidence and Demonstration of miracles," the Messiah, His
forerunners, and His followers declared God's truth. Halyburton repudiates
this view.
"The faith of the scriptures' divine authority is not founded on
this, that they by whom they were written, did, by miracles, prove
they were sent of God." ... It will sufficiently confirm it to
observe, (I) That many are, and were in duty obliged to yield this
assent to, and believe the scriptures, who saw not these miracles.
(II) We are no other way sure of these miracles being wrought,
than by the testimony of the word. (Ill) This way is not counte¬
nanced by the word: for it no where teaches us to expect miracles
as the ground of our assent.^
On the supposition that miracles had first to be performed and authenti¬
cated before any deliverance of the apostles could be accepted as reve¬
lation, Halyburton points out that
1* Ibid., pp. 530-1,
-42-
They who heard them, and saw miracles, could not be obliged
to assent unto their doctrine, until by reasoning they would
have time to satisfy themselves, how far natural causes might
go towards the production of such effects, and how far these
things, admitting them to be supernatumatural, could go toward
the proof of this, that what they delivered was from God.
Human sin being what it is, Halyburton holds that a firmer foundation
must be provided for belief, And this he finds in the nature of faith,
and in the developed Confessional doctrine of the testimonium Spiritus
Sancti Internum. Whatever force Hume's observations on miracles would
later have upon the theological development of England, they did not alter
the course of Scottish theology, whose view of revelation had an entirely
different basis.
Halyburton's doctrine of faith is that of the Confession, but
he places it in juxtaposition with Locke's philosophical principles. Ac¬
cording to Locke, the human mind has three channels to a knowledge of
existence. "Besides these, he admits no other objective light or evidence
that may be a just ground of assentj and adds, 'That to talk of any other,
is to put ourselves in the dark} yea in the power of the prince of darkness,
and turn Enthusiasts,"' While Halyburton vigorously denies the odious
charge of "enthusiasm," he asserts that there is yet a fourth channel to
a knowledge of existence, "which depends upon the testimony of credible
witnesses" and is called faith. And when knowledge of this sort rests
upon the testimony of God Himself, it is called divine faith. The "ob¬
jective" Word of God and the "subjective" response of man stand then in
a reciprocal relation which is supernatural, miraculous, wholly dependent
on God's agency, and lies beyond intuition, demonstration, or sensation.
Ibid.. p. 513. Hume was to elaborate the logic of this view.
Ibid., p. 517.
3* Ibid., p. 505.
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When it is inquired, wherefore do ye believe, receive, assent
to, and rest in the Scriptures as indeed the word of God, and
not of man? I answer, I do believe them, because they carry
in ifcheia, to ny faith, an evidence of God, or do evidence them¬
selves by their own light and power to ny faith duly exercised
about them, that they are the word of God, and not of man.
Faith, accordingly, is a form of knowledge. It is knowledge dependent
upon personal relationship which exists where there is evident veracity
on the one side, and trust in that veracity on the other. Where the
relation is between God and man, the knowledge is imparted by One
who lives beyond the sphere of sin and disorder; it comes to men in league
with the gracious power of the Spirit, enabling assent and transforming
human nature* For Halyburton, faith itself is the primary and inward
miracle that makes outward miraculous proof irrelevant and superfluous.
It enters into the conscience; .. challenges, convinces,
threatens, weakens, sets it a roaring, and the creation
cannot quiet it again.,.. It enters into the mind, opens
its eyes, sets before it wonders unknown, and undis-
cerned in counsel and knowledge concerning God, ourselves,
our sin, our duty, our danger, and our relief, the works,
the ways, the counsels and purpose of God. It speaks to
the will, converts it, and powerfully disengages it from
what it was most engaged to. ... It enters the affections,
makes„them rise from the ground, ... (and) point heaven¬
ward*
Space will not allow further consideration of Halyburton, of
his personal influence upon the development of Scottish Confessionalist
thought, or of a possible direct influence of Confessionalism upon David
Hume. Unfortunately, much must be left for later investigation. What
is evident, however, is the vast gulf that separates Scottish Confessional¬
ism from the account of religion given by the rationalists. The environ¬
ment in which David Hume first thought and moved was charged with
hostility to the assumptions on which Locke's form of demonstrative theism
1* Ibid., p. 552.
2' Ibid** p. 535.
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was founded. Moreover, it is of the first importance that this hostility
was not solely a matter of dogmatic pronouncement—although the statement
of the Confession on the matter of natural light was available to all.
Halyburton, and those who endorsed his argument, were evidently of the
opinion that the insufficiency of natural light could be argued from
historical evidence—-from the observation of what mankind has actually
been able to know of God apart from the Christian revelation. In some
particulars, he anticipated vaguely arguments that Bane was later to
employ against natural religion with devastating effect. It does not
seem to lie beyond the realm of credibility, therefore, that Hume should
think his philosophy reconcilable with the Confessional account of what
man may know of himself and God apart from Christian revelation. If
Scottish orthodoxy could throw so dark a cloud, of doubt upon human nature,
it should not shrink from a philosophy that reaches like conclusions,
though in a more precise form. If Scottish orthodoxy could make faith
the sole and sufficient foundation of a positive religious conviction,
it should not brand his statements to the same effect as cynical. It
should not, but it did—perhaps quite inconsistently.
In order to give this conjectural rendering of Hume's thoughts
and motives greater clarity and force, it is necessary to turn now to a
closer study of the system of "modified scepticism." In passing from
Halyburton, however, there is a remark in the Colloquia Peripatetica of
the revered "Rabbi" Duncan which indicates something of Halyburton's
mind. He writes,
There are three biographies of which I never tire;— Augustine's,
Bunyan's, and Halyburton's. The first is by far the deepest, the
second the richest and most genial, and with Halyburton I feel
great intellectual congruity. He^was naturally a sceptic, but




The judgment is borne out in Halyburton's theological writings. The
intellectual affinity between these two devout Scotsmen may perhaps in¬
dicate a cast of mind or bent of environment which, translated into the
form of rational philosophy, is scepticism. It seems not to have been
an uncommon thing in Scotland, even during the ascendency of Confessional
orthodoxy.
-SBHHBHf-
When David Hume is contrasted with Thomas -Halyburton, there is
obvious truth in professor Kemp Smith's remark that Hume's inborn temper¬
ament "cut him off from what, in Calvinist teaching, was the sole gateway
through which religion could be approached—the experience of that re¬
ligious type of inner division and self-conflict which was entitled the
consciousness of sin." of self-conflict, Hume knew nothing—at least,
after his early years. Sin was never his problem, either as a private
individual or as a philosopher. If religious conviction may be gauged
by a manifest concern about sin, Hume was evidently an irreligious man.
This, no doubt, was the logic of his hostile contemporaries.
And yet it does not follow that Hume's mind, his appraisal of
religious truth, or the philosophy of human nature expressing the prin¬
ciples on which his thinking depended, were influenced only by reaction
to his Confessionalist environment. Whatever else Hume might have denied
to Halyburton, obviously he did possess a "human nature," and a view of
human nature that was given practical expression in the life of Calvinist
Scotland. This view included a recognizable disposition of mind, which
Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (London, 1947), p. 1.
This edition of the Dialogues was first published in 1955, before pro¬
fessor Smith completed his critical study of Hume's philosophy. It is
to be regretted that he did not, in the second edition, revise his esti¬
mate of Hume's views on religion in the light of his reinterpretation
of Hume's philosophy.
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was in striking contrast to the rationalist temper of John Locke. It
was a mind accustomed to inner division, and in religious matters to the
contrast between the insufficiency of man's highest wisdom and the un¬
searchable wisdom of God. Hence, it was a mind not disposed to allow
the highest concerns and ends of life to be determined by close logical
argument or demonstration. Whatever values such demonstration might be
thought to exhibit, they were not paramount. The last word belonged
to faith. Hume's philosophy professed to be an objective inquiry into
the principles that actuate and explain human nature; his method was to
be descriptive and "experimental." "As the science of man is the only
solid foundation for the other sciences," he wrote in the introduction
to the Treatise. « so the only solid foundation we can give this science
itself must be laid on experience and observation."1 This in the first
instance would mean the experience and observation of his own countrymen,
their nature, and their mind. He was aware, of course, of their many
idiosyncrasies. He had no sympathy for "enthusiasm" and "fanaticism" in
Scottish religion. But was he not a Scotsman after ail? Could he, with
noble philosophic resolve, eliminate all "ScoticismS" and "Confessionalisms"
from his view of human nature? And did he? Or might his doctrines have
some affinities with the thinking of Calvinist Scotland? There is the
significant fact that throughout the period of his greatest philosophic
productivity culminating in the publication of the two Enquiries, Hume
himself believed his philosophy was reconcilable with the canons of
Scottish orthodoxy.
In view of the central importance Hume attributed to his "science




"system of the sciences" on a "foundation almost entirely new, arid the
only one upon which they can stand with any security.""1" For in the "system
of the sciences," Hume expressly included natural religion.
The interpretation of Hume is a perennial strain upon academic
philosophy, although the usual treatment is to place him at the end of a blind
alley leading from Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley. Professor Kemp Smith,
however, in his volume on The Philosophy of David Hume, has taken a differ¬
ent tack. He finds the clue to Hume's doctrine in the moral philosophy of
Francis Hutcheson, and maintains that Hume arrived at his most distinctive
views "through the gateway of morals" rather than from the reduction of
Locke's empirical principles. He regarded what are usually termed "theo¬
retical judgments" in the same light as Hutcheson had regarded "moral
judgments."
What is central in his teaching is not Locke's or Berkeley's
'ideal' theory and the negative consequences, important as these
are for Hume, which follow from it, but the doctrine that the de¬
termining influence in human, as in other forms of animal life,
is feeling, not reason or understanding, i. e,, not evidence
whether a priori or empirical, and therefore also not ideas—
at least not 'ideas' as hitherto understood. 'Passion' is Hume's
most general title for the instincts, propensities, feelings,
emotions and sentiments, as well as for the passions ordinarily
so called; and belief, he teaches, is a passion. Accordingly the
maxim which is central in his ethics—'Reason is and ought to be
the slave of the passions*—is no less central in his theory of
knowledge, being there the maxim; 'Reason is and ought to be
subordinate to our natural beliefs I.
It is not possible here to resketch Professor Smith's philosophic portrait
of Hume in detail, or indicate the nature of his indebtedness to Hutcheson—
who, as it happened, was a Scottish clergyman of the Moderate party. This
has been done in great detail by Professor Smith, and in a fair and con¬
vincing way. The acceptance of his conclusion carries with it an important
"*"* Ibid., p. xx.
N« K. Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London, 1941), p.- 11.
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modification of the long-established view; Hume's philosophy in certain
fundamental respects dissociated itself from the Locke-Berkeley tra¬
dition, and was not simply its futile conclusion. Beside the sceptical
reduction of Locke's notions of "substance," "causation," and the like,
there is a positive doctrine. It indicates that theoretical as well as
moral and aesthetic judgments are determined by an "absolute and uncon-
troulable necessity" of Nature, which overshadows reason and is inpenetrable
to it. Though reason can produce no evidence or demonstration to show why
the mind must believe in personal identity, an independent objective
reality, or a necessary relation of cause and effect, Nature places such
questions beyond the reach of crippling doubt."'' Ana in consequence,
"Reason is and ought to be subordinate to our natural beliefs."
If this is the case, then clearly reason cannot occupy the same
central place in Hume's view of human nature that it is assumed to have in
Locke's. Somehow, it is set over against another and more comprehensive
faculty, whose "most general title"—as Professor Kemp Smith indicates—■
is"passion." And when Hume's works are canvassed to discover in what
relation reason stands to "passion" in various instances, their disparity
becomes quite evident. They appear to be two distinct functions, whose
ideal relations may not be determined with precision, though to all
practical ends, passion is ascendent. There would seem to be at the
center of Hume's thinking a division which might appropriately be called
a double-mindedness. The three-fold ambiguity of this term has some merit,
for in its reference to the content of Hume's philosophy, it suggests the
fundamental bi-polarity that distinguishes his thought from the "gnosticism"
of Locke's; in its reference to Hume the philosopher, it suggests the
"Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin'd
us to judge as well as to breathe and feel." Treatise I, IV, I (p« 183).
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uneasy balance between the man given to devastating theoretical analysis
and the man bent upon the improvement of general tastes and sentiments;
and in its reference to the intellectual and moral integrity of the philos¬
opher it recalls the charge of duplicity, which—rightly or wrongly, has
been made against him from various quarters. The affinity of all three
references further suggests that three distinguishable problems in the
interpretation of Hume are actually one, and a correct understanding of
his mind will be decisive in each case. Above all, it will shed a clearer
light upon Hume's convictions as to religion. What, then, is the nature
of this "double-mindedness" which professor Kemp Smith's reinterpretation
suggests? What are the functions of reason and passion? And how are they
related to one another?
(a) As for reason. Professor Kemp Smith has emphasized a distinction
that Hume himself made as to the uses of the term—though he is not always
careful to indicate which of the two meanings apply. Reason for Hume is
synonomous with reasoning, and "All reasonings may be divided into two
kinds, namely, demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact
and existence.""'" The first sense of the term—reasoning as analytic and
formally demonstrative—is for Hume reason strictly so called. Reasonings
~
>
concerning "matters of fact and existence," on the other hand, are distinctj
and it will be found that Hume treats them as being within the sphere of
passion. To distinguish the second kind of reasoning from the first, he
frequently designates the latter as "moral reasoning"—creating further
difficulty for his interpreters by using "moral" in this extraordinary sense.
But "reason" is usually "demonstrative reason."
1* Enquiry. IV, II (p.55tef.N.K.Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume
(London, 1941), pp. 99-102.
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Hume follows Locke in holding "that demonstrative reason is
concerned with the relation of ideas within the perceiving mind, and
that mathematics provides the perfect example of strict demonstrative
knowledge. But in making this doctrine more precise than Locke had
left it, Hume provides himself with a sharp instrument that will be used
to whittle British empiricism to an insignificant remainder. First, he
revises the distinction between sensation and reflection, putting in its
stead the view that all knowledge is to be traced to perceptions. Per¬
ceptions are of two sorts: they are either immediate impressions or ideas—
the latter differing from the former only in that they have less force and
vivacity. Hume's account, clearly, is more precisely sensationalist than
Locke's. But further, while Hume agrees that knowledge consists in de¬
termining the relations of ideas, he holds that demonstrative knowledge is
necessarily limited to the reasonings of mathematics. Here only, in relating
ideas of quantity and number, reason is able to reach a conclusion which is
precise, clear, and cannot be challenged without involving thought in self-
contradiction. This finality of mathematical demonstration, Hume attributes
to the nature of the philosophic relation of "proportion in quantity or
number," in accordance with which exact sciences may be constructed. Arith¬
metic, algebra, and perhaps geometry, are these sciences
... in which we can carry on a chain of reasoning to any degree
of intricacy, and yet preserve a perfect exactness and certainty.
We are possest of a precis© standard, by which we can judge of
the equality and proportion of numbers$ and according as they
correspond or not to that standarcjl, we determine their relations,
without any possibility of error.
In mathematical reasoning, Hume finds the standard of perfect demonstration,
-1-* Treatise, I, III, I (p. 71). Hume recognizes that the relations of
resemblance, contrariety, and degrees in quality also allow of precise
determination. But this is by immediate intuition. Demonstration is
for Hume, as for Locke, a chain of intuitions.
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which is not subject to contradiction, and to which rational assent must
be given—when there is little occasion to doubt that the mi nri reaching
it has not allowed error to slip in! Even mathematics can not escape the
limitations imposed by human natureI
The marks of a perfect demonstration, exhibited by mathematical
reasonings, are that it employs clear and precise ideas, involves nothing
but the relation of those ideas, and reaches an exact conclusion which is
decisive, and allows no contrary difficulty. This last is an essential
and critical consideration.
Nothing can be more absurd, than this custom of calling a
difficulty what pretends to be a demonstration, and endeavour¬
ing by that means to elude its force and evidence.... A
demonstration, if just, admits of no opposite difficulty$ and
if not just, 'tis a mere sophism, and consequently can never be
a difficulty. 'Tis either irresistable, or has no manner of
force.
What Hume implies here is that, where reasoning reaches a conclusion that
can be challenged without absurdity, there is no demonstration—and in the
strict sense no "knowledge." Any professed demonstration may be tested by
inquiring whether any possible alternative is conceivable without involving
the mind in manifest contradiction; if there is even one, the conclusion
is demoted to a probability, whose degree remains to be fixed according
to certain practical rules. At this point, Hume is found to part company
with Locke and the rationalists, who had sought to demonstrate the foundation
principles of natural theology and morals. For Hume places the existence
and attributes of God, as well as the nature of moral principles under the
category of "matters of fact and existence." And for every conclusion as
to such matters, there is always a crucial alternative that does not involve
the mind in contradictions; that is, the supposition of its non-existence.
x* Ibid.. I. II. II (p. 51).
^* Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Part IX, p. 188 ff. (All
quotations are from Professor Kemp Smith's edition of the Dialogues.)
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Hume holds that all reasonings as to matters of fact or existence move
in the realm of probabilities. They are analogical in character, and
uniformly dependent upon the relation of cause and effect. On this view,
the prospect of a, tfaeistic demonstration is entirely precluded. Philosophy
can only determine as best it can—on the basis of the impressions and
ideas of experience—the nature of the cause-and-effect relation; then it
can reckon the probabilities relevant to belief in God and moral values.
But these are matters of "moral reasoning," in the broad sense, and their
proper place is within the domain of the passions. The sphere of demon¬
strative reasoning is limited strictly to mathematics.
03) Passion, as Professor Kemp Smith points out, "is Hume's most
general title for the instincts, propensities, feelings, emotions and
sentiments, as well as for the passions ordinarily so called; and belief
he teaches, is a passion.In each instance, the function of the particular
passion is to be contrasted with that of reason. It is dominant and active;
reason is reflective and passive. It determines human nature in a practical
way; reason is "cogitative," dispassionately considering whatever data may
come into view. According to Hume's analysis, emotions, volitions, moral
determinations, and beliefs as to matters of fact and existence are os-
sentially passional in character. They are non-rational.
Hume teaches that the "passions," in the ordinary and limited
sense of "emotions," "feelings," "instincts," and the like, are in no way
affected by reason. They are "impressions" and "impulses" excited by
appropriate "objects," among which rational demonstrations are not num¬
bered. Hume holds that it is meaningless to speak of a conflict between
man's reason and his passions; they are simply discontinuous. Passions
1* Supra, p. 47.
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may be called unreasonable only through loose and inaccurate usage.4
Similarly, volitions which are closely related to "emotions"
and "feelings" are uninfluenced by reason. In defining "will," Hume traces
it to "The internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we know¬
ingly give rise to any new notion of our body, or new perception of our
2
mind." Will is uninfluenced by an reflective considerations. "It exerts
itself, when, either the good or the absence of the evil may be attained
3
by any action of the mind or body." Its impulses are countermanded and
controlled only ty contrary impulses—not by dispassionate demonstrations
4
of the rational.
Further, Hume follows the lead of Hutcheson in his account of the
"moral sentiments"—-here used in the limited sense of "ethical determinations."
Ethical judgments are said to depend upon natural sentiments—feelings akin
to those of the aesthetic sense. Criticizing rationalist theories, Hume
writes in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding:
Why should not the acknowledgment of a real distinction between
vice and virtue be reconcilable to all speculative systems of
philosophy, as well as that of a real distinction between per¬
sonal beauty and deformity? Both these distinctions are founded
in the natural sentiments of the human mind; and these senti¬
ments are not to be controlled or altered by any philosophical
theory or speculation whatsoever.
In this connection, Hume zealously repudiates rationalistic ethics, endeavor¬
ing to show that the root of moral sentiment is sympathy—-which Sidgwick
describes succinctly as "a fellow-feeling with the happiness and misery of
others" which "furnishes a complete explanation of the approbation given
!• Treatise, II, III, III (p. 415f).
Ibid.. II, III, I (p. 399).
3. Ibid.. II, III, IX (p. 439).
4* Cf. II, III, III, (pp. 413-18).
5« VIII, II'(p. ). Cf. also Treatise, III, I, I (pp. 455-470).
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to the different qualities that make up our common notion of personal
1merit." The moral faculty is sensitive, indigenous to human nature,
and not affected by the demonstrations of reason.
The most revolutionary side of Hume's philosophy is, as
Professor Kemp Smith shows, the attempt to place in the passional sphere
all beliefs as to matters of fact and existence. His account of causation
has long been recognized as the root of a thorough-going scepticism, which,
when followed exclusively, paralyzes thought. In tracing the idea of
causality, or of necessary connection, to a custom attendant upon the con¬
stant repetition of two events, Hume rules out the a priori principle that
is the foundation of Locke's rational theology and inetaphysic. What Hume's
interpreters have generally missed is the positive intention behind his
sceptical analyses.
Iflr intention ... in displaying so carefully the arguments of
that fantastic sect (i.e., the Sceptics), is only to make the
reader sensible of the truth of my hypothesis, that all our
reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriv'd from nothing
but custom} and that belief is more properly an act of the sensi¬
tive, than of the cogitative part of our natures.2
Professor Robert Flint, in his work on Agnosticism, has pointed
out that Hume was the first among front-rank modern philosophers to analyze
3
belief, and give it a place in his system of thought. Its place is an
important one, and in works of Scottish thought down through the nineteenth
century remains so. The development of Scottish philosophy may justly be
measured in terms of the development of the doctrine of belief. As it is
propounded in Hume, it is a natural disposition of man's sensitive nature,
4
a "lively idea related to or associated with a present impression." When
Henry Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, p. £07.
2* Treatise. I, IV, I (p. 183).
(Edinburgh, 1903), Chapter IV, sections I-III.
4* Treatise. I, III, VII (p. 96). Belief, Hume indicates with great
significance, is akin to dreams and imaginings, but differs from them in
having a superior force and vivacity.
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the analytic powers of the mind are focused upon the world of fact and
existence, Hume finds that philosophic notions of long standing—
"causality," "material or spiritual substance," "personal identity," and
the like—are completely incommensurable with demonstrative reason. But
he does not construe this to mean the end of philosophy. He takes it rather
to indicate that the only valid method in philosophy is an experimental one,
which anatomizes natural beliefs, and renders them more precise by observing
the constant sequence in which they are related to appropriate events. By
scrutinizing the constant conjuration of beliefs and the objects of belief,
he holds it possible to calculate the degree of probability to be attached
to them. This is the nature of "moral reasoning." And while there is an
absolute gulf fixed between its highest probabilities and the certainties
of demonstrative reason, there is a sense in which the one may be said to
1
approach the other as its ideal limit.
Enough has perhaps been said to show what Hume understands by
reason and passion, and to indicate the great disparity between these two
central functions of human nature. Before going on to ask what bearing
these facts have upon his views of religion, it may well be asked whether
Hume's "double-mindedness" is not patently false to human nature—the
central fact of his philosophy. For analytic purposes he draws a line
between reason and passion very heavily, and labors the point of their
discontinuity. Has he not been false to it by failing to indicate the
real unity of man's whole being?
Hume seems to have been quite aware that he had not—and could not—
reconcile the demand of reason for absolute precision of thought with the
active, "sensitive" character of passion. Each lays its own claims upon
1* Ibid.. I, Sections II to XV. Also the first Enquiry, X, I (pp.110-12).
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man; and though in all practical circumstances those of passion have the
natural superiority, the claims of reason remain, and lead to quite
different ends. And so, at the beginning, of the Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding. Hume points out two species of philosophy—the one taking
passion, and the other reason, for its chief guide. And yet, though Hume
indicates no organic connection between them, they are cooperative functions
within the unity of the human spirit. As in matters of belief, for example,
passion and reason come into close relation, though it is of an ill-defined
and uneasy sort. For though Hume affirms that "reason is and ought to be
subordinate to natural beliefs," as Professor Kemp Smith has insisted,
reason still has the all-important virtue of a fixed and precisely defined
ideal of certainty. While passion has the natural title and prerogatives
of a king, reason still holds the purse. The resulting dilemma introduces
an uneasy discord into the whole area where the two functions meet. And
it is here that Hume finds a place for "modified scepticism." To carry
the court-figure further, the philosopher's task is to play the part of
the "wise fool"— the Shakespearean court jester—skillfully playing reason
and passion against one another in the interests of a higher wisdom.
Hume himself, in various places throughout the Treatise and
Enquiries, employs another figure that is perhaps more to his purpose.
The anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and dis¬
agreeable objects; but his science is useful to the painter
in delineating even a Venus or an Helen. While the latter
employs all the richest colors of his art, and gives his
figures the most graceful and engaging airs; he must still
carry his attention to the inward structure of the human
body.... Accuracy is, in every case, advantageous to beauty,
and just reasoning to delicate sentiment. In vain would we
exalt one by depreciating the other.-*■
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section I (p. 10).
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Hume evidently intended the suggestion quite seriously that reason can
dissect living and passional experience, in order to arrive at a stable
experimental science of human nature possessing high accuracy and use¬
fulness—a kind of philosophical anatomy. He did not intend, however,
that this limited and rational phase of philosophy be made the whole of
it. The further task, in the nature of the case allowing much less
accuracy, is to classify the passions, and investigate them experimentally
in a kind of philosophical physiology. And thus the two phases of phi¬
losophy are indispensible to one another—neither having the right to be
called the whole of philosophy. Hume's interpreters have erred by placing
him in the rationalist tradition and making his sceptical analysis serve
as the whole of his doctrine.*''
What now remains to be done is to view Hume's notions concerning
religion in the light of this doctrine of human nature, with its unique
"double-mindedness," and to indicate Hume's place in the development of
vScottish religious thought. What was his outlook upon religion? To what
did his philosophic principles lead him? Though the problem appears to be
quite simple and direct, it is all-important to notice that for Hume, living
in eighteenth century Scotland, but having cosmopolitan tastes in philosophy
* It may be noted in passing that the philosophic impasse between reason
and passion corresponds to the distinction between Hume the sceptic, and
Hume the moral philosopher and genial sophisticate. Speculative pursuits ^ .
answer the claim of reason. The cultivation of a "thoroughbre^d" nature—■ 0/
of developed "tastes" and "sentiments" in manners, morals, friendships,
literature, art, and aesthetics generally, answers to the more ample claims
of passion. Moreover, Hume's alleged "duplicity"—particularly in regard
to religion—would seem to spring from the same root. Though each specific
charge of unworthy motives must be dealt with on its evidence, an apparent
contradiction between his philosophic conclusions and his more "popular"
utterances may be only another evidence of the impasse between the rational
and passional side of the man. Hume's nature, after all, is probably the
only perfect illustration of his philosophy of human nature.
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and letters, it was not exactly simple. Two independenttraditions of
religious thought confronted him—English rationalist theology and
Scottish Confessionalism. And so in deciding what his views were, it
must be asked how rationalism and Confessionalism fare in relation to
the doctrine of human nature. The answer In the first instance is clear:
it undermines the intellecualist and "gnostic" assumptions on which Locke
had constructed his rational theology as well as his particular doctrines.
In the second instance, the answer is not so clear: Hume seems to have
begun with something close to sympathy with the Confessional outlook, though
the hostility of Confessionalists seems to have created doubts as to the
adjustment of passion and reason among "religious" people. Consider each
instance in turn.
(a) Hume's uncriticized philosophy accomplishes the all but
complete subversion of rationalistic theology. It is inimical to deism
no less than to Locke's theistic doctrine. The fact may be sketched briefly.
(i) As for the self, with which Locke's demonstration begins,
Hume is in agreement only to the extent of holding that a science of human
nature must be the foundation of the study of natural religion. "Experi¬
mental" analysis shows that the rational self supposedly known by immediate
intuition dissolves into a succession of impressions and ideas, whose re¬
lations to one another are fully as nysterious and impenetrable as the
gravitation of heavenly bodies. But while Hume denies rationalism its
idea of self, and hence the security of its professed foundation, he assumes
1
the passional belief in personal identity, and describes it. Much that
is said in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion reflects the con¬
clusion that the rational principle in human nature is subordinate to
1# Treatise. I, IV, VI (p. 251ff). Also, in the Appendix (pp. 653-6),
Hume expresses dissatisfaction with the account he has been able to give
of personal identity.
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another which is sensitive, non-rational, and "incogitabie.1,1
(ii) Perhaps enough has been said already to indicate the
grounds on which Hume rejects Locke's claim to have constructed a coercive
theistic demonstration. The causal relation, and analogical reasonings
based upon it, are traced to a customary disposition of the mind when con¬
fronted with the constant repetition of two contiguous events. If the
existence and attributes of God are to be made a matter for argument, it
can only be by means of analogical reasoning that can make no claim to a
priorivalidity. In the essay "Of a Particular Providence and of a Future
State"—which he included in the first Enquiry—and with more detail in
the Dialogues, Hume exhibits the difficulties that plague any effort to
disengage the analogical argument from the limitations of human nature.
All the difficulties encountered in relating the disparate elements within
man himself return to hinder the theistic demonstration.
(iii) But further, Hume places the doctrine of moral sentiments
against the rationalist notion that moral imperatives may be traced back
to logically coercive principles. If moral sentiments may be treated
simply as a set of approvals and disapprovals, sensitive in character, the
direct response of human nature to its personal environment, then demonstra¬
tive reason is simply incompetent to deal with moral questions. The after-
workings of this exclusion of reason appear in Hume's treatment of the moral
attributes of God. In the Dialogues,^Philo judges God by the canons of
approval and disapproval prevailing in his own eighteenth century society,
and finds God wanting—no doubt a just conclusion. But the further con¬
clusion that no moral attributes can reasonably be ascribed to God must be
**"* Cp. Part Ii (p. 147); Part IV (p. 158-164).
part IX (esp. p. 212).
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evaluated in the light of the radical separation of reason from the
moral sentiments within human nature.
(iv) Finally, the rationalist doctrine of revelation becomes
the object of Hume's criticism. He denies that revelation can be founded
rationally upon testimony to the performance of miracles or fulfillment
of prophecies (which is but another species of miracle). This is the
summary conclusion drawn from the "moral reasonings" of the celebrated
chapter, "Of Miracles." Hume defines a miracle as "a transgression of a
lav/ of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the inter¬
position of some invisible agent."1 What his argument professes to show
is the grounds for doubting any testimony concerning an alleged miracle,
when alternative explanations, either of the miracle itself or the testi¬
mony of it, claim the weighty support of experience and the "laws of nature."
Since by definition a miracle transgresses the laws of nature, it must
obviously have the bulk of human experience against it, and consequently
the balance of probability. Accordingly, whether miracles occur or not,
Hume concludes that there is no rational compulsion whatsoever to believe
a professed revelation because its declarer has been said to have per-
p
formed one.
Enquizy, I, I, footnote (p. 115).
Hume contents himself with this somewhat limited conclusion because
his empirical principles will not support a bolder one. He cannot deny
outright the fact of an alleged "transgression of the lav/ of nature" by
the Deity. A categorical denial of any matter of fact or existence is
not more legitimate than a categorical affirmation—when direct experience
is not possible; in either case, only probabilities can be reckoned. Nor
can he maintain that all testimony concerning miracles is ipso facto
fallacious. To assert that majority testimony—however overwhelming—
establishes an absolute norm for judging all particular testimonies is
a principle that would reduce Hume's philosophic polemic to impotence, for
his own conclusions would be overbalanced by the "natural law" of human
"religiosity," "superstition," "ignorance," "deception," and the like. He
limits his conclusion, therefore, supporting it with the further consideration
that an actual transgression of the "laws of nature" is much more improbable
than that the most honest man should be deceived. Enquny X, I (p.H5f).
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Hume's rejection of rationalist theology could hardly be more
thorough. He attacks its assumptions, its method, its conclusions. What
remains? On Hume's uncriticized view, it is impossible to say that
"Whatever is is rational," for the better part of man's most intimate ex¬
perience cannot be brought -under the hegemony of reason. Much less can
it be said with Pope that "Whatever is, is right," for the moral senti¬
ments are often shocked by the ways of man and Providence. The only
generalization to which Hume seems to attribute the character of an a.
priori principle within the framework of precise philosophy is the state¬
ment, "'Whatever is, is traceable to perception—to an impression or an
idea." But speculative application of the principle is subordinated to
the practical control of the passions. Clearly, if Hume's account
of reason and passion goes unchallenged, nothing remains of Locke's
rational theism. His philosophy was to be challenged, however, not only
in England, but in Confessionalist Scotland.
(b) But how did Hume's "double-minded" philosophy of human
nature affect Confessional thought? Or, more exactly, how did it affect
Confessionalism at the point where philosophy and theology had met in the
natural theology of men like Halyburton? On Hume's view, are "natural
religion" and "natural theology" possible?—But this is evidently putting
the question wrongly. Hume does not seem to have questioned their
actuality: the whole evidence of man's religious history indicates a
side of human experience that evidently is not contrary to nature, phi¬
losophy's task is simply to analyze the beliefs that are recognized to be
"religious." Do Hume's conclusions exclude the Confessionalist view, as
they do the rationalist?
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Huine himself apparently did not think that they did—at least
not until unfortunate experiences evidently changed his estimate of the
religious passion. Most of Hume's interpreters maintain that his only
relation toward Scottish Confessionalism was one of intellectual disdain
and emotional antipathy. But in the light of all the evidence now ac¬
cumulated, this would seem to be unjustified. Though any sympathies he
may have had with Scottish religious life were undoubtedly of a very-
imperfect kind, there would still seem to be an important alternative view
to the prevailing one. That is, Hume's general philosophy, and his con¬
clusions as to religion, reflect his Scottish Confessionalist background;
his place in the development of religious thought will be rightly deter¬
mined only when this is taken into account. Support for this view may be
found in Hume's writings and biography. It may be summed up by noting a
few fundamental similarities between Hume's philosophy of human nature and
the relevant parts of Confessionalist thinking, as expressed in Halyburton.
It is entirely probable that Hume borrowed nothing consciously from Con¬
fessionalist theologians; what influence there was came at another level.
(i) Both Hume and the Confessionalist reject the religious appli¬
cation of English rationalism, In both instances, positive convictions
emerge in express contradiction to fundamental rationalistic positions.
Of this, enough has already been said.
(ii) But further, both Hume and the Confessionalist agree that
all questions of natural theology are to be approached through the study
of human nature—through the determination of what man can do and know
from -what he actually has done and known. Beside the statement that the
problem of natural theology is "not concerning the works of God but
concerning us" may be set the other statement that natural religion is
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"in some measure dependent on the science of MAN." Hume's "experimental"
method and his later resort to the "natural history of religion" were
dimly and distantly foreshadowed in the historical studies of Halyburton.
—There is, of course, the fact that Hume was among the first Scotsmen to
be in touch with Enlightenment humanism, which might seem to make the
association with Halyburton irrelevant. But however large Hume's debt to
the new humanism, it must not be overlooked that he uses his "science of
man," as Confessionalism its anthropology, against the English form of the
Enlightenment. And through doctrines which in a rationalist setting become
the height of scepticism, he achieved fame or notoriety in the esteem of
the eighteenth century.
(iii) Moreover, both Hume and the Confessionalist teach that the
foundations of religion are non-rational—if the measure of rationality is
the natural reason of man. According to Halyburton, revelation stands in
sharp contrast to reason's limited, confused deliverances about God, re¬
ligious duty, and the highest good of man. Revelation alone sets before
the mind "wonders unknown and undiscerned in counsel and knowledge concern¬
ing God, ourselves, our sin, our duty, our danger, and our relief." While
there is nothing in Hume to compare to Halyburton's developed doctx-ine of
revelation, there is the same insistence that the roots of religion are
not in demonstrative reason. According to Hume, faith is religious belief,
occasionally referred to as a "sentiment" or "passion." It is grounded in
the passional side of human nature—as are moral sentiments and beliefs in
general. It is not only capable of affecting practical life—as specu¬
lative notions of the Deity cannot—but this is its chief function. "The
proper office of religion is to reform men's lives, to purify their hearts,
to enforce T moral duties, and to secure obedience to the laws and civil
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magistrate«" The Natural History of Religion develops this view in a
different way, by showing the association of historical religions with
the passions—understood here in both the broad and narrow sense. Even
philo, the persistent sceptic of the Dialogues, is allowed to speak of a
"sense of religion impressed upon the mind" by the "inexplicable contri¬
vance and artiface of nature," and can acquiesce in a shadowy theism de¬
spite his own determined reasoning to the contrary. This is in keeping
with the principle that "reason is, and ought to be, subordinate to the
passions, or to the natural beliefs." And this, in turn, is in keeping
with the anti-rationalist orientation of Confessionalism, although it
should be borne in mind that Halyburton does not exclude reason from the
sphere of religion—as Hume tends to do. Rather, he holds that it has
been disordered by sin, but may be restored to true rationality through
faith and revelation.
(iv) Further, both Hume and Halyburton make free use of arguments
which, if given the status of rational principles, would be entirely
sceptical. A few instances of Confessionalist scepticism have been noted.
They are neither as penetrating, nor as numerous, as the ingenious reason¬
ings of Hume. But they certainly amount to the same thing and are supported
by similar views of religious history. No more appropriate summary of
Halyburton»s argument against Lord Herbert's deistic reading of religion
can be found than this passage from Hume' s Natural History of Religion;
Survey most nations and most ages. Examine the religious
principles, which have, in fact, prevailed in the world. You
will scarcely be pursuaded, that they are any thing but sick
men's dreams: Or perhaps will regard them more as the playsome
whimsies of monkeys in human shape, than the serious, positive,
dogmatical asseverations of a being, who dignifies himself with
the name of rational.**
From an apologetic Preface, intended for one of Hume's historical
volumes, but later reduced to a footnote. Cf. Burton, op. cit.. II, p.11.
*•* Section XI (Included in Hume Selections, ed. by C. W. Hendel,Jr., p.282).
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The most important respect in which Hume's historical study differs from
Halyburton's is his failure to exclude Christianity from the general¬
izations upon "popular religion." By implication, all religion that does
not understand itself in the light of philosophic analysis and fails to
recognize its dependence on the science of man is of an unvrortly sort.
It is not only non-rational, but essentially irrational—an arbitrary,
abortive amalgum of passion and reason. But this broadening of Hume's
distrust of religion, which is a mark of his later works, seems to have
a close connection with the hostility of the orthodox opponents of his
philosophy. In a sense, Hume represents the scepticism of Scottish
Confessionalism turning back upon itself: the effort to discredit all
non-Christian, and even extra-Confessional, religions is easily turned
against religion in general.
These, then, are a few fundamental similarities between Hume's
philosophy and the relevant parts of Halyburton's theological outlook.
Taken at face value, they support the contention that Hume could, and
did, for some time think his doctrine reconcilable with the Confession
of the Scottish Church. If Halyburton's teachings could be accepted as a
tolerable exposition of its statement concerning the insufficiency of
natural light, it is possible to see how Hume might teach the whole of the
Treatise or the Enquiries in a Scottish University, without violating his
conscience. He evidently felt justified in asking the same intellectual
allowances for himself that had been granted freely to Confessional thinkers
whose scepticism was bold, though vague."'"
"■* In the Treatise, Hume expresses surprise that his views have aroused
not only "metaphysicians, logicians, mathematicians," but "even theologians."
I, IV, VII (p. 264).
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This, of course, does not mean that Hume was right in thinking
his philosopher could be reconciled with the vital and positive religion
of a man like Halyburton. He shared none of the deep religious, and
specifically Christian convictions, that are the essence of the Westminster
Confession. His thinking upon questions of religion is given no positive
force or content. He is the detached observe- par excellence. who accepts
the verdict that man's natural reason is incapable of reaching a significant
and saving knowledge of God, and in consequence confines his interests to
nature—that which may be experienced immediately by the five senses. His
thought is thus primarily a form of "naturalism." The positive side of
Hume's religious view—that religion is basically passional—in effect
makes faith, simply a matter of temperament, which may be cultivated or not,
in the same way that an "artistic temperament" may be developed or ignored.
Hume chose not to cultivate whatever of religious inclination he may have
had. This thorough-going humanistic tendency in the philosophy of Hume
brings him into close touch with the Enlightenment—-whose influence he
certainly felt, and which he profoundly influenced in return.
But for all his debt to the Englightenment, Hume was essentially
a Scottish thinkerj and this is the vital point in estimating his place in
Scottish intellectual history. His roots were Scottish. If he followed
the Locke-Berkeley tradition in philosophy, it was mainly to deflate its
intellectual authority, in order to make room for a new system of his own—
a "double—minded" philosophy much closer to the springs of Scottish thought
than to those of the English Enlightenment. To call Hume "the last of the
deists" has little meaning. With greater justice he might be said to
represent the complete naturalization, or secularization, of the Confessional
view of man—in much the same way that deism is the thorough naturalization
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of Locke1 s theistic rationalism. But even this is too facile. It must
suffice to say that the human nature at the center of his thought—his
major concem—is suspiciously Scottish; and in the forming of this national
character, Scottish Calvinism had no small part.
Historians of thought have been right in maintaining that in
Hume, the Enlightenment at last arrives in Scotland, some fifty years after
it had triumphed in England and on the continent. But it is evident that
this statement must be supplemented, in a number of ways, (i) The Scot¬
tish form of the Enlightenment was in a significant sense unique—standing
upon a different footing. And Hume's quarrel with Scottish theology did
not center upon the matter of rational demonstration, but on the account
of human nature, (ii) Hume's scepticism moved Scottish religious thinkers
deeply—as the Deistic Controversy never had—largely because it could with
considerable justice claim kinship with the accepted apologetic of the
older orthodoxy. Obviously, a proved insufficiency of the natural mind to
reach a rational knowledge of God does not guarantee a further interest in
the sufficiency of Christianity. It Is more directly a step toward the
practical repudiation of religion, (iii) Ana further, if Scottish thinkers
found it necessary to condemn Hume's doctrine of human nature as incom¬
patible with a religious view of life, the more discerning saw that the
old Confessionalist apologetic suffered equally, and as a spiritual instru¬
ment could be a serious liability. Thus at the very time England was grow¬
ing thoroughly weary of its Deistic Controversy, the problems of relating
Christian faith to natural knowledge and natural religion were just beginning
to agitate the Scottish mind. David Hume's philosophy raised questions,
to which the succeeding development of Scottish natural theology and theism
provided answers. Idk<=> Hume's doctrines, the answers generally revolved
about the question of human nature.
CHAPTER II
'MEDIATING PHILOSOPHY AMD NATURAL THEOLOGY
A moderate estimate of man's powers of thought and action
Carries with it, of necessity, a moderate view of man's ability to achieve
for himself a final certainty as to the character, and even the existence,
of God. Perhaps the first question to be asked of anyone holding such a
moderate estimate of man is whether his view rests on principle or on
convenience—on clear, consistent thinking or on facile compromise. In
considering the origin and first growth of Scottish demonstrative theism,
there can be no doubt as to the fact that it presupposed a "mediating
philosophy" consciously distinct from the rationalist elements of Locke's
teaching on the one hand, and from the "modified scepticism" of Hume's on
the other. But before the history of the development can be written with
discernment, something must be said about the principles with which it
began. In general, it is apparent that the new philosophy and the new
natural theology resulted from an honest, circumspect effort to out-think
Hume, and to found all thought and science upon a less sceptical account
of human nature, without yielding to the unsupported "gnosticism" of Locke.
The mediating position was rooted in a few fairly consistent principles.
The verdict of the "Scottish School" upon the development of
philosophy anri theology down to the time of Hume is well expressed in a
passage by Thomas Reid which deserves to be quoted at length. It reveals
the new temper of Scottish thought as well as something of the reasoning
that led to the mediating position.
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Extrernes of all kinds ought to be avoidedj yet men are
prone to run into themj and, to shun one extreme, we often
run into the contrary.
Of all extremes of opinion, none are more dangerous than
those that exalt the powers of man too high, on the one hand,
or sink them too low, on the other.
By raising them too high, we feed pride and vainglory,
we lose the sense of our dependence upon God, and engage in
attempts beyond our abilities. By depressing them too low, we
cut the sinews of action and of obligation, and are tempted to
think that, as we can do nothing, we have nothing to do, but
to be carried passively along the stream of necessity.
Some good men, apprehending that to kill pride and vain¬
glory, our active powers cannot be too much depressed, have
been led, by zeal for religion, to deprive us of all active
power.
Other good men, by a like zeal, have been led to depreciate
the human understanding, and to put out the light of nature and
reason, in order to exalt that of revelation.
Those weapons which were taken up in support of religion,
are now employed to overturn itj and what was, by some accounted
the bulwark of orthodoxy, is become the stronghold of atheism
and infidelity.
Atheists join hands with Theologians in depriving man of
all active power, that they may destroy all moral obligation,
and all sense of right and wrong. They join hands with Theo¬
logians in depreciating the human understanding, that they may
lead us into absolute scepticism.^-
Reid's verdict was that of a minister of the Church of Scotland,
who was also a leading Scottish philosopher in the latter half of the
eighteenth century, second only to Hume. He was a member of the Moderate
party which was responsible, not only for a marked change within the
church—away from the strict Confessional piety of men like Halyburton,
but also for the sudden eminence that Scotland attained in many branches
of the arts and sciences. Voltaire somewhere remarked, with truth equal
to his sarcasm: "It is an admirable result of the progress of the human
"*"* The Works of Thomas Reid (ed. by Sir William Hamilton: Edinburgh,
1846), pp. 655-6. Professor Kemp Smith has pointed out (philosophy of
David Hume, pp. 5-8) that Reid was largely responsible for the ordinary
interpretation of Hume—that his philosophy amounts to atheism and com¬
plete scepticism. That this was Reid's view is apparent in the passage
above. That it rested on a misunderstanding of Hume is true. Neverthe¬
less, it was an honest misunderstanding, and one which others who might
be thought more sympathetic to Hume's position have shared. Moreover,
Reid never disparaged the force of Hume's arguments, but met them
critically.
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spirit that at the present tine it is from Scotland that we receive
rules of taste in all arts from poetry to gardening.« This was to no
small degree the achievement of Scottish clergymen, who excelled more
perhaps in their extra—clerical occupations than in the ordinary service
of the ministry. But it was to be expected in a land whose life and
thought had been long and vigorously formed by Churchmen, that no radical
change could take place without their active cooperation. In order to set
the views of Re id and the Scottish School in clearer light, a few prelimi¬
nary facts may be indicated concerning Moderatism in general, and its
relation to the English Enlightenment.
The characteristics of the Moderate mind are not difficult to
find. Tolerance was perhaps its most obvious and public virtue—a check
upon the Confessionalist determination to enforce God's cosmic policy
against any opposition whatsoever. And closely associated with it was a
new intellectual liberality—a willingness to hear out and learn from
views opposed, or even hostile, to Christian belief, be they of a "free¬
thinker", or a deist, or a sceptic. A notable example of this was Dr. Hugh
Blair's defense of David Hume, when Confessionalists tried to arraign him
before the General Assembly of the Church in 1755. On that occasion, Blair
wrote a significant argument in Hume's defense:
The freedom of inquiry and debate, tho' it may have published
some errors to the world, has undoubtedly been the source from
whence many blessings have flowed upon mankind.... The proper
objects of censure and reproof are not freedom of thought, but
licentiousness of action; not erroneous speculations, but crimes
pernicious to society.^
Moral earnestness also was a particular mark of the Moderate. Though
Covenanting piety had always accented the moral demands of the Gospel,
"*"* Observations Upon a Pamphlet, intitled "An Analysis of the Moral and
Religious Sentiments contained in the Writings of Sopho (i.e.. Lord Karnes)
and David Hume, Esq.," (published anonymously; Edinburgh, 1755) pp. 1-2.
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its preaching ana instruction had a decidedly dogmatic stamp® Moderates
reversed the emphases, dealing more with questions of personal morality
than with creed or doctrineAt the same time, an enthusiasm for the
humanities--for classical learning and the arts—displaced the Confession-
alist preoccupation with purely theological studies. And this included an
interest in philosophy for its own sake, without holding it to very limited
service in the interest of faith.^
Moderatism clearly illustrates the fact that the Enlightenment,
in some of its aspects at least, had won enthusiastic friends within the
Scottish Church, and thereby deprived it of an insular status staunchly
maintained by the Confessionalists. Various historical influences worked
toward this end. The union of the English and Scottish Parliaments in
1707, and the thrust of subsequent political and economic events, had much
to do with breaking down the wall of partition between Scottish church life
and English church life—and so also between Scottish religious thought and
English religious thought. Thus, a trend that gathered momentum over a
period of fifty or more years came to its fruition around 1755, And from
then until 1805, Moderatism prevailed in the Church, and brought the
Scottish mind into intimate contact with the Enlightenment influences.3
Cf. Adam Milroy, "The Doctrine of the Church of Scotland" in The
Church of Scotland, Past and Present (Ed. by R. H. Stozy), Vol. IV, pp. £75-7.
Cf. "Jupiter" Carlyle's celebrated apostrophe to the Scottish Church
and its accomplished clergy, which is an arresting, if immoderate, measure
of their achievement. Quoted by A. J. Campbell, Two Centuries of The
Church of Scotland, 1707-1929, pp. 98-9.
3* In 1805, the Moderates lost their leadership when they became involved
in a dispute over the Chair of Mathematics in the University of Edinburgh,
for rather questionable reasons. They evidently abandoned principles
staunchly defended in 1755, when they succeeded in defending David Hume
against the misconceived and partisan charges of the Confessionalists-—
signalizing their supremacy in the Church. Moderatism, however, was not
a sudden growth. As early as 1714, when Professor John Simpson of Glasgow
was tried for heresy (cf. Campbell, op. ext., pp. 42-44), there were signs
that some windows in Scotland were open to new winds of doctrine. Francis
Hutcheson and William Leechman, also in Glasgow, had leadxng parts in
fostering the effort to "put a new face upon Theology in Scotland."
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These broadly stated facts raise fundamental questions for the
interpretation of Scottish intellectual history subsequent to Hume. Is
there any continuity between the religious teaching of the Moderates and
their Confessional predecessors? Is not the general temper and bent of
the Moderate mind more akin to the spirit of Locke and the Enlightenment
than to that of Halyburton? If so, are not those historians of thought
right who maintain that the new interest in natural theology that developed
with Moderatism was only an insignificant backwash of the English Deistic
Controversy? —-Were this the case, it should be expected that the advent
of Moderatism would mean a thorough-going revision of the entire religious
outlook of Scotland, bringing it into closer conformity to the rationalist
theology of Locke, Clarke, Butler, and Paley. But this did not occur. There
seems to have been little or no change in the previous adjustment of reason
to faith. The structure of the prevailing view of religion was such that
Moderates had a minimum of difficulty in reconciling their philosophy and
wide-ranging interests in things distinctly human and humane with the estab¬
lished doctrine of the Church.
This can be illustrated in a number of ways. Throughout the
fifty years of Moderate supremacy, the Westminster Confession remained the
undisputed doctrinal standard of the Scottish Church. There is little
evidence to show that the main body of Moderate opinion was consciously in
rebellion against the Confession at any point, or desired fundamental changes
in its credal statements. Controversies of this sort did not assume sig-
nificant proportions until well into the nineteenth century. It is certain,
moreover, that Scotland's new-found philosophy—the "Common Sense Philos¬
ophy" of Raid—-had no such effect on Scottish theology as Locke's rational¬
istic empiricism had previously had on English theology, or as Kant' s
1* Cf. Adam lilrcy, op. cit., p. 275ffj also Campbell, op. cit., pp.
100-102, 109-116.
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Critical philosophy was later to have on German theology. Indeed the
professed claims of philosophy upon theology were not heeded in Scotland
until the second half of the nineteenth century, when German Idealism
became a powerful influence. In indeterminate relationship existed be¬
tween Scottish philosophy and theology, even down to the time of Sir
William Hamilton and Campbell Fraser, as is evident in this character¬
ization of national thought by professor Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison).
Scottish philosophy has hardly anything to say on the question
of the possibility of systematic philosophy, or, to give it its
old name, the possibility of Ontology.... For their personal
ontology, if we may so speak, (Scottish philosophers) simply fell
back upon the language of religion, which relates God to the
world as its Creator, and to man also as his Creator, and in a
special sense, his Father and his God.-*-
I
More explicity, the conception of the task of philosophy in the "Scottish
School" was such that it did not conflict with the high doctrine of reve¬
lation embodied in the Westminster Confession. In all questions concerning
the ultimate and Divine Reality, Reid and his followers recognized the need
and the place of revelation. In consequence, Common Sense Philosophy and
Confessional Theology are found side by side, dividing the labor of thought
amicably between them, without any evident concern to define the rights or
the limits belonging to each. Such matters are left ambiguous.
The indeterminacy of this relationshiip is itself an indication
that Moderatism did not seriously alter the fundamental pattern of
Scottish religious thought inherited from the Confessionalists. But, in
place of the decidedly sceptical account of natural light that Halyburton
for one had seen fit to place alongside a high doctrine of revelation,
Reid substituted a positive doctrine—a philosophy whose conception of
Scottish philosophy (Edinburgh, 1885), pp. 213 & 216. The book was
written before he had added to his original name that of "Pringle-
Pattison."
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its task and claims for its conclusions were moderate. They were
moderate on principle.
The foundations on which the "mediating philosophy" and the
new natural theology rest are set in clearest light by Thomas Reid. He
may therefore be allowed to represent the "Scottish School" of philosophy.
Reid does not take up the study of natural theology per se. although
frequently in passing he indicates what bearing his philosophic principle
would have on theistic discussion. The intensive and extensive develop¬
ment of natural theology was reserved for the nineteenth century. The
first full-fledged Scottish treatment of the subject was W. L. Brown's
Burnet Prize Essay published in 1316, having the title On the Existence
of a Supreme Creator.
Reid's philosophy begins with David Hume. In a letter to Hume,
to whom he had submitted his Inquiry into the Human Mind before its publi¬
cation, Reid indicates the nature of his indebtedness, and the direction
in which his own thinking is turned.
In attempting to throw some new light upon those abstruse sub¬
jects, I wish to preserve the due mean betwixt confidence and
despair. But whether I have any success in this attempt or not,
I shall always avow myself your disciple in metaphysics....
Your system appears to me not only coherent in all its parts,
but likewise justly deduced from principles commonly received
among philosophers; principles which I never thought of calling
in question, until the conclusions you draw from them in the
Treatise of Human Nature made me suspect thet^
• For my understanding of Scottish philosophy, I am indebted chiefly
to the following works: James McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy: Henry
Laurie, Scottish Philosophy in its National Development (Glasgow, 1902);
Andrew Seth (Pringle-PattisonJ, Scottish Philosophy: A Comparison of
the Scottish and German Answers to Hume: and A. Campbell Fraser, Thomas
Reid.
2* Works of Thomas Reid. p. 91. The underlining has been added to
the text.
Reid begins with Hume by agreement and disagreement. He shares to the
full the belief that the only sound foundation of all scientific or
philosophic thinking is a science of man—by which, like Hume, he under¬
stands a science of the human mind. As a thinking animal, man is capable
not only of experience in general, but of reflection upon his experience.
He is not only capable of it, but is actively engaged in it at every
moment of consciousness. And whatever the connection of the human mind
with the ultimate springs of reality, it can engage in the effort to analyze
and give an orderly account of its own capabilities and actions—-which is
the task of philosophy. In this Reid agrees with Hume, But he disagrees
with what he takes to be Hume's wholly sceptical results, on the ground
that they are inconsistent with human nature, and if taken seriously, must
lead to the complete paralysis of thought and action—to philosophic and
spiritual suicide. And since he cannot attribute Hume's bad results to
flagrant violations of logic, Reid is led to re-examine the principles with
which Hume began. And his investigations bring him to the "Philosophy of
Common Sense," Hume's scepticism is to be refuted in toto, and wholly new
foundations laid for philosophic discussion. This includes theistic dis¬
cussion.
Professor Campbell Fraser has pointed out that there are two
stages in the development of Reid's thought,"1" During the first, he is
occupied with the refutation of the doctrine of "representative perception"
—the view, as Reid puts it, that "nothing is perceived but what is in the
mind which perceives it« That we do not really perceive things that are
external, but only certain images and pictures of them imprinted upon the
P
mind, which are called impressions and ideas," During the second stage
1* Or. ext., pp. 95-102J 118-125. The two stages coincide roughly with
his early career in Aberdeenshire and his professorship in Glasgow.
Reid, op. cit., p. 96.
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of his development, Eeid allows his earlier conclusions to lead into the
larger question concerning "active power" and the "Causality which all
changes in the universe presuppose"—changes in man himself and in his
surroundings. At the earlier stage, Reid's interest is given somewhat
exclusively to theoretical or speculative questions^ at the later, to moral
and spiritual questions. Nevertheless, Reid does not accept anything like
Hume's distinction between reason and passion, between rational and passional
functions. And while it is important to recognize the shifting interests
in Reid's development, they are not mutually exclusive. The "speculative"
and "active powers" of man, as he designates them, are intimately related
in the comprehensive rationality of human nature. All human experience—
from the simplest sense perception to the highest exercise of intellectual
and moral powers—-presupposes a few first principles, or rational .judg¬
ments. or common sense beliefs.
If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which
the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which
we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common con¬
cerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them—
these are what we call the principles of common sensej and what
is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd.1
Reid holds that on the basis of these original and ultimate principles,
with which ever^rational man is by nature endowed, it is possible to reach
a certainty common to all men. It is a certainty, a conclusive knowledge,
not limited to the relatijon|ng of ideas within the mind as Locke and Hume
would have it, but reaching out to an objective reality beyond the knowing
mind. Dualism and realism are terms often applied to Reid's philosophy,
describing one aspect of his conclusions based upon the principles of
common sense.
Reid, op. ext., p. 108.
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In attaching all human thought and experience to rational
first principles, Reid alters the primary maxim of Hume's philosophy,
that reason is, and ought to be, subordinate to the passions—in specu¬
lative matters, to natural beliefs. The principles of common sense—-or
"intellectual instincts," "implanted beliefs," "ultimate facts of con¬
sciousness" as Reid variously terms them—share certain characteristics
that Hume evidently attributes to the several passions.-'- They have an
immediacy analogous to that of sense perceptions^ They cannot themselves
be established by any rational demonstration, and in this sense are incompre¬
hensible to discursive reason. They are original and natural, not the result
of any other activity of consciousness. They are constitutive of human
nature and determine all that is recognizably human. And so in some sense
they may be regarded as universal and necessary—sufficiently so to make a
philosophy of human nature profitable, intellectually and perhaps otherwise.
Reid»s "principles" have this much in common with Hume's "passions." But,
Reid also describes them as "ultimate principles of knowledge," "primary
axioms," "fundamental truths", "original judgments." And by these desig¬
nations, he indicates the intimate connection of the common sense principles
and reason.
We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is
to judge of things self-evident} the second to draw conclusions
that are not self-evident from those that are. The first of
these is the province, and the sole province, of common sense}
and, therefore, it coincides with reason in its whole extent,
and is only another name for one branch or one degree of reason.
An earlier passage to the same effect may also be quoted;
At this point, I am indebted to an article by Sir William Hamilton in
his edition of Reid's works, entitled "The Nomenclature, that is the
various appelations by which the principles of Common Sense have been
designated." Op. eit., pp. 755-770
Ibid., p. 425.
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Such original and natural judgments are ... a part of that
furniture which Nature hath given to the human understanding.
They are the inspiration of the Almighty, no less than our
notions or simple apprehensions. They serve to direct us in
the common affairs of life, where our reasoning faculty would
leave us in the dark. They are a part of our constituionj and
all the discoveries of our reason are grounded upon them. They
make up what is called the common sense of mankind.
In making rational judgments central in his philosoply, instead
of Hume's isolated impressions of sense, Reid maintains in effect that evexy
aspect of human"experience is shot through with an element of rationality.
This is apparent in the extensive list of first principles that he gives,
without claiming to have exhausted all possibilities. By introspective
analysis, he arrives at a general classification that distinguishes between
"First Principles of Contingent Truths" and "First Principles of Necessary
Truths." The former are presupposed in all thought and discussion concern¬
ing truths that are "mutable, dependent upon some effect of will and power,
£which had a beginning, and may have an end." The latter are presupposed
as the axioms of the timeless and immutable truths, of which mathematical
conclusions are invariably given as an example. Because the axioms of
mathematics are abstract, precise, and the subject of universal agreement,
Reid simply agrees with any who hold that the mathematical sciences are
examples of perfect demonstration. But to the axioms of mathematics he
adds grammatical axioms, logical axioms, axioms in matters of taste, moral
axioms, and finally metaphysical axioms. These also are "first principles
i. Ibid., p. 209.
2" Ibid., p. 441. Examples of "first principles of contingent truths" are
these."(2) ...the thoughts of which I am conscious are the thoughts of a
being which I call MISELF, ny MIND, W PERSON. (5) ...those things do
really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we
perceive them to be. (6) ...we have some degree of power over our actions,
and the determinations of our will. (7) ...the natural faculties, by which
we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious. (12) ...in the phae-
nomena of nature, what is to be, will probably be like to what has been in
similar circumstances." Cf. pp. 441—452. These correspond roughly with
Hume's "beliefs concerning matters of fact and existence." They are the
foundation of Reid's dualism, or realism.
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of necessary truths." Reid holds that in each of these areas of human
experience and concern, reasoning is possible. But it can proceed with
assurance and certainty only when the appropriate first principles are
acknowledged and agreed upon. Ultimate moral axioms must have assent before
moral science is possible. The same holds true in Blatters of grammar>9 logic,
taste, metaphysics, and therefore, of natural theology.
Aristotle probably deserves most credit for the conception of
first principles held by Reid. It is only in the manner of establishing
them that Reid indicates the distinctive character of his "Philosophy of
Common Sense." In the nature of the case, first principles cannot be demon¬
strated: they are the presupposition of all demonstration, and must stand
firm, if at all, because of their own inherent necessity. To find a higher
warrant is impossible. Nevertheless, their right to be regarded as first
principles may be established indirectly by showing that they are consistent
with the universal nature of man, and that their denial would paralyze
human thought and action. This is the homo mensura principle that informs
the entire development of "the Scottish philosophy" from Reid onward, but
is first termed so only by Professor Campbell Fraser at the end of the
nineteenth century.
In his study of Scottish philosophy, Professor Seth (Bringle-
Pattison) has pointed out that Reid was not guilty of a naive appeal to
the general, uncritical consciousness of men to support his own philosophy,
or of maintaining "in spite of philosophy" that vulgar common sense refutes
Hume.
So far from meeting Hume's conclusions by an unsupported reasser-
tion of what was there sceptically explained away, Reid, admitting
the formal correctness of the reasoning, set on foot a rigorous
investigation into the premises or assumptions on which the con¬
clusion depended.... No procedure could be more distinctively
philosophical than this.-*-
1*
Seth, o£. cit., p. 119.
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Though Reid's philosoply is far less systematic and precise than Kant's
Critical Philosophy, Professor Seth nevertheless finds it can worthily
stand comparison with the Kantian achievement. Reid suggests three lines
of reasoning that give philosophic stature to his discussion of first
principles.^" The first is ad hominem argument which labors the incon¬
sistency of accepting some first principles while rejecting others which
stand on the same footing in human consciousness, or of accepting them in
one context while rejecting them in another. Hume's "double-minded"
philosophy, as understood by Reid and the traditional interpreters, is full
of contradictory denials and reaffirmations. The second is a proof ad
absurdum. which traces the consequences of denying a first principle, and
shows the absurdity involved in the denial.
There is hardly any proposition, especially of those that may
claim the character of first principles, that stands alone and
unconnected. It draws many others along with it in a chain that
cannot be broken. He that takes it up must bear the burden of
all its consequences; and, if that is too heavy for him to bear,
he must not pretend to take it up.
While Reid makes no careful and systematic application of this suggestion,
professor Seth points out that it is very like Kant's method in the de-
3
duction of the "unity of apperception." And the third line of reasoning
about first principles is to consult the common consciousness of mankind,
not simply by culling out random opinions, but by studying its concrete
embodiment in the structure of language—in as much as "the structure of
all languages is grounded upon common notions." Reid makes the fullest
use of this third method of indirection, and makes the analysis of grammar
.SE* cit.. pp. 459-41.
Z' Ibid., p. 439
S. Seth, op. ext., pp. 120-1.
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the main support of his doctrines. Professor Seth comments, "... if we
reflect upon the closeness of the connection between grammar and the
Aristotelian logic, the argument has manifest affinities with Kant's
deduction of the categories from the forms of judgment."1 In defense of
the first principles on which his doctrine depends, Reid argues with
vigor and insight, if not with systematic attention. The intent of his
reasonings, somewhat like Kant's, is to establish these maxims of human
consciousness as the foundation and norm of knowledge.
Yet, none of Reid's three ways of confirming first principles
purports to give them the precision, clarity, and solidity that Kant
attributes to the architectonic of his Critical philosophy. In fact, he
goes the length of allowing that "men who really love truth and are open
to conviction" may differ about the exact nature and statement of first
principles, because their minds have been swayed "by education, by authority,
by party zeal, or by some other of the common causes of error.It belongs
to the principled moderateness of Common Sense philosophy not to claim,
even for its own foundation principles, an absolute freedom from the preju¬
dices to which human nature is susceptible, or from the limitations of
time, place, and histoiy, by which it is bound. The first principle that
informs all others—primus inter pares—asserts only the competence of the
mind to acquire true knowledge commensurate with its "present state."
Our intellectual powers are wisely fitted by the Author of our
nature for the discovery of truth, as far as suits our present
state. Error is not their natural issue, any more than disease
is of the natural structure of the body. Yet, as we are liable
to various diseases of body from accidental causes, external and „
internal^ so we are, from like causes, liable to wrong judgments.
1. Ibid., p. 124. Sir William Hamilton also compared Reid favorably
with Kant. Cf. his edition of Reid, p. 715, footnote.
2. cf. Ibid., pp. 468-75, for Reid's doctrine of error.
5* Ibid., p. 468.
The aim of philosophy, accordingly, is to bring first principles to
clear and precise consciousness, in so far as this may be done by a
mind that recognizes its own finitude and susceptibility to error. Reid
would undoubtedly have objected to any philosophy, professing in the
of "pure reason" to formulate the mind's first principles with exactitude,
and measure its competence in an a priori manner. On his view, the dis¬
cernment of pure first principles is the end of philosophy and not its
beginning, its consummation and not its prolegomena. Reid is at odds with
Kant not only in being a less systematic thinker, but in rejecting the
element of "confident" rationalism evident in the Critical Philosophy."1'
Ey way of summary—Reid's "due mean betwixt confidence and
despair" is a mediating philosophy founded on rational but indemonstrable
first principles common to all men. The first duty of the inquiring mind
is to be consistent with itself and its kind—to allow as true only that
which is consonent with its own constitutive principles, and deny as false
only that which, if allowed, would paralyze its own rational processes.
How, then, does the characterization of first principles in Reid, and in
Scottish philosophy after him, throw light upon the new natural theology?
That is, what force do the theistic proofs carxy when translated into an
intellectual environment shaped by a mediating philosophy? There is the
-1-* Cf. Professor Campbell Fraser's summary of Reid's teaching;
"Reid's Common Sense is the final perception of a being who can know the
universe of reality only in part, and is therefore needed by man in the
intermediate position in which an absolute beginning or end of things must
he to him incomprehensible.... Although its judgments are not evolved from
premises, they are nevertheless what all men, except infants and lunatics,
more or less distinctly acknowledge in their individual actions, although
they may misconstrue them in their uneducated opinions, or spoil them by
indulgence in purely speculative systems. The divine inspiration of the
common sense is therefore man's final support, amidst the so-called "con¬
tingencies" of temporal change in himself and in his surroundings." Thomas
Reid. p. 155,
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fact that the new natural theology reinstates the theistic arguments
that Hume had challenged. It does so, however, not in the name of omni-
comptetent Reason, but in the name of the basic principles of human nature.
The foundations of theistic reasoning are laid in the constitution of man.
Reid views the theistic proofs with favor, but it may be shown
that this in itself is not equivalent to rationalism. For Locke and the
English natural theologians, reason is the key to the universe of reality,
and by its disciplined exercise, the finite mind may pass from the intuition
of its own existence and nature of God's; it can demonstrate the truth of
theistic belief with "apodictic certainty." Locke's argument to a First
Cause is translated into the pages of Reid. Beside it is to found Faley's
proof from final causes, which is expressed in this way;
The argument from final causes, when reduced to a syllogism, has
two premises;—First, That design and intelligence in the cause,
may, with certainty, be inferred from marks or signs of it in the
effect.... The second... is, That there are in fact the clearest
marks of design and wisdom in the works of nature; and the con¬
clusion is, That the works of nature are the effects of a wise and
intelligent Cause.^
In analyzing the two forms of theistic proof, Reid fastens upon the in¬
demonstrable "metaphysical axioms" which carry the full weight of the
theistic proof. Three are particularly relevant;
The first is, That the qualities which we perceive by our senses
must have a subject, which we call body, and that the thoughts
we are conscious of must have a subject, which we call mind....
The second ... is—That whatever begins to exist, must have a
cause which produced it.... The last... is, That design and in¬
telligence in the cause may be inferred with certainty, from marks
or signs of it in the effect.
Reid holds that both the "cosmological" and "teleological" proofs are pos¬
sible because these axioms may be accepted as genuine first principles.
I* Reid, op. cit., pp. 460-1. For cosmological proof, cf. pp. 466-7.
K>id., pp. 454-7.
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Admit the principles, and the arguments follow with convincing force.
Deny the principles, however, and further theistic discussion is point¬
less. That they may be denied is clearly possible. It is evident, more¬
over, that one who persists in denying them cannot be coerced by logic
into acknowledging God. The only philosophic recourse is to show that a
denial of these axioms contradicts the whole of human nature and ex¬
perience, making rational thought and action impossible, A philosophy
built around such denials could only end in spiritual suicide—in the total
disablement of man's rational and moral powers. But a critical view of the
human mind and the common experience of mankind discovers irreducible
judgments, such as these axioms, which impel thought to look beyond nature
to God."'" They are woven into the fabric of human nature as a perpetual
witness to the superintending Power, Whose Mind and Will are the ultimate
context of human life.
The many and critical imperfections of Reid's doctrine will
become increasingly apparent in the criticisms and developments of the
later Scottish natural theologians. These may be passed over for the
present in order that necessary emphasis may be given to the bent which
•
Arguing for the first metaphysical axiom, having to donmental and
material "substance," Reid writes: "The distinction between sensible
qualities, and the substance to which they belong, and between thought
and the mind that thinks, is not the invention of philosophersj it is
found in the structure of all languages, and therefore must be common to
all men who speak with understanding. And I believe no man, however
sceptical he may be in speculation, can talk on the common affairs of
life for half an hour, without saying things that imply his belief of
the reality of these distinctions." (Ibid., p. 454).—■Similarly, he
vindicates the causal axiom; "... it is to be admitted as a first or
self-evident principle. Two reasons may be urged for this. 1. The
universal consent of mankind, not of philosophers only, but of the rude
and unlearned vulgar .... 2. ...mankind not only assent to it in specu¬
lation, but ... the practice of life is grounded upon it in the most
important matters, even in cases where experience leaves us doubtfulj
and it is impossible to act with common prudence if we set it aside."
(pp. 456-7). The third axiom is based on like considerations, (pp.
457-60).
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Reid successfully impressed upon later tlieistic development in Scot],and.
Once again, a comparison with Kant may prove instructive. Kant, of course,
regarded the "theoretic-dogmatic" proofs as invalid, and in their place
substituted a moral proof of his own. In this connection he made a useful
distinction. Referring to the moral proof, he wrote:
... This is an argument which sufficiently proves to the human
reason in its moral or practical exercise the existence of God
as a moral Being.... It is not an absolute proof of His ex¬
istence, but a proof of it in a certain reference only, ...
The moral argument might thus be called an argument xaf TTO/
valid for all men as rational beings, and not merely for the
private modes of thought of this or that particular man; and as
such it is to be distinguished from the theoretic-dogmatic
argument yq a \ y ecy q y which asserts more things to be certain
than is given to man to know.l
Viewed in the light of Kant's distinction between proofs xoq-^a'XiqG^fa v
and proofs ycr f *aVGf°C)rrov. Reid's natural theology stands upon argument
that corresponds more nearly to the latter. The claim to know ydf*
j /
C&hG€iav . or discern with "apodictic" certainty, the "inner principle"
by which God's nature is uniquely determined, is as foreign to Reid as to
Kant. The rationalistic theism of Christian Wolff, refuted in the first
Critique. is precisely what Reid means by a "confident" philosophy which
fails to take the limitations of human reason into account and exalts the
powers of man too high. His own use of the traditional proofs, accordingly,
is not to be understood in a "theoretic-dogmatic" sense. The logic of the
new Scottish natural theology is more nearly that of Kant's moral argument,
which is a proof yqTJ (X fQppnoV* Specifically, it is a demand of the
"practical reason." Moral man in a non-moral universe is for Kant an un¬
ethical and impossible conception. He would therefore infer from the
inescapable imperatives of moral consciousness the reality of God, and of
•*-* Quoted in John Bailie, The Interpretation of Religion (Hew York, 1941),
pp. 271-2.
-86-
a free, responsible, and immortal soul in man. In Scotland, a moral
argument was to be worked out independently by Thomas Erskine of
Linlathen and Thomas Chalmers. But, while Reid himself conceives no
specific moral argument, he invokes a logic similar to Kant's—mutatis
mutandis—in founding theistie reasoning upon the whole of man's rational
consciousness, of which moral consciousness is but a part."*" The first
principles of morals have the same foundation in reason as grammatical,
logical, mathematical, metaphysical, and aesthetic first principles. They
are common to all men as rational creatures and not merely the "private
mode of thought of this or that particular man." And upon this is based
the inference, or presumption, that the ultimate springs of reality must
be such as to allow for the fact of human nature. The existence of God
is, in this sense, a demand of the whole rational nature of man, required
by the thrust of his total rationality and not simply by the imperatives
of his conscience. Alternative views contradict one or more of the basic
principles upon which thought and action rest.
On this view shared by Common Sense Philosophy and the new
Scottish natural theology, the theistic proofs are demonstrative only in
an etymological and not in a logical sense. Mature—which in the first
instance is human nature—shows, portrays, points out the Creator whose
manifold -wisdom is impressed upon all His works. But to read their mean¬
ing, something more than intellectual dexterity or logical acumen is
necessary. "Candour" and "humility" are specifically mentioned—two virtues
"All our reasonings in morals, in natural jurisprudence, in the law of
nations, as well as our reasonings about the duties of natural religion,
and about the moral government of the Deity, must be grounded upon the
dictates of our moral faculty, as first principles." Reid, op. cit.,
p. 599.
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appropriate to the limited powers of the human mind. Men have no choice
but to accept a station mid-way between a specious confidence that claims
to measure all reality by infallible logic, and an equally specious despair
that avows certain knowledge to be a will—o'-the-wisp» Candour and humility
in the use of rational powers clarify the immediate scene of human life,
and thereby expose the signs that point beyond nature to the God whose power
maintains it and gives it meaning. Only where these virtues are present can
natural theology come to a fruitful result. Without them, "demonstration"
in 1he etymological sense is impossible.
The view of natural theology constructed from Reid's incidental
references to the subject is nowhere given comprehensive expression in any
of his writings. Nox- is it developed at length until the time of Chalmers.
Nevertheless, it underlies such summary statements concerning natural theology
as are to be found in Scottish theological writing at the turn of the nine¬
teenth century. Principal George Hill, of St. Andrews—Chalmers' teacher in
theology—-introduces the subject of his Lectures in Divinity with these
representative paragraphs.
I assume, as the ground-work of every religious system, these two
great doctrines, that "God is, and that He is a rewarder of them
that seek him," When I say that I assume them, I do not mean that
human reason unassisted by revelation was ever able to demonstrate
these doctrines in a manner satisfactory to every understanding.
But I mean that these doctrines are agreeable to the natural im¬
pressions of the human mind, and that any religious system which
purifies them from the manifold error -with which they have been
incorporated, corresponds, in that respect, to the clear deductions
of enlightened reason.
When we say that there is a God, we mean that the universe is the
work of an intelligent Beingj that is, from the things which we
behold, we infer the existence of what is not the object of our
senses. To show that the inference is legitimate, we must be able
to state the principles upon which it proceeds. ... These principles
are found in the constitution of the human mind, in sentiments and
perceptions which are natural and ultimate, which are manifested by
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all men upon various occasions, and which are only followed to
their proper conclusion when they conduct us to the knowledge
of C-od.
Here, then is the mediating position of Scottish philosophy
evident in the new natural theology. It illustrates the principled
moderateness of Moderate thinkers. It has nothing of the "gnostic" ten¬
dency of English rationalistic theology, and passes no judgment upon the
nature and conditions of a supernatural revelation, philosophy is con¬
ceived to be a limited human activity, which nevertheless points toward
the Divine realityj revelation is freely acknowledged to be the activity
of God, by which He spells out His redemptive will for men. Christian
teaching about God completes the philosophic portrait of reality. In this
lies the justice of Professor Seth's remark that "for their personal
ontology," Scottish philosophers "simply fell back upon the language of
religion, which relates God to the world as its Creator, and to man also
2
as his Creator, and in a special sense, his Father and his God." This
relation between Scottish philosophy and revealed theology—.between reason
and faith—is, by its very nature, incapable of precise definition. In an
age bent upon scientific precision, it would seem increasingly inadequate.
And so, throughout the Scottish theistic development of the nineteenth
century, there is a progressive modification of the adjustment of reason
and faith. This will be traced to its culmination in the theology of
Scottish idealists.





MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND NATURAL THEOLOGY;
THOMAS CHALMERS
Although its roots are deeply embedded in the previous century,
the development of Scottish demonstrative theism properly belongs to the
nineteenth. The reasons have already been indicated; Confessional in¬
fluences dominated the Scottish mind until the middle of the eighteenth
century, legislating against the prevailing philosophic theism of England;
when Confessionalism relinquished its control, the subsequent "mediating
philosophy" confined itself on principle to the study of human nature and
its essential factors in human consciousness; in consequence, matters of
theistic proof were left for the most part to a small and insignificant
department of the theological course in the universities, Scottish theism
was first of all a "natural theology," the term being defined by contrast
to Christian "revelation," and the subject viewed as a halting introduction
to doctrines derived from Scripture and systematized in the Westminster
Confession. It is only with the nineteenth century that a distinctively
demonstrative theism assumes larger proportions, and undergoes a develop¬
ment that is increasingly independent of traditional theological views.
Throughout the nineteenth century, there appears an extensive Scottish
literature dealing primarily or exclusively with the theism of the rational
"proofs." The fundamental tendencies of thought embodied in these works—
the main themes pursued by Scottish religious philosophy—are now to be
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indieated in the representative doctrines of Thomas Chalmers, John Tulloch,
Robert Flint, and John Caird. The choice of these four theologians re¬
quires some preliminary justification.
The dominant characteristic of Scottish theistic literature is
its diversity. Here there is to be found no clearly defined body of common
doctrine, constantly undergoing greater and greater logical refinement, and
moving toward one general issue: Scottish theism does not lend itself
readily to the schematic treatment that is possible in tracing the develop¬
ment of German religious thought after Kant. Its history is that of
numerous independent assaults upon the citadel of truth, rather than of a
single, concentrated effort." While the main contributions are by academic
A comprehensive treatment of Scottish theistic development would take
into account the following writers. They are given in the order of their
earliest contribution to theistic discussion.
1816 W. L. Brown 1865 J. HutcMson Stirling
1823 Thorns Dick 1867 W. R. Pirie
1829 Alexander Grombie W. H. Gillespie
1830 Robert Morehead 1877 Robei-t Flint
(cir. 1830) John Ballantyne 1830 John Caird
1833 Thomas Chalmers 1884 George Jamieson
1835 Lord Brougham S. 3. Laurie
1846 J. D. Morell 1893 Edward Oaird
1847 George Gomb© W. L. Davidson
1850 James McGosh W. A. Knight
1854 Henry Calderwood 1895 A. J. Balfour
James Ferrier 1896 Duke of Argyll
1855 John Tulloch 1897 A. 3. Pringle-Pattison
1857 James Croll James Lindsay
: list can undoubtedly be supplemented: e .g., Dugald Stewart and Thomas
Brown—distinguished members of the "Scottish School"—made incidental
contributions to theistic discussion, as had Raid. Sir William Hamilton,
like Kant, held that the traditional proofs are invalid and professed to
accept a moral proof, which he nevertheless did not elaborates he and a
few disciples of like persuasion contributed only indirectly to the sum of
Scottish theistic doctrine.
Accounts of many of the writers listed are to be found in McGosh's The
Scottish Philosophy, and bibliographies in T, E. Jessop's helpful volume,
A Bibliography of David Hume and of Scottish Philosophy (London, 1938).
Jessop deliberately excludes the Scottish Hegelians from Ms list—Stirling,
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theologians and philosophers, there is a remarkable representation of
works by others in other walks of life: evidently, theistic speculation
was widely diffused even outside of university circles. Perhaps in¬
evitably, breadth of interest displaces depth of insight in much of the
theistic writing: it is not all of equal value, to be sure. Moreover,
the general Scottish mind proved to be extremely susceptible to influences
coming from the most diverse quarters, in a centuiy almost unique in respect
of the fragmentation of ideas. Many currents of thought come together to
form Scottish theistic doctrine, diluting in various proportions the
doctrines that were native to Scotland in the previous centuiy. The result
is disagreement, contradiction, and diversity in much of Scottish theistic
literature.
The selection of a few representative writers is in keeping with
the historical intent of this study. The choice of four theologians
facilitates the task of showing the continuity and the tendencies of
Scottish theistic thinking. At the same time, it imposes certain limi¬
tations .
The main division within the ranks of Scottish theistic writers
is between those whose primary concern is theology, and those whose
interest is philosophy. This in itself is not a valid ground for pre¬
judging either the philosophic or theological merit of any man's doctrine.
As it happens, though primarily theologians, both Chalmers and Flint
occupied the chair of moral philosophy at St. Andrews. Tulloch and Gaird
the Cairds, Laurie, and Pringle-Fattisonj he omits Pirie, Gillespie, and
Lindsay.
In this connection, two notable trusts for the study and propagation
of natural theology were established by Scotsmen—the one by John Burnett,
Esq. to reward periodic essays on the subject, the other by Lord Gifford
to maintain perhaps the most distinguished of all lectureships.
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each held a university principalship, and their interests ranged far
beyond th® limited sphere of academic theology* Catholicity of mind
characterizes all four* This, and similarity of background, make them
appropriate representatives of the larger theistic development of which
they were a part. All held chairs of theology in the divinity halls of
the Church of Scotland, and were ministers of the Church. They stand,
therefore, in the succession of religious thinkers that has already been
traced back to the time when Confessionalism completely dominated the
Scottish mind. The fact of their being consciously related to the Scottish
Church and its creed may be used as a selective factor, and a check upon
the mere random choice of representative theists, The nature of the develop¬
ment from the time of Chalmers to that of Caird, as well as something of
its extent, may in consequence be guaged with greater accuracy
In passing, it may be well to avoid th© possibility of misconstruction
by entering a specific disclaimer against all preconceived notions of in¬
tellectual development* To say that demonstrative theism was a developing
doctrine in Scottish thought implies only that there is a significant
historical affinity between men of such diverse views as Chalmers, Tulloch,
Flint and Caird—all of whom were Scotsmen by birth, and affected by their
national environment in varying degrees. Ideas of development derived from
Hegelian, evolutionist, and progressivist philosophies have influenced the
study of religious thought in Scotland as elsewhere* Edward Caird's
Gifford Lectures, The Evolution of Religion, maintain the thesis that there
is an inherent principle of explication in religious philosophy, working
sami-autematically toward an idealistic conception of God and religion.
The progressivist form of this thesis is offered in a survey of nineteenth
century theism by James Lindsays "The progressiveness of Theism! That is
the thesis which, in its modern aspects, we seek to present and enforce
against the common but loose assumption ••• that theistic philosophy has
no more inspiring function than ever renewed presentation of arguments whose
cogency and content remain forever unchanged." (Recent Advances in Theistic
Philosophy of Religion: Edinburgh, 1897j p. 1.) While the interpretative
simplicity of "developmental" views is undoubtedly attractive, they are
evident oversimplifications* The term "development" has been retained, how¬
ever, and is used to designate a succession of common emphases, as the term
"variety," "movement," "change," and the like do not*
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Such a selection, nevertheless, has distinct limitations to be
borne in mind. It may be thought to impose a false continuity and a con¬
servative bias upon the diversity of Scottish theistic writers. And to
some extent this is so. To cite one example, John Caird's association
with the Scottish Church and its intellectual inheritance evidently holds
his Hegelianism in check; in consequence, he diverges much less from his
contemporary Robert Flint—the direct heir of th© Common Sense tradition—
than his brother Edward and the more consistent Scottish Hegelians. But
while such limitations are apparent, they do not vitiate the fact that
Chalmers, Tulloch, Flint, and Caird do represent the outstanding tendencies
and large characteristics of a theistic development centered upon the con¬
cept of human nature. The view that the conclusions of theologians and
philosophers must be at odds stems from a frame of mind that has never
gained ascendency in Scotland. It is indicative of the prevailing Scottish
view that since the inception of the "Scottish philosophy" there has been
a remarkable cross-fertilization of thought between the faculties of
philosophy and theology in Scottish universities. And on this circumstance,
the right of four theologians to represent the wider theistic development
may be allowed to rest.
The development of Scottish theism is evidence of the fact that
religious thought does not exist in a vacuum. The task of religious
philosophy changes with the changing scene, all the more so in an age of
spiritual and intellectual ferment such as the nineteenth century was.
The truth about God and man must be expressed to minds conditioned by a
particular historical environment. The proofs brought forward to butressA.
the theistie conviction must deal strategically and honestly with the
hesitations, the doubts, the counter-arguments posed at each particular
point in the course of changing history. It is evident, therefore, that
the task of the theistic writers to be considered will be two-sided: on
the one side it is polemical, and on the other constructive.
The polemical task was imposed upon Scottish thei3ts in the first
instance by the "scepticism" of Hume, and later by the agnosticism of the
Positivists, the naturalism of many Darwinians, and the pantheistic ten¬
dency of the Absolute Idealists, These anti-theistic doctrines to seme
extent determined the course of theistic development, They required
scrutiny and honest criticism, and compelled important modifications in
the formulation of theistic proofs. They imposed the need for a more precise
and unambiguous terminology, carefully if somewhat cumbrously defined. And
they forced a rigorous inspection of theistic reasoning according to the
canons of formal logic. The result—in keeping with the general tendency
of the century—was a growing specialisation of thought, an increased
concern with the ultimate principles involved in theistic reasoning, and
the emergence of full-fledged, autonomous theistic systems of philosophy.
The movement of thought from Chalmers at the beginning of the century to
Gaird at the end is from a narrowly circumscribed science of "natural
theology" to an all-synthesizing "philosophy of religion," This is a
major tendency to be traced through the teachings of the four representative
theists,
The constructive task—if it may be so designated for the sake
of brevity—was imposed upon Scottish theists by the Truth itself, which
is to say by God Himself, Upon two fundamental propositions, all agreed:
God is, and He may somehow be known to be God by all rational creatures.
They agreed that this knowledge can be no esoteric or merely subjective
conviction of a few: it concerns the parent Fact of all facthood, the
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Supreme Reality that governs every relative reality such as man knows
his own to be. This certain knowledge must be communicated to all think¬
ing men, and in a form that evokes a like certainty# And this, of course,
is only another way of saying that it must in some sense be demonstrated.
But, as the survey of the antecedents of Scottish thought has shown, "de¬
monstration" may be construed in at least two general ways. Where it is
granted that God's existence and nature are a proper subject for rational
demonstration, the validity and scope of theistic proofs must still be
determined. What methods of thought are appropriate to the task? And to
what extent can the being and perfections of God be set forth by rational
argument? What is the relation of demonstrative theism to the totality
of religion and worship, and in what relation do the truths of theistic
demonstration and the truths of the Christian revelation stand? The
development in Scotland moves toward greater and greater confidence in
the powers and the scope of human reason. While Chalmers' natural theology
claims to be nothing more than anticipation of the Christian revelation,
Caird's philosophy of religion is a reasoned system unifying the whole of
religious experience, and a mold by which Christian theology itself is to
be shaped. And yet, the theism of the Scottish idealists stops short of
an absolute philosophy that would absorb moral and personal reality into
one grand cosmic consistency. To the end of the century, Scottish theism
is grounded upon the irreducible reality of man's moral and personal nature,
the inference being that such a nature necessarily points to the ultimate
and sovereign person of God, The development of this thesis is a second
major tendency to be traced through the doctrines of the four representative
theists, beginning with Thomas Chalmers,—Chalmers by education and temper¬
ament belongs to the eighteenth century "age of order." His natural theology
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nevertheless reflects the concerns and needs of the new century; as well
as profound elements of his Scottish religious inheritance which were
submerged in the somewhat academic presentations of Reid and his immediate
successors.
Of imperishable memory as preacher and reluctant leader of the
Great Disruption in the Scottish Church, Thomas Chalmers" added to his more
notable and permanent achievements the weight of matured conclusions as to
the possibility and character of a natural theology» Though not a par¬
ticularly original thinker, he faithfully reproduces in his voluminous
writings the leading theological and philosophical ideas of Scotland in
the early nineteenth century. He added to these only a most intense moral
earnestness which mastered his mind, while stating a moral doctrine that is
neither complete nor capable of being made entirely self-consistent. On
the whole, a study of Chalmers' Natural Theology is rewarding, not because
of any particularly original insights it has to offer, but because it shows
so completely the workings of a devout mind as finely formed as Balyburton's,
but attuned to a different intellectual and spiritual, environment a full
century later. While Windelband is undoubtedly correct in describing
p
Chalmers as an "unimportant supporter" of the Scottish School of philosophy,
his natural theology brings into clear perspective the strong moral, or
ethical, accent running through Scottish religious thought,
Chalmers' preoccupation with the moral foundations of natural
theology is hardly an innovation. Indeed, it might be said to be more
Chalmers was born in the year 1780, and died in 1347,
2* oit», p. 629.
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consonant with the tone and temper of Scottish Confessionalism than any¬
thing to be found in Reid's philosophy. The dominant ethical, and
practical, bias of Halyburton's discussion of natural religion is more
nearly approximated by Chalmers. While it is true that the second period
of Reid's philosophical development was given almost exclusively to the
problems of ethics, and with acme fervor, his moral doctrine has a rather
flat and academic quality in keeping with dispassionate analysis. The ex¬
ceptional vigor of Reid's conscience, like Kant's, is tamed and disciplined
by the trappings of formal discussion, appropriate to the philosophical
opponents of Hume's closely reasoned conclusions, Reid's chief academic
disciples also perpetuated this subjection of strong ethical force to the
exigencies of philosophical method. Chalmers, however, with the manner
and accent of prophetic utterance, allows moral consciousness to have full
rein. The result is a "theology of conscience" which largely overshadows
the contrasting "theology of academic demonstration." Chalmers attributes
considerable importance to certain scientific,or a posteriori, reasonings
in the interest of theistic belief; but the coercive character of natural
theology he traces, not to "apodietie" certainties of reason, but to the
"felt supremacy of conscience" and its imperative demands.
It is chiefly through a theology of conscience that Chalmers
would counter the arguments and influence of Hume's negative outlook upon
natural religion and theology. The far-flung effects of Hume's doctrine—
and they were generally detrimental to religion in all its aspects—are a
matter of familiar record. The exact proportions of his influence upon the
religious thinking of his countrymen are rather difficult to assess, al¬
though in a few striking instances—notably those of James Mill and Thomas
Carlyle—it worked profoundly against the tradition handed down from the
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fathers. Some significance should probably be attached to the fact that
of these two, Carlyle only won his way back to a distinctly spiritual
view of lifej and this he did largely through allegiance to conscience
t
and an indominable sense of duty. It has been said of Carlyle that he
was a "preacher" and a "missionary of conscience" laboring outside the
churches. Chalmers, by similarity and contrast, might appropriately be
called a "Carlyle within the Church"—evidencing much of the same all-
mastering devotion to conscience, and finding there a ground on which to
meet all men in order to point them beyond conscience to its Sovereign,
beyond moral law to the Law-Giver, and beyond the benefactions of nature
to the Divine Benefactor. While the course of the two lives could hardly
have been more different, their common ancest^ry of mind and conscience
is quite apparent. But, going much beyond Carlyle is one important respect,
Chalmers would make natural theology a preface to the book of Christian
revelation, in which the full extent of God's righteousness and grace are
made perfectly plain. Of this, he seems never to have had any lasting
doubt.
Chalmers' concern with natural theology is hardly intelligible
apart from Hume's philosophy of human naturej much less, its particular
doctrines. His earlier published views specifically repudiated any interest
in any rational or moral considerations apart from those contained in
revelation itself; in this respect, he out-Halyburtoned Halyburton, who
at least tried to show their insufficiency. But the evidence of a deeper
acquaintance with Hume is followed by a decided change of view. As back¬
ground to «n that Chalmers has to say concerning _a posteriori theistic
proofs stands Hume's "singular effect" argument—a particular consequence
following from his account of causality. But even more important is the
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general tenor of Hume's argument, a consequence of his subordination of
reason to passion, culminating in the well-known conclusion to the
Dialogues;
If the whole of natural theology, as some people seem to
maintain, resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat
ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, that the cause or
causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote
analogy to human intelligence; If this proposition be not
capable of extension, variation, or more particular explica¬
tion; If it afford no inference that affects human life, or
can be the source of any action or forbearance; And if the
analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no farther than
to the human intelligence; and cannot be transferred, with amy
appearance of probability, to the other qualities of the mind;
If this really be the case, what can the most Inquisitive, con¬
templative, and religious man do more than give a plain,
philosophical assent to the proposition as often as it occurs;
and believe that the arguments, on which it is established,
exceed the objections which lie against it.-®-
It is a somewhat strange, but irresolvable, fact that nearly sixty years
elapsed before a Scotsman countered this view forthrightly in the name of
conscience. In relation to the religious tradition of Scotland, the most
destructive effect of Hume's philosophy had not been his dismemberment of
the theoretical "proofs" which never had a vital place in Scottish religious
thought, but rather what amounted to the secularization, or "naturalisation",
of the Confessional view of man. The result of Hume's philosophy is a
human nature devoid of any fundamental human experience that can either
confirm or deny the reality of God and the divine destiny of the human
spirit. Over against this must now be placed the fundamental affirmations
of Chalmers' natural theology:
The theology of nature is the theology of conscience; and
conscience tells every possessor of it, if not the certainty,
at least the probability of a God. And this probability is
enough to set men agoing; for, as Butler says with deep and
eminently practical sagacity, probability is the guide of life.
And so the sense of moral deficiency, the unfailing sense of
Dialogues. p. 227. I have altered the underlining of the text.
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every earnest spirit, will, without any nice argumentative
computation, suggest the instant feeling of at least a
probable guilt, a probable God, and. a probable vengeance at
His hands,-—enough to set the whole machinery of human interest,
and fears, and disquietudes, into busy operation. It is in the
midst of such agitations and doings that Christianity offers
itself to the notice of the inquirer.-
Chalmers1 doctrine of the supremacy of conscience is to be set over
against Hume,s doctrine of the supremacy of passion. This is the crux of
his effort to reclaim human nature—ordinary human nature—for a theistic
view of life, and also for the fuller Christian view.
To set Chalmers® teaching in the clearest light, (A) his "theology
of conscience" must first be described and set in its proper historical
setting. Then (B) it will be possible to show the limited but important
place he accords to "a posteriori proofs" in relation to the whole of
natural theology: Chalmers1 devotion to science was second only to his
Christian commitment, and the inductive method of science was for him and
the Scottish School generally the only sound method of philosophy. Finally,
(C) it will be possible to assess Chalmers * contribution to Scottish
theistic development. He makes full use of Reid's generous concession,
that first principles may well be the occasion of differences between men
"who really love truth and are open to conviction." In so doing, he
illustrates a fundamental tension within Scottish theistic doctrine,
reflecting the temper of the early nineteenth century, and indicating the
direction in which later theistic development was to move*
(A) Chalmers® two volume work on Natural Theology is the cul¬
mination of a personal evolution that began by denying any significance
"*"* From "An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy
of Europe in the Nineteenth Century by J. D, Morell, A.M.," first pub¬
lished in the North British Review for February, 1347. Gf. Chalmers *
Miscellanies (New York, 134-5), p.491 *
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the reasonings which form the substance of his mature thought on the
subject. His earliest view—adopted evidently in conscious reaction to
the views of Principal Hill, his teacher in theology at St. Andrews-
professed to find adequate grounds for the acceptance of Christian reve¬
lation in objective historical evidence as to the veracity of Scripture,
without any further considerations whatsoever. His latest view sees
conscience as the natural monitor of the human spirit, and a "point of
contact"—to use a more recent term—to which the divine revelation of
Christian Scripture is directed. ¥ith characteristic frankness, Chalmers
has described the radical change in his thinking:
Miracles, simply as such, and without regard to adjuncts at all,
were enough in all conoeivable circumstances, to authenticate any
professed communication from God to the world. The historical
evidence of these miraculous facts were enough of themselves to
constitute a simple but solid foundation on which to rest the
whole superstructure of our creed. We confess our partiality
in other days, to what we held as a beautiful and consistent ex¬
emplification of the question between us and infidels. There is
nothing, however which has contributed more to modify our views
upon this subject than the very question whereof we now treat.
Instead of holding all religion as suspended on the miraculous
evidence, we see this evidence itself standing at the bar of an
anterior principle, and there waiting for its authentication.
There is a previous natural religion on whose aid we call for the
determination of this matter. It is an authority that we at one
time should have utterly disregarded and contemnedj but now we
hold it in higher reverence, since, reflecting on the supremacy of
conscience within us, we deem this to be the token of an ascendent
principle of morality and truth in the universe about us.1
The direction in which Chalmers1 thought moved was thus from a somewhat
2
naive view of the objective, self-evidencing truth of Christian revelation
Evidences of the Christian Revelation, in Selected Works. Vol. VI, pp.
235-6. Chalmers1 numerous writings have been collected in three incomplete
and mutually suplementary sets: The first, begun by Chalmers himself, was
the Works in 25 vols., published between 1836 and 1&42; the second, edited
by his son-in-law Dr. Hanna, was the Posthumous Works, published between
1847-9j the last was the Selected Works, also edited by Dr. Hanna, and pub¬
lished around 1857. These collections respectively will be referred to
hereafter as W, PW, and SW, with the appropriate volume indicated.
2* E.g., Chalmers wrote in his article on "Christianity" in the Edinburgh •
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to a greater awareness of the inward and spiritual reality of human nature
to which Christian revelation is addressed. The stages of this thought-
development may be traced through a succession of Chalmers1 publications,
and collated with relevant biographical material collected by William
Hanna^ in the four volume Memoirs.1 His earliest view was expressed in
several articles and volumes dealing with "Christian evidences." But these
conclusions were severely criticized by older contemporaries who revived
Reid*s charge against the Confessionalists, that to contemn natural theology
is to play into the hands of the sceptic. Some of the criticisms seem to
have hit their mark, for Chalmers ceased to publish anything concerning
"Christian evidences" for ten years—during which time his thoughts were
altered considerably. Meanwhile, an appointment to the Chair of Moral
Philosophy in the University of St. Andrews came to him in 1823, and there
he remained for five years. His only qualifications for the teaching post
were those which had been made evident during his earlier career as a
preacher. It was during this period that characteristic views on questions
of moral doctrine were formed, providing the foundation for his later
volumes on natural theology. One of his first undertakings after trans¬
ferring to the Chair of Theology in the University of Edinburgh in 1828
was to accept an invitation to prepare the first of the Bridgewater Treatises
on the subject, The Power. Wisdom, and Goodness of God As Maw-? faataA in the
Encyclopedia (edited by David Brewster) Vol, VI, p. 384,: "Upon the
authority of the proofs already insisted on (i.e., proofs of miraculous
authentication, as in Locke), the New Testament must be received as a
revelation from heaven; and ... instead of sitting in judgment over it,
nothing remains on our part, but an unreserved submission to all the
doctrine and information which it offers to us."
The full title is Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Thomas Chalmers.
P. D. Passages relating to the development of Chalmers1 thought on the
subject of natural theology are the following: I, pp. 143-6, 205, 367-8,
372-3, 375-9; III, pp. 309, 436-7; IV, pp. 420ff, 428.
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Adaptation of External Nature to the Moral and Intellectual Constitution
of Man* It was thus, at the invitation of an English bishop, that his
thoughts concerning natural theology were finally crystallized* And the
somewhat prolix treatise, published in 1833, became the core of the thorough
revision incorporated three years later in the first two volumes of the
collected Works with the title, Natural Theology. Subsequent treatments
such as the introductory chapters of the Institutes of Theology1 add little
of importance, although a lengthy review of J. D* Morell's Speculative
Philosophy of Europe is of particular interest. In the last year of his
life, Chalmers was introduced through Morell's pages to Kant and post-
Kantian philosophy. In Kant he discovered one whose moral theology seemed
to accord well with his own established views, despite what he deplored as
the wrong-headed agnosticism of the first Critique. Although Chalmers'
knowledge of Kant was neither thorough nor entirely accurate, he was justi¬
fied in claiming the great German as an ally of his own characteristic
doctrines. Both were concerned to refute Hume. The transformation of his
earlier estimate of natural theology and his formulation of ilia moral proof
for the existence of God were completed, however, before he came into pro¬
longed contact with Kant in Mbrell's history.
In taking issue with an argument such as Hume's, Chalmers makes
plain from the outset that the primary frame of reference within which
discussion must take place is one of moral principles. That is, moral con¬
siderations clearly have precedence over the theoretical. The note of
responsibility for theoretical, or speculative conclusions is paramount.
Man is not to blame, if an atheist, because of the want of proof.
But he is to blame, if an atheist, because he has shut his eyes.
He is not to blame, that the evidence for a God has not been seen
1# PW, Vol. VII, Books I and II.
by him, if no such evidence there were within the field of his
observation. But he is to blame, if the evidence have not been
seen, because he turned away his attention from it.... There is
a moral perversity of spirit with him who is willing, in the
midst of many objects of gratification, that there should not be
one object of gratitude.
As will be seen presently, Chalmers makes significant concessions to Hume
as to theoretical principles, leaving little roam for confidence in the
demonstrative powers of reason, or in its ability to establish more than
the most tenuous probability that God exists. Yet even so weak a con¬
clusion as this is deemed adequate to the essential character of natural
theology.
Though in the dark as to the question whether a God exists, yet
on the bare imagination of a God, we are not at all in the dark
as to the question of the gratitude and obedience which are due
Him. There is moral light in the midst of intellectual darkness....
The very idea of God, even in its most hypothetical form, will
bring along with it an instant sense and recognition of the
moralities and duties that would be owing to Him.^
With his position thus boldly stated, Chalmers leaves little doubt as to
the character of theistic "proof." Its force springs primarily from moral
imperatives rather than from logically coercive demonstrations. The seat
of natural religion is the rational conscience instead of the rational
intellect. Unless the moral faculty is called into play, theistic reason¬
ing is without any vital significance. When it is, the search for God
ceases to be an abstract theoretical quest, and becomes an obligation—an
imperative for conscience. That it is thus imperative, that natural theology
is essentially a theology of conscience, is Chalmers1 central doctrine.
It is in virtue of this ever busy and ever whispering conscience
within (man), if there be not the certainty, not even the proba¬
bility, there will at least be the imagination of a God. It is
this faculty, in truth, with its ever recurring instigations,
Natural Theology. W, Volume I, pp. 72-3.
2' Ibid.. p. 64.
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which gives to humanity its strongest sense of a God. Apart from
revelation, it is the theology of conscience, and not the theology
of academic demonstration, which originated and upholds religion
in the world. It is because of this part or peculiarity of our
mental constitution that we have a popular theology everywhere.^
Later generations of Scottish theologians were to give greater emphasis
and consistency to this position clearly enunciated by Chalmers. While
the influence of Kant's moral theology at the end of the nineteenth and
in the early part of the present century was undoubtedly decisive, a
Scottish predilection toward such doctrine is already evident in Chalmers.
His chief resources were almost entirely native, being the Confessionalist
piety and fervent moralism of his forebears, as well as the doctrines of
the great English moralists—chiefly Bishop Butler.^ —The ramifications
of Chalmers' "theology of conscience" may be brought into view by consider¬
ing in turn (i) the distinction between the "ethics of theology" and the
"objects of theology" which introduces his every treatment of natural
theology; (ii) the doctrine of the supremacy of conscience; and finally
(iii) the moral proof of the existence of God,
(i) On the basis of the distinction between the "ethics of
theology" and the "objects of theology," Chalmers would show that, how¬
ever right Hume may have been in ^laboring the difficulties and ambi¬
guities of theistic demonstration, universally necessary ethical principles
remain to compel earnest inquiry as to the reality and character of God,
The chief "objects of theology" are God, who is infinite Spirit, and the
spiritual soul in man—whose essential nature cannot be studied or sub¬
stantiated by the limited means of empirical science and inductive philosophy.
Institutes of Theology, FW, Vol, VII, p, 73,
2. Chalmers' innocence of German theology, for example, is apparent in
a letter addressed to a friend travelling in Germany: Cf. Memoirs. Ill,
p, 433. The review of Mbrell's Speculative Philosophy of Europe indi¬
cates his previous ignorance of German speculative doctrines.
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Sense knowledge is relative to man's finite place in space and time, and
in the nature of the case cannot deal with the transcendent attributes
of spirit. Chalmers gives a large measure of assent to Hume's inductive
principles, and presently will be shown to agree that however far inductive
reasoning may rise toward an absolute theistic conviction, the objects of
theology must remain under a cloud of final obscurity and uncertainty.^-
As over against this, however, the science of ethics has to do with primary
axioms which, like the axioms of mathematics, must be deemed valid for all
possible minds, human and Divine, under all possible circumstances. The
ethics of theology are, accordingly, what might be described in Kantian
terminology as a number of ethical maxims a -priori, of which the principle
of the "virtuousness of gratitude" is given as an example.
The moral propriety of gratitude is that which attaches to the
relation between a benefactor and a dependant; and it equally
remains so whether the relation be seldom or often exemplified.
Nay, gratitude would be the appropriate virtue of this relation,
although actually it were never exemplified at all.... The
virtuousness of gratitude would remain a stable category in
ethical science; although, never once exemplified in the living
world of realities, we derived our only notion of it from the
possibilities which were contemplated in an ideal world of
relations.
Chalmers evidently assumes that there are a number of such ethical principles
which, on formulation, are self-evidently and universally valid; but like
Reid, Price, and Clarke—the intuitive moralists whom he read, and on whom
he appears to depend for this element of his moral doctrine, he makes no
systematic attempt to show what those principles are. The side of this
doctrine that claims his attention entirely is the belief that the universe
is moral "from the top throughout," and that the moral relations that obtain
Cf. Natural Theology. I, pp. 17-20.
2» Ibid., pp. 21-2.
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within the finite sphere of human consciousness must apply in the infinite
reaches of reality. If God possibly exists, moral obligations to Him are
certain and inviolable.
There is naught to baffle our ethics in the infinity of God, or
in the distance at which He stands from us. Only grant Him to
be our benefactor and our owner; and on this relation alone do
we confidently found our obligations, both of gratitude, and of
service. Just as there is nothing in the mighty distance or
overbearing magnitude of the sun that baffles our mathematics.1
Chalmers gives a prominent place to this distinction between the
"ethics" and the "objects of theology" in order that it might serve as a
key-note to the whole of his discussion of natural theology, although in
fact it cannot be made entirely consistent with the remaining elements of
his moral doctrine. He makes a specific distinction between the "abstract
question in morals" which belongs to the science of ethics, and the
directions, or dictates, of conscience which regulate the natural—or
instinctive—propensities and affections of man's whole being.^ The
rational maxims of ethics also have no place in Chalmers' formulation of
the moral proof. On the whole, it appears that the account of the "ethics"
of theology—associated constantly by analogy with the mathematics of
natural science—is taken over from the eighteenth century age of order and
from "Newtonian moralists" without reconciling it with the introspective
and inductive method of ethical study presupposed in the doctrine of the
supremacy of conscience. It is quite evident that Chalmers' moral universe
is conceived after the fashion of Newton's physical universe—that the in¬
finite variety of personal life is reduced to fixed spiritual forms, subject
to inflexible and predictable moral lawsThis, on the one hand, illustrates
1* Ibid., p. 42
2. Ibid., pp. 305-6
3. Cf. ibid.. pp. 23-47. The conversion of physical order and stability
into moral equivalents is illustrated fully in Chalmers' popular Astronom¬
ical Discourses (W, Vol., VII).
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his indebtedness to a characteristic thought-pattern of the eighteenth
century. The doctrine of the "felt-supremacy of conscience," on the other,
looks in a different direction—away from abstract and supra-personal laws
to the immediacies of moral consciousness, upon which the case for theism
mainly rests. Yet, however independent of Chalmers1 most characteristic
ethical doctrines, the distinction between the "ethics" and "objects of
theology" bears important testimony to the relative weight of ethical and
theoretical considerations in his thinking,
(ii) The conviction that man is primarily a creature of conscience
stands at the center of Chalmers1 moral theology. And by making moral con¬
sciousness primary and supreme, he revises Raid's account of human nature,
which had maintained a judicious balance between "intellectual powers" and
"active powers," Conscience, according to Chalmers is the dominant "faculty"
of man's nature, and the self-evident datum that defines its character, "The
supremacy of Conscience is a fact in the constitution of human nature—seen
in the light of consciousness by each man, of his own individual specimen;
and verified in the light of observation, as extending to every other
specimen within the compass of his knowledge,""'' This moral emphasis is an
omnipresent faot in the Natural Theology. It is significant that in dealing
with the structure of the mind after the fashion of Scottish Philosophy,
Chalmers quickly passes over its intellectual functions in a few brief para¬
graphs, and devotes three chapters to the moral structure of human con¬
sciousness, as well as six chapters to moral relations within human society
and its fundamental institutions,^ This decided disproportion is evidently
Natural Theology. I, p, 351.
E.g., there are chapters "On those special Affections which conduce to
the civil and political Well-being of Society" and "On those special Affec¬
tions which conduce to the economic Well-being of Society." Chalmers' life¬
long interest in political and economic theory was closely associated with
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intended to correct a deficiency in theistic thinking, not to the entire
exclusion of other considerations. But the fundamental change repre¬
sented by this "correction" cannot be overlooked.
authority, and its specific dictates are facts of immediate experience,
which must be experienced immediately in order to be known as facts. This
characteristic of being bound to direct consciousness lies behind the
terminology employed to justify the prerogatives of the moral faculty: it
stands upon an irresistable "feeling," a natural "sense" or "sentiment."
The supremacy of conscience is a "felt supremacy."
The place which it occupies, or rather which it is felt that it
should occupy, and which naturally belongs to it, is that of a
governor, claiming the superiority, and taking to itself the
direction over all the other powers and passions of humanity.
If this superiority be denied to it, there is a felt violence
done to the whole economy of man. The sentiment is, that the
thing is not as it should be: and even after conscience is
forced, in virtue of some subsequent derangement, from this
station of rightful ascendancy, we can still distinguish between
what is the primitive^design or tendency, and what is the
Another relevant passage differentiates conscience from other components
of the human spirit, equally natural.
One, it is generally felt, may be too ambitious, or too much set
on wealth and fame, or too resentful of injury, or even too facile
in his benevolence, when carried to the length of being injudicious
and hurtful} but no one is ever felt, if he have sound and en¬
lightened views of morality, to be too conscientious. When we
affirm this of conscience, we but concur in the homage rendered to
it by all men, as being the rightful, if not the actual superior,
among all the feelings and faculties of our nature.2
his intense ethical fervor. A disciple of political conservatives like
Hume and of Adam Smith in economic theory, Chalmers is always at pains to
justify his own outspoken conservatism by reference to ethical principles.
At the same time, he protests in the name of conscience against particular
abuses of political and economic power.
1* Ibid., p. 317
2* Ibid., p, 318. Chalmers follows closely the teaching of Bishop Butler
in matters of psychological detail. E.G., "Every affection in our nature
Chalmers teaches consistently that conscience, its inherent
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In all such statements, Chalmers is careful to distinguish between the
right to authority which conscience is felt to possess, and the actual
power of conscience to enforce its authority over the "inward desires and
outward doings" of a particular man. In general, the distinctive moral
sense may be described as an awareness that man is, according to his own
inherent nature, subject to the ordering of conscience. And the order
which conscience imposes—de jure if not de facto—comprises "all those
virtues which the hand of the Deity hath inscribed on the tablet of the
human heart, or on the tablet of natural jurisprudence."^
As moral doctrine, this view of the supremacy of conscience is
not extraordinary—although it does represent fairly the general reaction
at the beginning of the nineteenth century against the exteraalism of
eighteenth century ethics generally or of a theological ethic such as
Paley's. There was in Chalmers' moral doctrine, as in that of many con¬
temporaries, a growing awareness of the essential inwardness of moral im¬
peratives, which Kant characterized for German thought in his doctrine of
the autonomy of the moral will. On Chalmers' view, however, the distinctive
character of man's moral being is not necessarily the disposition of his
will to perform that which it recognizes as a self-imposed law, but rather
the presence of an active conscience, declaring that the nature of man
embraces not only what he persistently is and does, but also the Impinging
and imperative sense of what he ought to be and is not. For Chalmers, moral
consciousness is a facet of nature, "the token of an ascendent principle of
morality and truth in the universe about us."
is appeased by the object that is suited to it. The object of conscience
is the subordination of the whole to its dictates." Also, the distinction
Chalmers emphasized between the de jure and de facto supremacy of conscience
is attributed to Butler.
Ibid., p. 339. These are the virtues thought to be common to all
historical religions and mores: temperance, chastity, kindness, integrity,
and truth, etc.
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(lii) To Chalmers and his countryman Thomas Erskine probably
belongs the distinction of being the first to introduce a "moral proof"
into the theistic thinking of Britain, without the benefit of German
speculation along similar lines. S. T. Coleridge, it is true, was simul¬
taneously publishing his own very sketchy notions of Kant's teaching, but
did not himself subscribe entirely to any part of it. Chalmers, through
Erskine, who acknowledged indebtedness to Coleridge, may have received
some remote influence from the sage of Konigsberg; but the form, or forms,
in which he presents the "moral proof" show a direct debt to Bishop Butler.
The transformation he makes in Butler's teaching is a further indication
of important differences in natural theology and theistic thinking after
it had crossed over from England to Scotland. Chalmers' moral proof is,
in fact, a series of three or four distinguishable proofs, based upon the
leading elements of Butler's moral psychology. Of these proofs, the most
important is that arising from the doctrine of the supremacy of conscience.
The foundation of the moral proof is the fact of conscience and
its strong imperatives in the direction of virtue, rather than any con¬
sideration of the abstract and a priori principles of virtue that comprise
the "ethics of theology," Chalmers keeps these two elements of his moral
doctrine separate, and for interesting reasons.
The objective nature of virtue is one thing. The subjective
nature of the human mind, by which virtue is felt and recognised,
is another. It is not from the former, any more than from the
eternal truths of geometry, that we can demonstrate the existence
or attributes of God—but from the latter, as belonging to the
facts of a creation emanating from His will, and therefore bearing
upon it the stamp of His character.... Virtue is not a creation
of the Divine will, but has had everlasting residence in the nature
of the Godhead. The mind of man is a creation; and therefore in¬
dicates, by its characteristics, the character of Him, to the fiat
and the forthgoing of whose will it owes existence.
1* Ibid., p. 306.
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The question-begging tendency of such considerations may be overlooked
in order to notice the rather unique development this view represents.
Chalmers seems to hold that because the rational principles of ethics are
universal and necessary—and therefore equally necessary for a conceivable
God as for any man, they are inappropriate to an argument bent upon show¬
ing the actual existence and moral character of a living God. From the
outset, therefore, his reasoning concerns itself only with existing facts.
And conscience, as has already been indicated, Chalmers takes to be an
Immediate fact of nature. The moral proof, as a result, depends on what
later generations have learned to call a kind of "existential thinking."
Conscience bears direct testimony to the "moral greatness of Virtue,"
... as erect in the consciousness of its strength as if it had
the public mind of the Universe upon its side. It is difficult
to resist the feeling, that amid all the mystery of present ap¬
pearances, the highest power is at one with the highest principle.1
This expresses most directly the logic of the doctrine that is given more
formal expression elsewhere in Chalmers* voluminous writings.
The clearest and most detailed formulation he gives to the moral
proof from conscience is to be found in the following passage, which also
analyzes the logic on which Chalmers would have the argument rest.
The sense of a governing principle within begets in all men the
sentiment of a living Governor without and above them, and it
does so with all the speed of an instantanious feelingj yet it
is not an impression, it is an inference notwithstanding—and as
much so as any inference from that which is seen, to that which
is unseen. There is, in the first instance, cognizance taken of
a fact ...by the eye of consciousness which has been termed the
faculty of internal observation. And the consequent belief of a
God, instead of being an instinctive sense of the Divinity, is
the fruit of an inference grounded on that fact. There is instant
transition made, from the sense of a Monitor within to the faith
of a living Sovereign above; and this argument ... may be regarded,
notwithstanding the force and fertility of other considerations, as
the great prop of natural theology among men.
1* Ibid., p. 336.
2* Ibid., pp. 331-2
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In one respect, this formulation is unfortunate, for it does not differ¬
entiate clearly between the ordinary "cosmological" proof—-proceeding
from an effect to an appropriate cause—and a distinctively moral proof.
In fact, endeavoring to bring theistic reasoning into conformity with the
inductive procedures of science, Chalmers frequently treats the moral
argument as a species of proof based upon the causal principle as formu¬
lated by Reid. But, with insight more appropriate to the moral tenor of
the Natural Theology as a whole, he characterizes it as having its appropri¬
ate rationale from within the moral consciousness. Conscience governs as
though it already had "the public mind of the Universe upon its side." It
points to the "highest power" as supporting its authoritative demands
But, however formulated, Chalmers insists on the inferential character of
the moral proof. He rejects what he terms the "mysticism" of holding that
there is an immediate intuition of the Divine Being—insisting to the con¬
trary that man is inherently and essentially a creature of conscience, by
nature impelled to lookbeyond himself for the grounds of his moral being.
In Chalmers* presentation of this view, there is good evidence to
show that his thinking is a direct inversion of the elements of Bishop
Butlers' doctrine of conscience. In his ethical doctrine, Butler everywhere
presupposes the existence of God as rational Mind: He is the Guarantor of
the teleological order in which conscience has its superior place in relation
to the moral ends of human life, and therefore its superior authority.
Butler had felt the full force of the rationalistic movement in the eight¬
eenth century. For ethical purposes, he assumed the coercive certainty of
Add to this passage just referred to the following generalization upon
historical evidence: "Righteousness, it was felt, would not have been so
enthroned in the moral system of man, had it not been previously enthroned
in the system of the universe j nor would it have held such place and pre¬
eminence in the judgment of an spirits, had not the Father of Spirits been
its friend and ultimate avenger." (Ibid., p. 335.)
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theoretical demonstrations.1 Chalmers, for his part, attributes the moral
proof to Butler, but in this he seems to have been over-generous. The
reasoning is more appropriate to Scotland. Beginning with the nature of
man disclosed in the empirical consciousness, and assigning the dignity of
conscience to a "felt supremacy," Chalmers is able to argue—as Butler did
not—from moral facts to a moral God.2 This is in line with the central
tradition of Scottish theology and philosophy.
Chalmers thus arrived at a moral proof before the influence of
Kant and Germany had been felt profoundly anywhere in Britain. For this
reason, therefore, some may forgive him the comparison he draws between
Scottish and German theism in his review of Morell's Speculative Philosophy
of Europe:
The first and greatest argument ... of our Natural Theology, is
identical with that of Kant's—the felt supremacy of conscience,
which we have long deemed the most influential of all others for
upholding the faith of a God throughout the world.... This argu¬
ment, too, we bring to bear, even as Kant did, on the soul's im¬
mortality.... Such, in its main features, is the Natural Theology
of Kant, and such, we add, is the Natural Theology of Scotland, in
which, after all, Kant felt himself obliged to take refuge, when,
as if by compensation of errors, he conjured up what he calls the
Practical Reason, to repair the mischief, or rather the else ir¬
retrievable ruin which his Pure Reason had inflicted on the cause
of Theism.3
It is plain here and in other remarks that Chalmers understood Kant's
moral teaching and proof very imperfectly. He seems to have known little
of the concept of "pure practical reason," or of its a priori deliverance
as to the Sungnum Bonpm for man. He denies that any proof can be based on
the univeral, necessary, and abstract principles of ethics—although,
1# Cp. supra, p. 18, n. 2.
2« in lectures on the Analogy of Religion (SW, vol. V, chap. Ill), Chalmers
suggests that Butler has not made full use of moral considerations in fail¬
ing to argue for a positive belief in the existence of God and the immor¬
tality of the human soul. (Cf. p. 518.) Consistent with his own premises,
Butler had limited the argument to "neutralizing" anti-theistic objections.
3* Op. cit., pp. 483-4-
-115'
quite significantly, he recognizes such principles. And while the second
form in which he would cast the moral proof proceeds upon the premise that
pleasure and happiness are ordained concomitants of virtue, this is argued
on psychological grounds—in direct contradiction to Kantian psychology.1
The relative merits of the two men cannot be debated here: in point of
philosophic breadth, consistency, and originality, few would deny Kant's
considerable superiority. The peculiar strength of Chalmers' views, by
contrast, will probably be allowed to stem from the constant attention he
gives to the concrete actuality of human nature: he is not prone to accept
the sharp disomies and over-neat abstractions in which the Critical Phi¬
losophy abounds. Specifically, he anticipates the criticism of later
Scotsmen, with greater knowledge of Kant, who were to find the agnosticism
of the Critique of Pure Reason and the limited moral faith of the Critique
of Practical Reason mutually incongruous. Be this as it may, Chalmers
sensed in Kant a kindred mind, awakened from dogmatic slumber by Hume, and
aroused to counter his modified scepticism in the name of moral reality.
And this sense of affinity—which had considerable foundation in fact-
persisted in the Scottish mind, and helps to explain the remarkable influx
of German thinking in Scotland during the latter part of the nineteenth
century.
(B) Proofs of a more conventional sort—the "cosmological" and
"teleological," loosely grouped together as a posteriori proofs—have a
place in the comprehensive argument of the Natural Theology, although it
1# The adjustment of happiness to virtue is said to betoken the superin¬
tendence of a beneficent Deity. (Cf. Natural Theology. I, pp. 352-83).
The third form of the moral proof begins with the premise that habit works
to the strengthening of the virtuous character and to the annihilation of
the vicious. This is seen as a further adjustment of nature to moral ends,
and a mark of God's moral sovereignty over nature. (Ibid., pp. 383-404-)•
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is a limited place. Far from constituting, the foundation of the science,
they are ancillary to the dominant moral element in Chalmers' thinking.
They are held to establish the bare' probability that, behind the cosmic
order which surrounds and undergirds man's incarnate existence, there is
a supreme Designer and Governor, who is therefore the Benefactor and
Sovereign of mankind. While this probability must fall considerably short
of being certain knowledge, Chalmers urges that it is sufficient to set a
man of sensitive conscience on the quest of a fuller knowledge of God, and
thus prepare his mind to receive the full and clear revelation given in
Christianity. Natural theology fulfills its function only when it has
accomplished this.
It has already been indicated that the ascendency of _a posteriori
proofs in the eighteenth century, and the form of inductive reasoning in
which they were cast, reflected the profound respect of that age for the
scientific method perfected by Newton."^" If Chalmers gives a posteriori
reasonings a limited, and even subordinate, place in arguing the theistic
case, it was not because he had any less respect for science and the
scientific temper that had so powerfully influenced the mind of the age.
His devotion to natural science in all its branches was first evident
during undergraduate days at St. Andrews, continued when he later instructed
in mathematics, chemistry, and kindred subjects at the University, and per¬
sisted even when his mind was given over largely to specifically theological
and ecclesiastical studies. In the Natural Theology, the conclusions of
contemporary science provide the details, upon which the _a posteriori proof
is a generalization.2 Moreover, the character of the Scottish Philosophy
"*"* Supra, p. 20.
2# Ibid.. pp. 189-279. While Chalmers' own thought patterns reflect
the static notions of Newtonian physics, he was aware of contemporary
speculations in the fields of geology and biology which were to revolutionize
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was largely determined by the attempt to apply the methods of physical
science to the study of the mind. To arrive at first principles, Reid
had proposed that the only valid procedure was by induction from the
elemental perceptions of human consciousness. And the contributions of
Scotsmen to what has since become the "science of psychology" were con¬
siderable. The philosophical outlook Chalmers received from Reid could
only confirm his respect for the achievements of science and the nature
of scientific thinking. There is in his teaching not the slightest trace
of the iconoclasm that lurks behind Carlyle's passionate moralism. In
fact, he readily allows the theistic argument to be formed by the require¬
ments of the prevailing scientific temper. "We confess that our chief value
for the experimental argument, is because of its special adaptation to the
habitude of those minds which are disciplined in the methods and investi-
1
gations of Physical Science."
Confidence in all forms of inductive reasoning had been shaken,
however, by Hume's contention that every induction is a species of "moral
reasoning" based upon the causal principle, and that this principle, on
inspection, may be traced to nothing but a passional custom of the human
2
mind in response to the repeated sequence of two contiguous events. And
the mind of the nineteenth century. The work of Cuvier is cited to support
a "Geological Proof for a Commencement of our present Terrestrial Economy."
(Ibid., p. 228ff.) While Chalmers died twelve years before the publication
of Darwin's Origin of Species. the principle of natural selection is weighed
and criticized—adversely—in the Natural Theology. (Ibid., p. 265ff.)
1. Review of Morell's Speculative Philosophy of Europe, op. clt., p. 488.
2* Hume's reasoning is generally as follows: it is to be admitted that
the idea of causality involves three essential elements, the contiguity,
sequence, and necessary connexion of two events. But analysis shows that
only the first and second are traceable to direct experience—that is, to
an impression of sense. The last is discovered to be an addition of the
subjective consciousness—a custom attendant upon tie constant repetition
of the objective sequence. And the custom, like the objective sequence, is
itself in the cause-effect sequence, being the effect of repeated experience
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the theistic argument in particular was further shaken by Hume's view
that the world is a "singular effect," unlike any experienced effect of
an experienced cause, and that consequently the analogy of Divine
creativity to the human has not the slightest rational force.
When two species of object have always been observed to be con¬
joined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one
wherever I see the existence of the other: And this I call an
argument from experience. But how this argument can have place,
where the objects ... are single, individual, without parallel,
or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will
any man tell me with a serious countenance, that an orderly
universe must arise from some thought and art, like the human;
because we have experience of it?1
Despite Hume's somewhat incredulous question, Chalmers maintains
that an orderly universe does occasion the inference to a supreme Thought
and Artistry very like the human, does so on the basis of adequate ex¬
perience, and that the inference is therefore entirely legitimate. He
professes to accept the conditions that Hume would impose upon the argument.
We concede to him his own premises—even that we are not entitled
to infer an antecedent from its consequent, unless we have before
had the completed observation of both these terms and of the suc¬
cession between them. We disclaim the aid of all new or questionable
principles in meeting this objection and would rest the argument a
posteriori for the being of a God, on a strictly experimental basis.
To obviate the difficulty raised by the "singular effect" argument, Chalmers
introduces considerations intended to show that the orderly universe exhibits
properties which characterize every work of human contrivance. And in
in the past, and the cause of anticipations as to the future, that when a
known cause appears, it will be followed by the customary effect, or, that
when a known effect appears, it has been immediately preceded by its
customary cause. (Cf. Treatise. I, III, sections II to VI (pp. 73-94) J
also, N. K. Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, pp. 88-95; 365-403.)
1* Dialogues. Part II, pp. 149-50.
2. Natural Theology. I, p. 138. There is in this passage an implied
criticism of Reid, Dugald Stewart, and others in the Scottish School.
Following Thomas Brown, Chalmers holds that they needlessly multiplied
first principles to butress the theistic inference—that only one is
necessary: namely, an "aboriginal faith in the uniformity of nature's
sequences," an "instinctive expectation of a constancy in the succession
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accordance with the same principles by which inference is made, for
example, from a watch to a human watchmaker, the mind moves from the
observed cosmos to its Maker.
On comparing a work of nature with a work of human art, we find
a posterior term common to both—not adaptation for the end, be¬
cause each has its own specific use, and the one use is distinct
from the other—but adaptation for an end. It is on the strength
of this similarity that we can carry the inference of a designing
cause from the seen to the unseen in specimens of human handiwork;
and, by a stepping-stone in every way as sure, from the seen handi¬
work of man to the unseen handiwork of God. In each we behold not
subservience to the same end, but subserviency to an end—and on
this generality in the consequent of each,' we infer for each an
antecedent of like generality—a mind of commensurate wisdom to
devise, and of commensurate power to execute, either of the struc¬
tures that are placed before our eyes.-
Reduced to its essentials, the argument is a refinement of Paley's well-
known reasoning by analogy. It affirms that the ordered world and works
of human contrivance are of a common species in so far as they exhibit
variously the adaptation of parts to general ends. Since works of human
contrivance are constantly experienced in conjunction with the ordering
minds of men as their essential cause, therefore, from the similar works
of nature, inference is made to a similar Mind.
Whether it is possible to observe adaptation for an end without
discovering the particular end adaptation subserves, whether natural order
implies design and therefore a Great Designer, whether a Common Sense
of events" which is anterior to experience, and is constantly being "modi¬
fied and restrained by it." "The constancy of nature and man's faith in
that constancy do not stand related to each other like the terms of a
logical proposition, or in the way of cause and consequence. There is a
most beneficent harmony between the material and the mental law—but it is
altogether a contingent harmony." (ibid, p. 124.)
-*-• Ibid., pp. 157-8. In this connection, Chalmers' draws a distinction
between the "laws of matter" and the "dispositions of matter"—a distinction
later accepted and taken up by J. S. Mill. McCosh suggests (op. cit., pp.
402-3) that it might more appropriately be termed a distinction between the
"properties of matter" and its "dispositions" according to organized forms
or systems in space and time, which are self-perpetuating and/or self-
generating: e.g., chemical and physical properties are to be discovered in
-120-
"belief" in the absolute regularity of nature justifies the inference in
the face of Hume,s critical account of causation—these and other questions
were raised by Chalmers and bequeathed to later Scottish natural theologians.
This was his chief contribution to the discussion of theoretical principles, a
limited but a significant one. It is important, however, to notice as
precisely as possible the force he attributes to the argument. Strictly
taken, it professes to be nothing more than an argument to a very wise and
powerful Cause of the ordered universe, and not to a Being of absolute
power and perfections."'' Chalmers does not feel the need to supplement the
conclusion of the _a posteriori reasoning by any "ontological" or speculative
considerations.2 For it is not by this means he believes the knowledge
essential to religion is to be had. Inductive reasoning can at best establish
a probability commensurate with the weight of "experimental evidence" that
can properly be claimed to butress the theistic view; religion demands
knowledge of God. But Chalmers can be content with a very limited con¬
clusion, because he believes it is sufficient to activate the moral nature
of man. Whatever the attributes and powers of the Being who orders the
universe, man receives from Him the nature of his incarnate existence and
the attendant conditions that make it possible. As the Benefactor of man¬
kind, declared by the witness of conscience to stand on the side of virtue
the matter forming vegetable or animal organisms. It is from the dis¬
positions of matter, in which its laws or properties are utilized to achieve
some end or other, that Chalmers would derive the theistic argument. The
dispositions, if not the properties, betoken design. Cf. Ibid., pp. 189-228.
!• Cp. the passage drama from the writings of Thomas Brown which Chalmers
cites in summary of his own view of the "natural attributes" of God: Ibid..
II, pp. 361-4.
2. While holding that a posteriori reasonings are the only sound basis
for philosophy, and that a priori systems lack meaning and solidity of
principle, Chalmers does not eschew them entirely. As pure speculation
based only on plausible analogies, they cannot claim to be satisfactoiy
philosophy; but as antidotes to the agnostic speculation of Hume, they de¬
serve respect. While the speculative theist engages the speculative anti-
theist in aerial combat, empirical philosophy advances to consolidate the
position of Common Sense and faith on the solid ground of observation, Cf.
Ibid., I, pp. 99-120.
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and goodness, He deserves all the gratitude and service that the sensitive
conscience would render.
Our conclusion on the whole is that no alleged defect of evidence
in Natural Theology can extinguish the use of it.... Even the
faint and distant probabilities of the subject, may still lay
upon us the duty of careful and strenuous inquisition; and that,
long anterior to our full acquaintance with the certainties of
the subject. The verisimilitudes of the question are the signal
posts, by following the intimations of which, we are at length
conducted to the verities of the question. Although Natural
Theology, therefore, should fail to illuminate, yet, by a moral
force upon the attention, it may fully retain the power to impel
.... It has indeed discharged its most important function, if,
at the point where its guesses or its discoveries terminate, it
leaves us with as much light as should make us all awake to the
further notices of a God, or as shall leave our heedlessness
wholly inexcusable.
On Chalmers * view, natural theology is first and last a theology of con¬
science.
(C) What, then, is Chalmers' contribution to the Scottish
development of demonstrative theism? It is clear, of course, and may be
taken for granted, that a wide gulf separates the "theology of conscience"
from the "academic demonstrations" that were the core of rationalistic
theology in the eighteenth century. To hold Chalmers' doctrines to the
standard of logically coercive, or "apodictic," demonstration is to mis¬
understand the meaning and force they had for him and for contemporary
Scotland. To make the aims and methods of eighteenth century England or
nineteenth century Germany normative would undoubtedly leave Scottish
natural theology in a very unfavorable light—without doing justice to its
alternative insights.
Chalmers' Natural Theology is not characterized by a thorough
consistency and precision of doctrine that ought to be the marks of any
professedly scientific treatment of theistic argument. In part, this may
lm
Ibid.. II, pp. 414.-6.
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ba accounted for by the fact that Chalmers wrote for a wide public and
in a "popular" vein suited to a generally educated mind—not in a language
designed for specialists in either philosophy or theology. The develop¬
ment of a highly technical vocabulary and the limitation of interest in
such matters to specialists was brought about toward the end of the nine¬
teenth century, although intellectual "professionalism" never became the
fetish in Scotland that it was elsewhere. But more important in accounting
for the want of consistency and precision in Chalmers® thinking is the
element of uncertainty and hesitation it contains—undoubtedly a re¬
flection of the contemporary intellectual environment that had been deprived
of its old confidence in order and reason. Quite apart from the outward
confusions occasioned by revolutions and despotisms, social upheavals and
economic rivalries, that affected the whole of Europe, there were the
inward confusions attendant upon the disintegration of older ways of thought
and belief. And Hume, of course, had contributed much to accelerate the
disintegration.
Chalmers' Natural Theology is a "transitional work," reflecting
many characteristics of the foregoing "age of order," but at the same time
moving out in search of a more satisfactory foundation of belief. In
general, Chalmers may be said to represent a growing tendency away from,
the externalism and "scientific objectivity" that had prevailed in Reid's
time toward a new inwardness. a new insistence that man's interior life be
given full weight in making up the case for theism* Reid's professed aim
of applying the inductive principles of natural science to the study of the
human mind appears in retrospect to have succeeded in "naturizing" human
nature in a thoroughly Newtonian fashion. He generalized upon the data.
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or facts, of consciousness, systematizing the whole in accordance with a
number of first principles, of which the axioms of mathematics continued
to be a leading example—as in the rationalistic view of Locke. This
characteristic teaching of Reid is retained by Chalmers, as has already
been shown, in connection with the distinction between the "ethics" of
theology end its "objects." But beside this stands Chalmers5 doctrine of
conscience and his moral proof, emphasizing the inward, immediate, and
distinctively human indications of consciousness as to the nature of ulti¬
mate reality. Moral consciousness provides an "inkling" or clue as to the
spiritual interior of the Universe. Its compulsions body forth an order
of being that will not be regarded with entire objectivity and disinterested
judgment. And it is in this moral order of being that Chalmers finds the
roots of natural religion.
With this greater preoccupation with a distinctively human facet
of nature, new questions arise—or rather, old questions in a more acute
form. Chalmers makes himself more open than Reid to the charge of anthro¬
pomorphism. not only in respect of man's conscience, but also in reasoning
by analogy from human contrivance to the Divine. Since the dawn of philosophy
in Greece, anthropomorphism has generally been held to be, or approximate,
an outright error in determining the character of the Deity. Unfortunately,
Chalmers nowhere deals directly with the obvious dangers of forming God in
man's image. But the drift of his thought indicates that he was not
entirely unaware of them. On the whole, it is plain that while Chalmers'
natural theology is insistently anthropocentric. it is reluctantly anthro¬
pomorphic. In so far as the mind must rely upon spare analogies between
the attributes and works of man, and the attributes and works of God, he
refuses to treat its conclusions as anything but probabilities—tenuous
-Im¬
probabilities at that. This is something of a concession to the force
of Hume's arguments. But in so far as all human thought is conditioned
by, and a condition of, human consciousness, Chalmers feels justified in
the insistence that natural theology be grounded upon that which is most
immediate and most imperative in consciousness. For him, this means the
fact of a sovereign conscience. Man is moral, and will be moral, whatever
the darkness that overshadows the reasonings of his intellect. His course
is therefore plain. Personal obedience and gratitude to an impersonal
order in response to unintended demands and benefactions are inconsistent
with the testimony of conscience as to the moral nature of the universe.
Conscience demands a moral being as its moral object, and where it does
not obviously have one and feels the need of one, it will impel a search
for one. This, according to Chalmers, is the imperative underlying all the
reasonings of the natural theologian. The authoritative judgments of con¬
science upon man's "inward desires and outward doings," and its awareness
of indebtedness for the benefactions of nature, all set conscience on the
quest of a supreme Governor and Benefactor. And the quest ends, for Chalmers
at least, with the revelation of God given in the Scriptures of the Old and
New Testaments.
For Chalmers, as for Reid and Halyburton, it is revelation alone
that can satisfy the demands of conscience and supply what is lacking to
his natural powers of intellect. Christianity provides the ultimate and
certain truth about God's Being, His infinite attributes, and His inflexible
purpose of righteousness and love. As compared with revealed doctrine, the
conclusions of natural theology occupy an extremely small and narrowly
circumscribed place. They provide no fixed norm of truth by which professed
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revelations can be authenticated or rationally established. Christian
theology is not in the least dependent upon it, but is verified by "the
light of heaven," by the "inner testimony of the Spirit." But natural
theology performs an invaluable service to Christian truth by bringing to
clear focus the needs and questionings that are forced upon man by his own
nature, and for which the Christian Gospel brings the only solution.
He is egregiously wrong, (who) speaks of Natural Theology being
the basis of Christianity, in the same way that the foundation
to a house is to its superstructure, or a premise in argument is
of its conclusion. He utterly mistakes the law and nature of
this succession. It is true that Natural Theology comes before
Christianity, not syllogistically, however, but historically,
not in order of demonstration, but in order of human sentiment
and feeling. The one precedes the other just as the sufferings
and anxieties of distress precede the inquiry after relief, and
then the actual finding of its effieaqy.-'-
The tendency toward greater inwardness in dealing with human
nature marks a further step in the development of Scottish demonstrative
theism. And this of course was in keeping with a decided trend of thought
in the first half of the nineteenth century, that received most striking
expression in the Romantic Movement. Chalmers1 views of the Movement, in¬
fluenced no doubt by the Edinburgh Review, seem not to have been entirely
favorable. What his indebtedness may have been, if any, would be very
difficult to assess. But on the whole, this discemable tendency in his
thinking on questions of natural theology seems to owe more to his own
intense Christian piety than to any external influence. It is plain enough
from the history of his early rejection of natural theology to his final
acceptance of it that Chalmers was a convinced Christian before he became
a natural theologian. And no appraisal of his theistic doctrine can dis¬
regard the fact that his acknowledged greatness lay in his extraordinary
Review of Morell's Speculative Philosophy of Europe, op. cit., p. 4-91.
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power as a preacher, pastor, and leader of the Church® Some would main¬
tain without hesitancy that he was "the greatest preacher which Scotland
has produced," and while "not the most intellectual or emotional speaker
of his age," he was, nevertheless, the "most practically influential,
spreading his power over the length and breadth of Scotland,"^" His was
the rare moral and spiritual force of one unreservedly committed to the
truth of the Christian revelation of God. In seeking spiritual sustenance
for his own intensely inward faith, he turned to the devotional writings
of Balyburton, Jonathan Edwards and Erskine of Linlathen. From these he
must certainly have gained increased confidence in the conviction that
man's innermost life is made for communion with God, and that when He speaks
to man, He addresses one whom He has made and destined for Himself®
McCosh, op. cit., pp. 397-9. The verdict is appropriate as coming
from one who himself enjoyed a considerable reputation as philosopher,
natural theologian, and authority on the history of "the Scottish Phi¬
losophy."
Cp. esp. Thomas Erskine on the relation of the Christian Gospel to the
"inward revelation in conscience:" Remarks on the Internal Evidence for
the Truth of Revealed Religion (Edinburgh, 1323), pp. 51-3, 175-6; The
Spiritual Order and Other Papers (Edinburgh, 1871), pp. 253-60. Cf. also
the letter quoted in H. F. Henderson, Erskine of Linlathen (Edinburgh,
1399), p. 23. As has been indicated (supra, p. Ill), Erskine formulated
a moral proof for the existence of a spiritual and Divine order: cf.
The Spiritual Order, pp. 11, 14, 47-49.
So great was Chalmers' admiration of Erskine's writings, that a friend
once remarked, "It seems to me that the Gospel has never appeared to him
in any different light from that in which Mr. Erskine represents it."
(Memoirs, III, p. 246.)
CHAPTER IV
NATURALISM AND NATURAL THEOLOGY:
THE THEISM OF JOHN TULLOCH
To say, with Chalmers, that man is nature a creature of
conscience is an affirmation that is far from being entirely unambiguous,
however. What he intended by this view is plain enough in the context of
his wideranging interests and convictions. What it could mean when some
would attempt, not only to apply the method of natural science to the
study of mind and spirit—as did Chalmers himself, but beyond that to
resolve all spiritual phenomena directly or indirectly into a few em-
pirififlliv ascertained natural principles—this. Chalmers was not able to
foresee. It seemed imperative to Scottish theists a generation later to
disentangle natural theology from the encroachments of an expanding
"naturalism.And Principal John Tulloch may be regarded as their repre¬
sentative. Believing as surely as did Chalmers that man's spiritual being
is intimately involved in the order and system of the natural cosmos, his
primary concern is to show its uniqueness and its supremacy over the realm
of cause and effect. The human spirit distinguishes itself by asserting
its freedom from the "laws of nature," and its power to exercise control
The term is to be taken in the broadest possible sense, as including
all systems flourishing at the middle of the nineteenth century which would
limit scientific and philosophic attention to whatever of reality is ordered
within space and time, without reference to any transcendent, or super¬
natural reality. It thus includes not only materialism, but various forms
of Positivism, radical empiricism, and agnostic science.
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over them. In this, Tulloch finds the evidence of a higher spiritual
order. His theistic doctrine is unequivocally anthropocentric: the
reality of man's spiritual freedom and dignity is the ground upon which
the demonstration of God's infinite spirituality and perfections is to
be based. Tulloch's doctrine is expressed most suceintly in a favorite
aphorism: Nullua spiritus in Microcosmo. nullus Deus in Macroeosmo.
The primary theistic task, as Tulloch conceives it, is thus to
vindicate the reality and rights of spirit—both human and Divine—in the
face of current philosophies that would interpret the whole of experience
without remainder in accordance with a "Law of Universal Causation,n as
John Stuart Mill termed it. What is strikingly apparent in passing to
this from Chalmers' conception of natural theology is its formulation in
terms of the main currents of contemporary thought within and beyond the
borders of Scotland, in England, and indeed throughout Europe. Chalmers
had remained a self-consciously Scottish thinker, defending positions
reached by earlier Scottish theologians and philosophers against external
criticism,''' Tulloch at the middle of the century shuns any appearance of
provincialism, and in formulating the central theme of his own writings,
he states the issue as it was widely debated far beyond limited theological
circles, by contemporaries of many callings and persuasions:
E.g., cp. his appraisal of Kant and German thought: supra, pp. 105,
n.2, & 114.. The chief obstacle in the way of a more cosmopolitan outlook—
for Chalmers and the great majority of his contemporaries—was the language
barrier. Chalmers knew French and thus was able to read the works of
scientists and philosophers using French—including Leibnitz. He knew no
German. Carlyle did great service for his countrymen in mastering German
and translating outstanding German literature into English. Tulloch
studied in Germany as well as in France, inaugurating a new era of theo¬
logical scholarship among his countrymen.
The question with which they deal in diverse application is the
great question of contemporary thought, in comparison with which
all other questions are of little moment—Is there a spiritual
world? Is there a metaphysical as well as a physical basis of
life? Is Reason or Soul, in other words, an entity, and not a
mere manifestation of nervous force—a life behind all other
life, and not merely the highest and most complex phase of natural
life?1
Tulloch is more truly a representative of his times, than was
Chalmers of his. He maintains a studied openness to contemporary life and
thought in every quarter; Conversely, while his thinking is much less pro¬
vincial than Chalmers1, it is more eclectic, and reflects—rather than
affects—the broad tendencies and influences prevailing at the middle of
the nineteenth century,. It would be difficult to encompass in a short
space the numerous factors that entered into the thinking of Europeans
during this transitional period, but in general they may be seen as ad¬
hering to one or the other of two conflicting movements of thought. There
was on the one hand the RrmntrvM a Movement, which had originated in protest
and reaction to the formalism, the narrow intellectualism, and spiritual
superficiality of the eighteenth century. It had come to full flower in
Chalmers* lifetime, and by mid-century had receded. let, its influences
remained, permeating the outward formalism of the succeeding "Victorian
Era." In its various forms it had taught men to value the subjective
elements of human consciousness, to affirm the life of the individual
against most forms of external compulsion, to seek out the history of
human development as the proper meaning and purpose of reality, and in
general to humanize the whole of nature—in Imagination at least—in op¬
position to those who would naturalize man. The faith of Naturalism,on
1# Modern Theories in Philosophy and Religion (Edinburgh & London, 1884-),
Preface, p. v. In context, the passage has reference to the essays of
the volume.
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the other hand, continued to gain acceptance. It had developed in the
wake of Hume's criticism of eighteenth centuxy rationalism. Viewed in
one perspective, it resulted from the translation of Hume's "double-
minded" and essentially Scottish point of view into an environment of
thought molded by the older rationalism; in such a setting, Hume's modi¬
fied scepticism became a conclusive refutation of all religious metaphysics.
The alternative seemed to be a radical empiricism, founded upon the
principle that the only valid knowledge is that which may be reached by
inference from direct sense experience, as in scientific induction, and
that the universe of reality may be measured by this method. The proponents
of Naturalism, in support of their faith, claimed the weight of prodigious
achievements in science, technology, and social experimentation. The middle
period of the nineteenth century has been described by Professor Whitehead
as "an orgy of scientific triumph"—its orgiastic character arising from
the real achievements of scientific thinking in conjunction with the faith
of expanding Naturalism in the limitless possibilities of scientific
achievement. Romanticism on the one side and Naturalism on the other,
conditioned the thought of Tulloch's contemporaries. And it will be found,
that in speaking for himself, Tulloch also speaks for an age that was seeking
to strike a balance between the relative truths of the one and the other.
It should be added, however, that Tulloch's primary allegiance —as Chalmers'
—is to Christian truths it everywhere affects his judgment of contemporary
beliefs, though it, in turn, is affected by them.
Tulloch's liberation from the provincialism that clung to Chalmers'
natural theology, and his sensitiveness to the general mind of the age
were no accident of temperament; they are the bi—products of a new and
consciously developed theological method. In the capacity of Principal and
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Professor of Divinity at St. Mary's College, St. Andrews, Tulloch acquired
a considerable reputation as a student of the history of theology. As
historian and critic, he was thus among the first of a distinguished line
of Scottish theologians who have labored for clarity, breadth, and depth
of religious thought by setting Christian and theistic doctrine in the
light of histoiy. Apart from his Burnett Prize Essay of 1855 entitled
Theism: The Witness of Reason and Nature to an All.-Wia« and Beneficent
Creator. Tulloch's contributions to the development of theistic thinking
in Scotland are made entirely in the form of critical observations upon
past and current doctrines, theistic and anti-theistic. The most celebrated
of these studies is the two-volume work on Rational Theology and Christian
Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century, published in 1872. There
were in addition two other works in which his own critical principles are
more apparent: the Modern Theories in Philosophy and Religion (1884), and a
series of St. Giles1 Lectures entitled, Movements of Religious Thought
Poring the Nineteenth Century (1885). It would probably be too bold a
venture to attempt to trace this new departure in theological method to a
single primary influence. Tulloch undoubtedly was indebted to more than
one. He studied in Germany where the principles of modern historical
criticism had already been laid down, and where Church historians—such
as Neander, with whose work he was intimately acquainted—had pointed the
way to a historical method in theology. There is reason to believe, how¬
ever, that he did not assimilate this influence entirely, for he shows
little interest in broad historical movements and tendencies. His historical
method is to intellectual biography, and in this respect seems par¬
ticularly indebted to the development of historical study among his own
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countrymen. It is a correlative aspect of Scottish anthropocentrism in
theology and philosophy—this attention given to history, instinctive but
undeveloped in Halyburton's discussion of "natural light," brought to
critical consciousness in Horned historical works, romanticized in the
novels and biographies of Scott and Carlyle, and first utilized system¬
atically in Tulloch's own time as a means toward broader intellectual
perspectives and deeper insights. Whatever "philosophy of history" Tulloeh
may be said to have is closely akin to Garlyle's in this respect: he is
concerned above all with the succession of men who have contributed most
to the knowledge and belief of mankind. Robert Flint, somewhat later, was
to reshape the historical method in theological study, and give it the
form it has retained ever since.
In passing from Chalmers to Tulloch, considerable transformation
of thought has obviously taken place, which decisively modifies the further
course of theistie development.^ "Liberalism" is the term that was early
appropriated by those who undertook to free human thought and action from
Differences of temperament and ecclesiastical loyalty should not be
left entirely out of account in characterizing the transition from Chalmers
to Tulloch, although they are of minor importance. At the time of the
"Great Disruption" of the Scottish Church in 1843, Tulloch was a student
of divinity, with strong sympathies for the cause of the Free Church group.
Re remained, nevertheless, in the Established Church, and in later years
became its foremost defender against the declared purpose of Gladstone to
disestablish the Church of Scotland. Moreover, Tulloch did not subscribe
to the "evangelicism" of the church party to which Chalmers gave his al¬
legiance, being himself a convinced Moderate. Still, though cast in a role
antithetic to Chalmers1, he did not underestimate the greatness of his
Christian stature, nor the importance of his contributions to the life of
the church and to the stimulation of Christian and theistie thought. Cf.
his Theism, pp. 8, 18, & 214? also Movements of Religious Thought, pp. 143
& 161.—Details of Tulloch1s life are all drawn from an absorbing biography
by Mrs. M. 0. Oliphant entitled, A,Memoir of the Life of John Tulloch. P.P..
LL.D. (Edinburgh & London, 1888).
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the limitations imposed by previous ages of intellectual, moral, and
spiritual attainment. Liberalism in Scotland was in most respects a
direct continuation of the older "Moderatism," although that term had
since passed into general disfavor. The same characteristics of tolerance,
intellectual liberality, moral earnestness, broad cultural interest, and
philosophic acumen are retained by the new liberalism, and intensified.
John Tulloch's writings exemplify each of these qualities in a notable
degree, and it is clear that he would associate himself unreservedly with
the development of Scottish "liberalism" which he characterized in these
words: referring to the third and fourth decades of the nineteenth century,
he writes,
There has seldom been in our national history a more fruitful
epoch of religious thought. And the same general character is
more or less stamped on all its manifestations, various as these
otherwise are. This character may be said to be expansiveness.
. The theological mind is seen opening in all directions. There
is a general breaking up of the old close traditional systems
transmitted from the earlier time. The idea of God as the loving
Father of all men—of the religious life as having its root in
immftd-tatft contact with the Divine, rather than in adherence to
any definite forms whether of Church belief or Church order; the
recognition of the religious consciousness as a pervading element
of human nature with its own rights in the face of Revelation, and
especially in the face of the scholastic dogmas which had been
based on Revelation; toe desire after a more concrete and living
faith merging into one the abstractions of theological nomenclature:
and more than all perhaps an optimist Catholic ideal displacing toe
sectarian ideals of the older schools of thought; all these larger
features meet us with more or less prominence.
This "expansivenesd1 of the new Liberalism, as Tulloch conceives it, is
obviously not just a heterogeneous accumulation of fact and experience to
illustrate older creeds and convictions; it is at its center the "opening
of the theological mind in all directions" in order to unify and compre¬
hend every true"religious insight within a single "optimist Catholic ideal."
!• Movements of Religious Thought, p. 167, The underlining has been added
to the text.
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The possibility of attaining to such an ideal is grounded in the ultimate
and essential conviction that man is constituted a spiritual being: re¬
ligious consciousness is "a pervading element of human nature with its own
lights in the face of revelation." In maintaining this view, whether in a
specifically Christian or broadly theistie context, Tulloch is motivated
by the belief that he moves with the tide of contemporary thinking toward
a more liberal and comprehensive creed.3.
When the specific problems and content of theistic doctrine are
isolated from the larger body of theological thinking, it is possible to
observe in some detail what logic there is in the development from Chalmers
to Tulloch. It is true, of course, that religious philosophy, like most
intellectual disciplines with the exception of physical science, was affected
by the particular kind of humani sm and optimism that had been generated by
the Romantic outlook. Tulloch1s debt to Coleridge, the arch-Romantic, will
prove a case in point. To some extent, the "logic" of -the liberal tendency
is that of instinctive reaction against the limitations, the artificialities,
In tracing the development of religious thought in Scotland from the
beginning of the nineteenth century to his own time, Tulloch adjudges the
tendency toward liberalism its outstanding characteristic. His studies of
Scottish religious thought are invaluable for the general ^source material
they contain. (Lecture IV of his Movements of Religious Thought deals with
Scottish thought from the beginning of the century to the Great Disruption;
an article in the Contemporary Review of March, 1877 (Vol. XXIX, No. 3),
entitled "Progress of Religious Thoughtin Scotland," carries the account
onward to the time of writing.)
Tulloch points out that the Confessionalist tradition—which was con¬
tinued in the Free Church by Drs. Cunningham and Candlish after Chalmers*
death—was gradually modified and transformed by a number of writers. Thomas
Erskine of Linlathen, John Macleod Campbell, and Edward Irving were native-
born. Carlyle*s writings also were a germinating influence in the religious
thinking of Scotland. From England, the effect of Coleridge*s speculations,
the writings of Maurice and Kingsley, the sermons of F. W. Robertson, was
slowly being assimilated. And from Germany, the religious doctrine of Kant,
Schleienoacl^r, and the Hegelians began to be heard. Tulloch himself was! more or lessjacquainted with all these diverse representatives of the new
"liberalism" he himself espoused.
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of an age too ready to compress moral and religious experience within
the mold of orderly and comprehensible systems. Nevertheless, Scottish
liberalism also contained a knowledgeable criticism of the older natural
theology, and one of far-reaching consequences. Tulloch's essay on
Theism, while not first-rate as a work of original and constructive
theistic argument,1 suggestively criticizes the intent of establishing
the existence and attributes of God, apart from any professed Revelation
to men, by inference from the constitutive elements of human experience.
In general, the criticism is two-fold.
(i) Tulloch urges that it is inconsistent and impossible to
found a valid theistic argument on a view that places the distinctive
attributes of human consciousness on a plane with the "merely natural."
This had been the bent of natural theology from Reid to Chalmers. In
answer to Hume, it had been argued generally that rational principles and
moral imperatives are of the essence of man's being, and must be included
within the concent of nature. In so far as this doctrine is intended to
do justice to the fact of "man's involvement in nature "—as it has been
teimed in more recent times—Tulloch assents to it. "It is undeniable that
man's intellectual and moral being, in all its most subtle and complex
!♦ Tulloch received the second award from the Burnett trust in 1855, the
first being given to a Rev. R. A. Thompson of Lincolnshire. Whatever the
merits of Thompson's work, Tulloch's probably received its due: it is not
the best among his own works.—The Burnett Trust, founded in 1785 by John
Burnett, an Aberdeen Merchant, provided two prizes to be awarded at inter¬
vals of forty years for essays dealing with natural theology, theistic
difficulties, and the relation of natural religion to Christianity. The
prizes were first awarded in 1815—occasioning the first extended modern
treatment of Natural Theology by a Scot (W. L. Brown's Essay on the
Existence of a Supreme Creator): they were given for the last time in 1855.
Funds of the trust were diverted to other purposes because of the im¬
patience of hard-headed trustees, and perhaps also in pari because the
natural theology envisioned by the Deed of Trust was rapidly passing out
of fashion—dispatched by the Scottish idealists.
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manifestations, shows the same order that we everywhere discover in
nature.""1" But he questions the wisdom of insisting upon it in order to
provide a foundation for scientific induction, and to conform to the
scientific Bhabitudew that had possessed contemporary thought. It was
this, of course, that had shaped Chalmers1 thought, and informed the view
that moral consciousness is an integral aspect of the natural order. His
insistence upon a posteriori method in all philosophical reasoning was a
mark of high respect for the achievements and possibilities of scientific
induction. Tulloch points out that it is only a short step from the
assertion that theistic argument may—indeed, must—be cast in the form
of a scientific induction to the view that all conscious experience be
subject to the same order, the same laws, the same causal principles, that
apply in analyzing the data of the natural sciences. This step had been
taken, by Bentham, the Mills, Ccmte, Lewes and others—giving rise to the
naturalistic tendency that was continuing to gain force at mid-century.
Tulloch readily concedes to Naturalism the greater consistency, as against
the older natural theology.
We are satisfied that the old motto is true, "Nullus spiritus.
nullus Deus." It is not enough to recognize mind as well as
sense, and to argue outwards towards a Divine mind. Unless we
start with the Divine in man, we can never reach it in Nature.
Unless we begin with a substantive spiritual entity, we can
never find such an entity at all. Mind which is the mere growth
of Nature, can never help us to pass beyond Nature.... A mere
necessary condition of mind in us can never warrant the assumption
of a Supreme Mind outside of us. Such an inference is open at
once to all the force of the Kantian critcism against the old a
priori argument, and all the force of modern criticism, on the
ground of anthropomorphism. Mind, abstract it as we will, is a
human experience, and except on the ground of some special affinity
with the Divine, has no right to stand at the head of Nature.2
1* Theism, p. 296.
2# Modern Theories in Philosophy and Religion, p. 120; cf. also, Theism,
pp. 17-20. The somewhat diffuse reasonings of Tulloch's earliest work
are summed up more succinctly in his later writings.
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(il) Tulloch urges further that to define natural theology
by contrast to revelation, and—citing the critical instance—to dis¬
tinguish sharply between the sphere of natural religious knowledge and
that of Christian truth, is unsatisfactory. At least, in the light of
contemporary appraisals of scientific knowledge, such a distinction
tended as much to disrupt religious conviction as to support it. In main¬
taining the preeminence and perfections of Christian knowledge, Chalmers
for one had set the most essential part of his own personal faith in a
light uncongenial to the scientific mind. The genius of his natural
theology had been to approach religious truth from the standpoint of
science; but, like Halyburton before him, he had represented Christian
truth as entirely discontinuous from the imperfect inferences of the
natural reason, authenticated by a direct act of Divine grace through the
inner witness of the Spirit. Tulloch writes of the "Evangelical School,"
in which he expressly includes Chalmers, that
...with all its merits, (it) had conceived of Christianity
rather as something superadded to the highest life of humanity
than as the perfect development of that life; as a scheme for
human salvation authenticated by miracles, and, so to speak,
interpolated into human history rather than a divine philosophy,
witnessing to itself from the beginning in all the higher phases
of that history. And so Philosophy, and no less Literature, and
Art, and Science, were conceived apart from religion. The world
and the Church were not only antagonistic in the biblical sense,
as the embodiments of the Carnal and the Divine Spirit—^which
they must ever be; but they were, so to speak, severed portions
of life divided by outward signs and badges. ...(These "common¬
places" of the Evangelical School) were essentially narrow and
false. They destroyed the largeness and unity of human experience.
They not merely separated religion from art and philosophy, but
they tended to separate it from morality.
The unsatisfactory character of the sharp distinction between the spheres
of natural and revealed truth is indicated most simply by the assertion
Movements of Religious Thought, p. 13; the underlining has been added
to the text. Cf. also, Theism, pp. 78-80; 290-1; 313-15. It should be
noted that all the implications of Tulloch's criticism do not apply to
Chalmers.
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that it is more in keeping with the scientific temper to rest with the
limited and inconclusive inferences of Chalmers the natural theologian,
than to go on to the supernatural faith of Chalmers the Christian, To
vindicate the theistic view fully, Tulloch maintains that such a dis¬
tinction must he overcome,-—and can be. He argues that the natural and
the supra-natural are conjoined in man. In the analysis of this con¬
junction lies the possibility of a comprehensive philosophy that will em¬
brace both nature and spirit, the material, the human, and the Divine,
The more deeply our whole being is studied, the more, we feel
assured, will freedom and conscience, and in a word, reason,
as forming the comprehensive spiritual element in man, be ac¬
knowledged as realities,—and Theism hence be found the en¬
nobling complement of all human study, no less than the direct
expression of Divine Revelation.
Theistic development down to Tulloch's time was thus, in part at least, an
2
advance through criticism of the older natural theology.
Against the background of the larger movements of thought at the
middle of the century, and the special circumstances that brought Tulloch
into intimate contact with them, it is now possible to examine in greater
detail his elaboration of the theistic argument. It will be advantageous
to consider first (A) the moral aspects of his doctrine, which are its
Ibid., p, 431, Again, the underlining has been added,
2<» The older view sharply dividing the order of natural knowledge from
that of revealed knowledge was "modernized" by Sir William Hamilton, the
most distinguished Scottish philosopher of the nineteenth centuxy. His
philosophy of the "unconditioned" elaborated Reid's Common Sense doctrines
in the direction of Kantian agnosticism, while at the same time it pro¬
fessed to establish the truths of religion upon the ground of a "moral
faith." Hamilton did not elaborate the notion of a "moral faith." In
its distinctively philosophic aspects, the development represented by
Tulloch is a criticism of Hamilton^ teachings. His most able critics
were his own students, Henry Calderwood (The Philoaophv of The Infinite.
1854) and James F, Ferrier (Institutes of Metaphysics. 1854)♦ Tulloch was
the contemporary and debtor of both. He was an intimate of Ferrier.
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foundation. Then it will be possible to see (B) that the moral insight
is expanded so as to establish a theoretical ground upon which "intellect"
may effectively vindicate theistic convictions in the face of an expanding
naturalism. This will lead in turn (C) to a final appraisal of Tulloch's
own contribution to theistic development in Scotland: none before him
had reached the conclusion that theistic argument is contingent upon the
reality—the ontological "fixity," so to speak—of the human spirit. In
more conventional terminology, Tulloch attained to the view that knowledge
of God is to be had by reasoning from "the image of God" in man.
(A) It has been said of Hume that he came to his most character¬
istic doctrines "through the gateway of moralsj" of Chalmers, that his
natural theology is first and last a "theology of conscience." Now it must
be said of Tulloch also that his theistic view is grounded upon the moral
consciousness, whose self-disclosed essence is "the theistic fact round
which, as their rational nucleus, all the others gather."^ What that essence
is, Tulloch usually indicates by the single word "freedom": "This fact of
a free rational activity, or soul in man, is implied in every form of
spiritual philosophy, and appears to constitute the essential basis of all
theology.He introduces a consideration that has no place at all in
Chalmers' thinking, and which had felt the weight of Hume's hostile criti-
3
cism. It is not without significance, however, that Reid in his discussion
of "the active powers," was among the first—if not the first—of modern
philosophers to raise the problem of freedom, or "free will," to a place
Theism, p. 292.
2. Ibid., p. 293.
3. Gf. Hume's chapter "Of Liberty and Necessity" in the first Enquiry.
Section VIII.
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of prime importance.^" Tulloch brings into prominence a side of Scottish
thought that has hitherto been noticed only in passing, and unequivocally
asserts the dependence of the theistic case upon the fact of freedom. In
this latter respect, he is distinctly a representative of the nineteenth
century, and of Scottish thought approximating views reached elsewhere along
other lines of development.
Freedom, according to Tulloch, is an ultimate fact of conscious¬
ness, a deliverance of Common Sense as Reid would put it. He makes use of
the terminology employed by Reid in accounting for the "first principles of
necessary truths," and specifically for the free-will principle as the
cornerstone of ethics. The fact of freedom is experienced in its immediacy
to be a "sense," "sentiment," or "feelingj" not only a "feeling of self,"
but a "feeling of what has been called self-determination or choice."^
"...that we feel ourselves to be free, none can truly deny. This feeling—
our deepest and most ineradicable consciousness—the doctrine of necessity
3
(as the antithesis of a doctrine of freedom) cannot accept as a fact." On
the other hand, the rational character of the fact is indicated by describ¬
ing it as an "idea" or "intuition of reason." As such, it is not to be
reached as the result of reasoning, but is itself a ground of reasoning.
Cf. Sidgwick's Outlines of the History of Ethics, p. 262: "The position
of the question ... became materially different under the influence of the
important reaction, initiated by Reid, against the whole manner of phil¬
osophizing that had led finally to Hume. Not only did the conviction of
Free Will occupy a prominent place among the beliefs of Common Sense which,
in the view of the Scottish school, it was the business of philosophy to
define and defendj it was also generally held by this school to be an
absolutely essential point of ethical doctrine."
Theism, p. 295.
3. Ibid., p. 300.
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...It is not only not wonderful that we cannot understand freedom,
but the fact is such in its very idea that it is impossible we
ever can understand it, transcending as it necessarily does that
logical power of which it is the condition.... We have no claim
to comprehend it, for (as logicians) we do not contain it—it
contains us.
Thus, in general, Tulloch would describe the conviction of freedom in
exactly the same way that Reid had dealt with first principles. The dif¬
ference lies in what each takes to be the object of Common Sense: Reid
holds it to be a body of first principles j Tulloch, an order of spiritual
reality in which man finds himself in immediate relation to God.
When the "fact of freedom" delivered in moral consciousness is
observed further, with a view to discovering its content, Tulloch finds
that it has a binary character: it involves both independence and de¬
pendence. liberty and order. When compared with the order of Nature,
"freedom" represents an "efficiency" or "power of self-determination" with¬
in the human spirit, which is "unconditioned by arynatural cause." But
when regarded as a manifestation of spirit, belonging to a distinct level
of being apart from the "merely natural," "freedom" involves the relation-
ing of this self-evident efficiency under thedirection of "the All-efficient."
That is, the freedom of which Tulloch speaks is not of a sort incompatible
with order producing chaos in the matter of moral and spiritual relations;
it is freedom subject to a higher spiritual older that manifests itself in
and through the exercise of man,s finite freedom, or power of self-deter¬
mination. Spiritual freedom asserts itself emphatically "in opposition
to the law of phenomena"—the mechanical regularity of the natural cosmos.
At the same time it embodies within itself elements of which a distinct,
spiritual cosmos is made. Thus, in the experience of freedom at the root
of moral consciousness, Tulloch would ground the conviction that spirit
18 Ibid-# PP. 299-300.
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resides in human nature, and is the immediate token of a sphere of being
in which the reality of God is not only meaningful, but necessary."*"
This view worked out in detail in the Theism, one of Tulloch's
earliest convictions, was little developed in later writings. It remained,
however, as the basic critical principle in every analysis of the issue
between the naturalistic and the theistic views of life. Thus, in apprais¬
ing the arresting doctrines of John Stuart Mill—the attempt to fuse
Romantic notions with the more consistent naturalism of his father and
Bentham—Tulloch reverts to his familiar theme:
The effect of (Mill's) thoroughgoing criticism has been to make
clearer than before the roots of the great opposing lines of
thought on which all higher speculation rests. In the end, on
either side, a postulate stares us in the face. Man is either
divine from the first—a free spiritual being standing apart
from all nature,—or he is essentially material. On the latter
basis, no religion in the old sense can be based. All attempts
to find spirit in matter, if spirit is not already presupposed
as prior to matter, is a mere futile imagination.2
If this immediate bearing of the doctrine of freedom upon the
debate with naturalism be borne in mind, further elaboration may be deferred
for the moment, so that the positive theistic argument may be seen in proper
perspective. The "fact of freedom" and the "fact of conscience" together
constitute the whole of that which is peculiarly the "moral consciousness."
Both facts disclose intuitively, or in their immediacy, the reality and
character of the spiritual order in which God is ultimate and supreme.
!• The problem of freedom in a more precisely ethical sense centers upon
the discussion of "motive." Tulloch concedes to "necessitarians" that
"volition goes forth under motive." He takes issue with them only on the
point of "What constitutes motive? What is the spring of the order which
is universally admitted to obtain among the facts of man's spiritual being,
no less than among all other facts?" (Ibid., pp. 296-7.) His own con¬
clusion is simply, in accordance with the general view, that "The spring of
the soul's activity is ever within the soul.... According to a well known
pithy saying of Coleridge, 'it is not the motive makes the man, but man the
motive.'" (p. 298.)
2« Movements of Religious Thought, p. 244. Of. also Modem Theories
(Edinburgh, 1844)> pp. v-vi, 53ff. 120-1, 158-60, 305-6, etc.
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Tulloch sets conscience in much the same light that it had received from
Butler and Chalmers. He is emphatically at one with Chalmers at this
point in describing conscience as the agent of an insistent obligation,
presiding over every conscious activity of mind. It is the source of all
knowledge of duty, and has a de .jure authority over the other activities
of mind.1 He also agrees that this authority has extraordinary force in
confirming the theistic position: "The sense of government in every heart
can only proceed from a living governor, who placed it there. The moral
power within us, therefore, gives, as its immediate inference, a Divine
2
Power above us.w A difference arises, however, in giving an account of
the nature of the theistic "inference" from the authority that attaches to
the "fact of conscience," and also to the "fact of freedom"--to the whole
of moral consciousness. Tulloch argues that it is a "simpler," "more just
and penetrating view" to affirm that "the authority which, in conscience,
speaks to us is not merely something from which we may infer a divine Power,
but is already the direct expression of that powerIn other words, man
is a spiritual being under higher authority and is not himself in possession
of it. Moral authority inheres in one who has a final right to it, unclouded
or unconfused ty extraneous influences. For this reason, it cannot belong
to rnnn whose view of moral reality is inconstant, variable, lacking often
in necessary precision, and dissociated from the actual disposition of his
will. Tulloch holds that it is more satisfactory to regard the undoubted
authority disclosed in moral consciousness as an intuition of the tran¬
scendent fact of God and the Divine Will, Immediately apprehended and not
reached at the end of a logical induction from a fact inherent in the nature
Theism, pp. 312-13, 317-18.
2. Ibid., p. 312.
3• P. 3H.
-144"
of man.1 This view is stated boldly and broadly in the following terms:
We have in the very fact of conscience, the intuition of the
Divine will, just as we have in the fact of self-existence
the intuition of the Divine existence. As we cannot realize
our being without at the same time realizing another and a
higher Being, so we cannot become conscious of duty, without
at the same time realizing another and a higher Will. The
moral law is to us nothing more than the revelation of this
higher or divine Will in the soul. We do not, therefore, need
to rise from it to God, for it is already the voiee of God
within us. We are carried out of ourselves, so to speak, in
the simple reality of conscience.2
Thus, at the root of moral consciousness lies a cognitive act by
which the mind is brought into direct contact with the objective reality of
God, who is its ground. Intuition "...unites the soul to objectivity by
the very character of its affirmation in reason."-^ In a manner entirely
analagous to the way in which sense perception brings the mind into direct
contact with the objective facts of nature, intuition sets before it "the
higher world of truth" that centers in God.^ Tulloeh urges that the ob¬
jective reality of God—not rational First Principles—is the proper object
of the higher Common Sense. "The infinite Presence...is the complement of
man's spiritual being at all points."^ God is known from within a direct
personal relationship—known to be Personal Will and Reason, revealing His
In defense of this position, Tulloch writess "...it gives, in a
psychological respect, a more discriminating and consistent interpretation
of conscience, than when it is regarded as in itself both a perceptive and
imperative faculty. Viewed simply as the organ of a higher power, its
psychological dignity is at once vindicated, and its possible abuse readily
understood. For let the organ be untrained or neglected, and its intuition
will be dim and obscure, or even absolutely perverted. But let it be appro¬
priately disciplined, and its intuition will rise into clearness and truth."
(Ibid., p. 315.)
2» Ibid., p. 314.
3. Ibid., p. 331.
4. Cf. ibid., p. 319f. Tulloch's doctrine of "intuition" is very like
Coleridge's view of "rational intuitions." He was intimately acquainted
with Coleridge's thought. Cf. Movements of Religious Thought, pp. 6-34.
**# Theism, p. 327.
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purpose of order and righteousness to men. And from the Sovereign Person¬
ality of God, the spiritual order in which man participates derives its
most essential characteristics:
This supernatural order is no mere ideal rule or law—a projection
of our higher imagination or an invasion of "something not our¬
selves," whence we cannot tell. It is a divine reality,—a Personal
Reason and Will like our own, enlightening, educating, controlling
us. Morality, in the true sense, is conformity to this divine reality;
Philosophy, in the highest sense, is our theory of its mode of being;
and Theology, our knowledge of its activities and manifestations.•*•
The sovereign reality of God is the foundation of moral consciousness,
known by intuition in and through the responsible exercise of human freedom.
From the moral perfections of His Being—His supreme righteousness and good¬
ness revealed to conscience—the constitutive sense of "authority" may be
seen to follow readily.
The bearing of this doctrine of intuition upon the polemic with
Naturalism will be seen to better advantage in the following section, dealing
with its "intellectual" or "theoretical" aspects. Before going on to these
all-important matters, however, it may be well to point out that Tulloch's
notion of "intuition" involves a real distinction between the spirit who
intuitively apprehends, and the Spirit who is apprehended. In this respect,
he consciously dissociates his own view from Idealistic doctrines, monistic
2
in character, and variously informed by the "principle of identity." Though
Tulloch is often found referring to man as "divine" or having "seme special
1* This illuminating passage is contained in the introduction to Tulloch's
lectures on The Christian Doctrine of Sin (Edinburgh, 1876), p. 18.
2* German idealism was currently making its way into the British mind,
though more in the form of imaginative insight than of precise exposition.
Men of letters—poets, essayists—were the first to introduce the informed
public to the teachings of the idealistic successors to Kant. Schelling was
particularly influential, and his views were frequently mistaken—by Coleridge
and Carlyle, for example—to be those of Kant. (Cf. Rene Wellek, Xmroanuel
Kant in 1793-1838: Princeton, 1931.) In Scotland, Hamilton and
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affinity with the DivineM—to conacience as "the voice of God within,"
these expressions are not construed as meaning that the human spirit is
an integral manifestation of God's supreme and constitutive Spirit. Man
is not to be identified with Nature, but much less is he to be identified
with God. Moral intuition is an insight appropriate to his own distinctly
human spirit. In this respect, Tulloch's doctrine is very like the view
of intuition he discovered in Pascal's Pensees, by which he was directly
and profoundly influenced.-^ With Pascal, he conceives the true theistic
perspective to be a distinct alternative to "lyrrhonism and Dogmatism,
Montaigne and Epictetus," and—Tulloeh himself adds—to "empiric materialism?*
and "transcendental dogmatism." In the best Scottish tradition, Tulloch's
theism remains a mediating philosophy. Common Sense thought, though trans¬
formed considerably, is still hostile to "gnostic" rationalism in its newer
form.
Ferrier penetrated farther than mo3t into the mysteries of the Idealistic
idiom, stirring some to a proper philosophic interest. Also, Victor Cousin,
the French eelectic who had mediated Scottish thought to the continent (in a
series of lectures delivered first in 1819, and finally published in 1857
under the title, Philosophie Ecossaise), mediated continental idealism to
Britain.
Tulloch published a short study of Pascal in 1878, mainly biographical.
His early knowledge of the great French Jansenist was signalized in an
article entitled, "Pascal—Christian Philosophy," published in the British
Quarterly Review four years before the Theism was written (August, 1850j
Vol. XII, pp. 139-69.) Pascal seems to have provided him with the idea and
the inspiration to work out a "just and adequate Philosophy of Religion."
Even at this early date, there is evidence that he read Pascal with the eyes
of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, whose influence he was to feel increasingly and
whose concept of "rational intuitions" was at variance with Pascal's "heart"
or "reasons of the heart."
British Quarterly Review, op. cit.. pp. 151-2. Tulloch criticizes
Cousin's Idealistic proclivity in Theism, pp. 324-27. He characterizes the
Hegelianism of the "Young Germany" school as pantheistic, and for that reason
ultimately "destitute of all moral meaning and power": pp. 427-31. Cf. also,
Theism, pp. 69-70.
In what has been shown so far, it is probably apparent that
Tulloch's notion of "moral intuition" is broadly conceived, and on all
sides refuses to be limited to the sphere of the merely ethical. Moral
consciousness is the means of a direct insight into the ultimate consti¬
tution of things, and is itself a manifestation of reason. It is now possible
to show how this equation affects the remainder of Tulloch's theistic doctrine,
with special reference to the polemic against Naturalism*
(B) The problem posed by Naturalism for theistic belief had been
well summed-up by Hume in the celebrated question, "What peculiar privilege
has this little agitation of the brain which we call thought that we must
• •• make it the model of the whole universe?" Translated into Tulloch's
phrasing, what "right" has mind to "stand at the head of nature?" To tho3e
who were determined to maintain the interests of science, and yet were pro¬
foundly sympathetic to the requirements of man's moral and spiritual being,
the question seemed to raise irresolvable difficulties* Reason appears to
demand the consistent application of the causal principle to every datum of
experience—the explanation of them as effects of antecedent causes within
a unified system of cause and effect. Spirit, however, must have some
element of freedom, or inner power of self-determination not governed ab¬
solutely by an external antecedent, if it is to be spirit* The apparent
impossibility of reconciling the two views led to aesthetic, theological,
and philosophic constructions which did not profess to achieve a reconcilia¬
tion* Scientific reason must be left alone to tend where it will, though
in all probability it must move in the direction of a thoroughly mechanistic
view, excluding theism* Beside it, however, stand the facts of moral con¬
sciousness, disclosing an order of being in which the "privilege" of thought,
the "right" of mind, have their peculiar locus and ascendency over Nature*
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Dichotomy is the last word* To a limited extent, this dichotomy was present
in Chalmers1 separation of rational and moral powers. It was dearly present
in the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, and in the more celebrated
Critical doctrines of Kant. With Hamilton and Kant primarily, Tulloch takes
issue. He urges that the moral insight is all-comprehending; it must be con¬
clusive for reason, if only because reason, intellect, conscience, conation,
—all are in the same case. They are aspects of personality which is unitary
and indissoluble. At the center of rational consciousness, dichotomy is in¬
tolerable and impossible.
Rational consciousness is a whole—an organic whole, and its dis¬
tinguishable functions for that reason cannot be compartmentalized or isolated
from one another. "According to the only genuine conception of the human
mind, ... there are none of the sides of mental activity which can be strictly
demarcated from the others, all blending as they do endlessly into one
another.That any adequate concept of human nature must consider man "in
his totality1* is a further insight discovered among the thoughts of Pascal
with which Tulloch's own convictions fully accord. Conscience and intellect,
for example, may be variously occupied, each with its proper concerns, but
both are united within the all-comprehending oneness of personality. In
direct consequence, Tulloch rejects the Kantian and Hamiltonian view that
moral consciousness only, not intellect, can obtain rationally valid evidence
for belief in God. "We cannot legitimately disjoin the intellectual and
the moral—the pure and the practical—and hold their deliverances asunder."2
In so far as such views merely imply that to the region of moral
consciousness must be traced the foundation of the theistic argu¬
ment, and its peculiar seat, we are prepared to coincide with them.
But we cannot assent to any view which would limit the evidence to
Theism, p. 320. Cf. also, pp. 4-3, 45.
2« Ibid., p. 324.
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this region* It finds here its peculiar home; but it by no
stops here* Springing from the depths of our moral consciousness,
it is taken up by the intellectual common sense; and the special
argument from design is neither more nor less than the application
which is thus made of the primary theistic principle.^
That is to say, the fact of freedom, or free will, at the center of hitman
personality is of decisive Importance in deciding the theoretical problems
confronting the inquiring intellect* Isolation of the one from the other
must falsify truth because it falsely treats consciousness as a house div¬
ided against itself. Free will is nothing if it is not consonent with reason,
and reason is irrational when it disregards its alternative aspect as freedom.
We know nothing of Will apart from Reason; the one is to us merely
the peculiarly active, the other the peculiarly intelligent, side
of the same spiritual energy. They unite and form one in what we
comprehensively call Mind, which we therefore recognize as the only
adequate source and explanation of the universe*
When Tulloch speaks of mind, consequently, it is mind clothed with the
attributes of rational self-determination. It is this mind that must raise
questions concerning an ultimate reality of which it is a part* It is this
mind that must determine what "explanation" of reality is valid and true*
This, of course, is the task of philosophic demonstration. And
once again, the use to which Tulloch puts the "theistic proofs" reveals the
■vital center of his argument. His view of a valid theistic proof discloses
the basic premises of his position. Two thirds of the Theism are given over
to the discussion of foundations in logic and "metalogie," and to the illus¬
tration of the argument frcm the various branches of contemporary science.
He describes his scheme of proof as "generally called •Inductive,'" although
its critical consideration,-—its major premise—is not susceptible of induc¬
tive treatment. For simplicity and precision, Tulloch formulates his general
1* Ibid*, p. 291.
2. I&d., P. 45.
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thesis syllogistically:
Order universally proves Mind.
• The Works of Nature discover Order.
• • The Works of Nature prove MLnd.l
The complex major premise is, of course, the crux of the matter. No one,
and least of all a proponent of the Naturalistic view, would seriously dis¬
pute the achievement of the sciences in showing what regularities and patterns
of events undoubtedly characterize the present constitution of nature. What
is denied is that natural order must be regarded as the evidence, and the
practical equivalent, of design, Tulloch accepts the obligation to show
that "Mind is everywhere the only valid explanation of order—its necessary
correlate."^ That is to say, he would "prove" that mind is the "only valid
explanation" of order because it alone answers fully to the notion of a
"cause;" it is everywhere the "necessary correlate" of order, because this
is implied in the very fact of its rational employment. Thus, the proof
of the major premise involves Tulloch in two distinguishable lines of argu¬
ment, the one having to do with the doctrine of "efficient causation," the
other with the doctrine of "final causation," This complication seems to
give promise of involved argument, but closer examination shows that the
clue to its meaning is to be found in the exact correspondence of the
characteristics of mind, or reason, to those already considered in a moral
context. Reason, or mind in its intellectual activity, possesses an "author¬
ity" comparable to that of moral consciousness. It is in itself a pledge
that reality is rational throughout, even as conscience is a pledge that
reality is moral throughout. The doctrine of "efficient causation" would
prove the efficiency of mind in relation to natural order, and conversely
1' Ibid., p. 14.
2# Ibid., p. 16.
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the witness of natural order to the causation of mind. The doctrine of
"final causation" would prove that the claim of reason to survey the whole
of reality is rooted in the intuition of an infinite Mind, whose designs
pervade the cosmos. Without following Tulloch into too great detail, his
treatment of the two inter-related doctrines may be indicated.
To show that "order universally proves mind." Tulloch would first
prove that the notion of "causation" regarded as indispensible by all con¬
temporary philosophy must be traced genetically to the power of rational
self-determination possessed by mind, apart from which it has no meaning.
He argues specifically against the naturalistic "law of universal causation"
enunciated by John Stuart Mill. Mill had insisted that the term "cause" be
used only to designate an antecedent which is followed regularly and pre¬
dictably by a recognized consequent. Causation lies simply in the fact of
invariable sequence. And the task of philosophy is to prove that the whole
of reality may be brought within a unified and comprehensive system, of
which "causation" thus understood is the organizing principle. Tulloch is
not concerned to contradict the positive but limited truth in this view, but
would urge the necessity of supplementing it. The senses yield nothing more than
the experience of regular sequences, as Mill asserts. Nature may therefore
be regarded as an order of merely mechanical sequences—and this is the sense
in which Tulloch himself uses the term most regularly. But a sequence is not
in itself sufficient to define a "cause." Reid had pointed out that day
follows night, and night day, with unexceptionable constancy, yet the one is
never regarded as the "cause" of the other. Mill's rider that, to be an
instance of causation, the observed sequence must be "unconditional"—that
is, not dependent upon a more inclusive "constitution" of things—can mean
anything or nothing. It adds to the mere observation of sequence a belief
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ia a universal regularity which has no justification whatsoever upon
empiricist principles, and thus indirectly refutes its own pretensions.1
Whence, then, does the notion of "causation" arise? Tulloch concludes
that if it does not come "from without," it must come "from within," frcm
a "relation of power" by which consciousness itself is set over against
nature, from the primal experience of self-determination, from the know¬
ledge of inner freedom.
What is commonly called the Will, therefore, is...the ultimate
source or fountain of the notion of causation. We apprehend
ourselves as agents, and in this apprehension we have already
in the fullest sense, the idea of cause. Had we not this appre¬
hension, it seems impossible that we could have ever risen above
sequence, as the obvious fact given us in outward observation.
With this apprehension lying at the very root of our being, and
constituting it essentially, it is equally impossible that we can
hold by that fact as furnishing the exhaustive conception of the
Universe. According to the radical and imperative character of
our mental constitution, we must recognize a deeper life than
mere sequence, however grand and orderly, in the phenomena of
nature; and this deeper life is just what we mean by a. cause.2
Whatever the merits of the particular arguments Tulloch brings to the proof,
the conclusiveness of his doctrine of causation depends ultimately upon
one's ability to accept the axiom of Freedom as he conceives it-—"the theistic
fact around which, as their rational nucleus, all the others gather."
The doctrine of "final causation" completes the validation of the
major premise, "Order uMveraally proves Mind." Tulloch argues at length
1* Cf. Theism, pp. 27-33. Also Mill's Logic. 3rd edition (London, 1872)
Vol. I, pp. 390-1. Tulloch had a high regard for Mill's logical ability,
and his contributions to scientific method. Be had shown the inadequacy
of earlier scientific theory-—amply illustrated in Reid and Chalmers,—
which recognized the paramount importance of induction and failed to see
the necessity of subsequent deduction and verification. Mill also worked
out the "four canons of inductive method." These and other contributions
were to modify Robert Flint's development of a scientific theism.
2* Theism, p. 36; also pp. 35, 43, & 45.
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that a conviction of all-pervasive design is involved in the constitution
of rational consciousness. "We can no more, in fact, help maVing Hind ob¬
jective, and apprehending it as the only ultimate cause or explanation of
things, than we can help recognizing existence under the forms of our
mental constitution at all. The one is simply the carrying out of the
other."1 The "ultimacy" of mind—its right to stand at the head of natura¬
ls a rational necessity arising from within. It is, like the imperatives
of conscience, an intuition of the Divine Presence, a direct apprehension
of God, whose wisdom is commensurate with His power, and His power with His
absolute right. Tulloch maintains that God is Himself, in His infinite
personal reality, what Raid might call the First Principle of all necessary
metaphysical truths.
This infinite Presence in space and in time is the complement of
man's spiritual being at all points. It asserts its power in the
human mind in manifold ways, that can only be accounted for by its
truth. Apart from its shadow in the intellect, science could not
exist: knowledge would be a mere perplexed and confused accumula¬
tion. This, however, brings unity into all our mental operations.
Reason descries an infinite meaning everywhere, and science is the
creation of such a gift. Apart from this reality in the heart,
life would be vanity. The higher glory of eternity could not en¬
compass and strengthen it. It is only the truth of the Infinite
that rives significance to speculation or perseverance to well¬
doing.
The Infinite Presence is a personal Presence, which man is enabled to per¬
ceive in and through the exercise of his own personal being. Personality
is the key to the universe of meaning, and declares for theism as the highest
philosophy—the only consistent and comprehensive philosophy.
Tulloch's answer to the inevitable objection that this is arrant
anthropomorphism is simply to reaffirm that the issue between Naturalism
l' Ibid., pp. 62-3.
2. Ibid., p. 327j cf. pp. 63-70. A similar view is expressed by Tulloch's
contemporary, Campbell Fraser. Cf. his Essavs in Philosophy (Edinburgh,
1856), pp. 24.6-7.
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and Theism turns upon the acceptance or rejection of the postulate that
man is endowed with a rational freedom that involves a spiritual orderj
and the spiritual order is orderly and conceivable only under the sovereign
aegis of an infinite Spirit. A demonstration of these postulates is as im¬
possible as it is meaningless. They are simply ultimate facts, or rather
aspects of the ultimate fact that the distinctive life of man is possible
only in personal relation to God. It is a datum "anterior to all demon¬
stration, and even the very condition of that logical thought, which in vain
seeks to reach it."-'- The a posteriori reasonings that are possible in ac¬
cordance with the theistic syllogism do not establish the reality of God,
but only confirm it. Infinite Spirit is known, if at all, only by a direct
intuition. By this cognitive act of personality,
..♦the great truth of the existence of God is only preserved
as a truth of religion, encompassed with a radiance of evidence
which only the willfully blind can fail to see, yet not mathemat¬
ically demonstrated, that they who devoutly seek the light may
have gladness in its discovery
An "a priori intuition"—seen however indistinctly—is therefore the pre¬
condition of any a posteriori proof. Its object is God.
Stated most succinctly, Tulloch's case against Naturalism comes
to this: to the mind of man, constituted as it is, "Order universally proves
Mind." Before turning to the matter of estimating Tulloeh's place in the
development of theist doctrine in Scotland, it must be asked what attributes
are to be ascribed to the Mind that is everywhere the "necessary correlate"
of order? What of God is known without benefit of a specific historical
tradition such as that stemming from Jesus Christ? This question is brought
U Ibid., p. 336.
2. Ibid.. p. 336. Tulloch alternatively uses the terms "belief" and "faith"
to designate the intuition of God, for the reason here made plain. Knowledge
of God and the right exercise of personality through the agency of will
mutually condition one another, within the unity of spirit.
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to Tulloch's writings with greater difficulty than it was to Chalmers1,
because the sharp distinction between a "natural" and "revealed" knowledge
of God is no longer precise. According to Tulloch, the knowledge of God
accessible to every human spirit is not a mere probability, but a real
knowledge of the real God. That is, it is knowledge of God in His Moral
Perfection and in His Infinity. His sovereign Righteousness and Goodness
are disclosed intuitively to the conscience of good and just men, though
they are not necessarily recognized as being of God.-*- His Infinity is
apprehended by human reason in full and strenuous exercise.
In natural theology this predicate of the Infinite is at once
the most consummate and comprehensive that rewards our inquiry,
without which every induction must come short of the proof of
a Divine Existence. It gives, as its essential contents, not
only all those special attributes of eternity, omnipotence,
omniscience, of which it is simply the generic expression} but,
moreover, the unity of these attributes, in which the idea of
God alone completes itself. For unity is plainly a logical con¬
dition of infinity.^
It is this God, or this kind of God, who is to be known by the proper
recognition and use of human reason. But, it must again be added, it is
a knowledge of God commensurate with human finitude and freedom.
The intuitive knowledge of God, while real knowledge of the real
God, has definite limitations, and is not such as logically to exclude the
need for a special and direct Self-disclosure like Christian revelation
claims to be. On the one hand, it is a knowledge of "apprehension" and
not "comprehension"--as Tulloch puts it, appropriate to man as man, and
1. Tulloch observes suggestively in a sermon: "Virtues can never be
splendid vices. So far as they are real, they are always good, and not
evil. They are really of God, although there may seem no traces of their
roots in Him." (Some Facts of Religion and Life: Edinburgh & London, 1877}
p. 199.) Tulloch!s sermons, while generally expository, incorporate many
academic and theistic conclusions.
Theism, pp. 327-8.
3. Ibid.. p. 69F} also, cf. supra, p.
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not to be confused with God's omniscient and absolute Self-knowledge.
There is room for a larger knowledge of Him—-from whatever source. On the
other, it is knowledge that is hedged about by an irrationality that defies
the powers of human reason. The most perplexing limitation of theistic
truth is the fact of evil in God's world, which is at bottom, according to
Tulloch, the fact of sin. The problem of evil becomes acute only at the
level of moral consciousness, where the whole personality of man is found
capable of standing in direct contradiction to the Being and purposes of
God. The reality of this contradiction introduces an element of radical
incomprehensibility into the spiritual order.
Sin...is in its essential conception the revolt of the human
self against the Divine. Whereas the good consists for us in
the harmony of the Divine and the human will, the evil con¬
sists essentially in the insurrection of the latter against
the fozmer. The soul passes out of the sphere of Divine con¬
formity, and asserts itself in an attitude of opposition to
God and to goodness. This is the most radical principle of
moral evil.*
As the express contradiction of God's sovereign will, sin can have no
rational explanation whatever. Apart from the negative consideration that
the possibility of wrong choices is implied in the gift of moral responsi¬
bility, sin makes an all-comprehending philosophy impossible because it
presents an irrational element within the spiritual order, a completely
incomprehensible surd. But then, what is required is not a rational ex¬
planation of the circumstance, but a moral power that can rectify it, and
in a practical way point to a restored order uniting spirit with sovereign
Spirit. Tulloch does not attempt to conceal his own conviction that such
moral power is to be found preeminently in the Christian Gospel. Christ
has eome into the sphere of moral disorder with supernatural power to
Ibid.. p. 386.
2. Cf. Ibid.. pp. 386-7.
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reestablish the intended harmony between man and God. What is required
of religion is not a body of explanatory principles, giving answers to
merely theoretical questions, but an effective resolution of the conflict
between sinful men and the righteous God. The Gospel, through the faith,
worship, and theology, that clothe it, reveals a gracious God, who in
Christ makes available to sinful men "a Divine power of moral elevation
and consolation."-*- In this teaching, there is much to recall Halyburton's
doctrines of sin and of revelation. It is needless to say, of course, that
it represents an authentic strain of New Testament teaching.
To the mind of man, constituted as it is, "Order universally proves
Mind." That which everyone is able to know of God by virtue of being human
is a "direct expression of Divine Revelation" to Reason, and is the ground
of man,s essential spirituality and rationality. Theistic philosophy is
therefore the "complement" of all human studies, including the natural
sciences, for unlike Naturalism, it gives due place to mind, or spirit, in
constructing a rational account of reality. The theist, according to Tulloch,
will allow science to deal with nature on its own terms: he will impose no
theoretical or methodological limitation upon the pursuit of knowledge in
any sphere. He will only insist that, of importance fully equal to the
facts established by the sciences is the fact that a rational spirit sets
out in the first place to obtain scientific knowledge. In this light, the
conviction that the sum of things is orderly, meaningful, and also valuable,
must betoken the infinite wisdom and goodness of God.
(C) It now remains to indicate what development Tulloch's religious
philosophy represents in the course of demonstrative theism in Scotland.
His liberalism and refreshing openness to widely divergent strains of historical
•*•• On Tulloch's view of the relation of theistic intuition to Christian
faith, cf. Theism, pp. 396-423.
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doctrine are certainly new when seen against the background of earlier
Scottish thought. But the novelty is not so great as to amount to the
abandonment of all that characterized the older natural theology. Closer
scrutiny shows that Tulloeh extends its characteristic anthropocentrism
and mediating position. In disentangling natural theology from naturalism,
he would go so far as to say that theistic discussion is wholly dependent
upon the fact of "freedom,11 "spirit," "personality," in man. The "image
of God" in man "demonstrates" the reality of God to any who will carefully
consider what his inner life implies. Self-knowledge is the preface to
knowledge of the Divine. God must be known within the inmost sanctuary of
subjective consciousness before His presence and purposes may be recognized
in Nature. To refute Naturalism, therefore, it is necessary first to refute
the Naturalistic view of man. "Blot out the Divine in man," Tulloch remarks
suggestively, "and no Divine can be found in Nature. Soul and God are
essentially co-relative, and if soul is denied, God, or a Creative Mind,
can nowhere be found.""'" The aphorism, Nullus sniritus in Microcosmo. nnllna
Peu3 in Macrocosmo. is a succinct and accurate paraphrase of Tulloch's argu¬
ment. The rational correlation of the human and the Divine is significant;
so also is the order of precedence of the two phrases.
It should be plain that the thought conveyed by these statements
is radically new so far as the tradition of Scottish theology is concerned.
Tulloch's position makes large concessions to a humanistic way of thinking
in no way countenanced by the Confessionalist view of man, and hardly con¬
sistent with a thorough-going Naturalism—nevertheless, a humanistic ground
midway between an anthropocentric natural theology on one side and the
general position of Mill, the radical empiricists, Cerate, and the Positivists
Movements of Religious Thought, p. 242.
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on the other—few of whom were content with a thoroughly consistent
Naturalism. It was, of course, a ground exploited variously by the
Romantics, who as often as not had little concern with philosophical recon¬
ciliations, and did not attempt to argue in defense of the extreme sub¬
jectivity they cultivated. Tulloch's theism, surrounded by a somewhat
confused environment of thought, reflects its diverse tendencies, yet without
losing entirely its rootage in Scottish theological traditions.
Some-ldiing has already been said as to Tulloch's affinities with
Reid and Chalmers, and also of his criticism of their conclusions. The
tendency toward "inwardness" is intensified. The authority attached by
Chalmers to the deliverances of conscience is attributed to the whole of
rational consciousness, to human personality in the unity and diversity of
its functions. Reid's free-will principle is taken up once more as the
necessaxy presupposition of ethical reality and theistic belief. The
"mediating" position inseparable from Common Sense is maintained in the face
of new "gnosticism" cultivated under the influence of German Idealism. The
propriety, not to say the necessity, of receiving Christian revelation is
affirmed. All in all, persistent Common Sense characteristics are apparent
throughout Tulloch's systematic and critical presentation of theistic argu¬
ment. If the Infinite Presence is demonstrated at all, it is by means of
evidence resident in human nature. Quite significantly, however, Tulloch
is not fond of the term "human nature," and uses it sparingly. The reason
is, of course, the insistence that man is more than natural—that his mind,
reason, spirit, is in itself supra-natural, and has its being in an order
of reality that is centered in God. Strictly speaking, human nature is that
part of man's physical and psychical make-up which may be "explained" by
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"laws," or traced to regular "causes." Nature and spirit meet in the
constitution of man, but spirit asserts its independence of, and right
to control, nature.
In holding that spirit enjoys freedom and sovereign rights as
against nature, in drawing a sharp contrast between the one and the other,
Tulloch reproduces at the heart of his theistic philosophy the fundamental
division separating the convictions of his contemporaries—the cleavage,
broadly speaking, between Naturalism and Romanticism. It is of first im¬
portance, of course, that he tries to work out some kind of reconciliation
by which opposing conceptions are not only juxtaposed, but the one is shown
to dominate the other. Still, the fact remains that for Tulloch, knowledge
of the spiritual order is distinct from knowledge of the natural order.
While sense perception is the source of the latter, intuition is a distinct
function by which the rational mind apprehends spiritual and "supersensible"
reality. Consequently, while Reid and Chalmers taught that knowledge of
God apart from revelation is by inference from empirical data, Tulloch holds
that it is by direct spiritual perception. In this, there is a certain
element of mysticism, no doubt, although in none of his writings does Tulloch
give the impression of possessing a predominantly mystical frame of mind.
The intuition of the Infinite Presence, even when unrecognized for what it
is, still is presupposed by every characteristic function of the human mind,
and comes nearest the surface of full consciousness in the moral exercise
of personality. For this reason, Carlyle's tern "natural superaaturalism"
might well be applied to Tulloch's theistic philosophy.
Something has been said of those outside the Scottish tradition
who influenced Tulloch's thought on the important matter of intuition. Two
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in particular—Blaise Pascal and S. T. Coleridge—-are frequently referred
to in Theism and the critical writings, either or both of whom could well
be given credit for suggesting a doctrine of intuition. It is not entirely
strange that these incomparable minds should have attracted one surrounded
by the influences of Scottish thought. Pascal*s Biblically-centered Pensees.
his distaste for rationalism, his sense of the ultimate dependence of re¬
ligion upon moral commitment, and above all his conviction that the intuitions
of the "heart" must be recognized "underlying and forming the conditions of
every process of the logical faculty,"1—these characteristics seem to have
brought to light latent affinites in the Scottish mind. Tulloch's appreciative
studies express the high esteem in which Pascal was held in Scotland.^ That
Coleridge*s thought should be coupled with that of the great French Jansenist
is readily intelligible. He was a careful reader of Pascal, and in so far as
his own religious speculations incorporate much direct and indirect light
from the Pensees. it is clear why the two should be linked together in
Tulloch's estimation, and cited alternately in support of views common to
both. let, in the last analysis, Coleridge's influence predominates: Tulloch's
doctrine of intuition is closer to the teaching of the Semantic philosopher.
Coleridge is more confident of the "immediacy" and the self-evidencing
rationality of the intuitive power than Pascal—who interpreted more closely
the Hebrew-Christian notion of "faith." Tulloch also lays stronger emphasis
upon the "greatness" of wan in the strength of his rational powers, than
upon his "wretchedness" in consequence of willful rebellion against God.
Moreover, he does not ponder seriously the problem that had loomed large in
"*"• British Quarterly Review, op. cit.. p. 153.
2. Tulloch's contemporary, Alexander Campbell Fraser, was profoundly in¬
fluenced by Pascal. Fraser's Philosophy of Theism (the Gifford Lectures
for 1894-6), a precise and influential statement of a position strikingly
similar to Tulloch's, acknowledges frequently a similar debt to Pascal.
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Confessionalist theology, whether the knowledge of intuitive reason may
not be distorted as a result of sinful rebellion, and radically false to
the extent that it is perverse and morally myopic."1' With Coleridge,
Tulloch shares the conviction that a "just and adequate Philosophy of
Religion" can be constructed which will claim the assent of all who con¬
sider seriously the implications of human spirituality, and will establish
the eminent rationality of Christian revelation. This conviction undoubtedly
led him, as it had Coleridge, back to men of like persuasion two centuries
earlier, and resulted in a penetrating study of Rational Theology and
Christian Philosophy in England in the Eighteenth Century-—a work whose
solid merit must still be admired. At the same time, Pascal's reluctance
to construct anything like a systematic philosophy, and also his decided
preference for Christian apologetic, seem to have escaped Tulloch's critical
powers completely. Coleridge's thought undoubtedly was more in harmony with
the liberal temper of the nineteenth century than the great French Jansenist.
Whether it was as close to the Calvinistic and Augustinian foundations of
the Scottish theological tradition will perhaps be doubted.
Once the inner, spiritual, and essentially subjective grounds of
theistic belief have been "demonstrated," however, Tulloch is not content
to stop where Coleridge had stopped. Here there is final evidence that
the influence of the older Scottish natural theology has not been left
behind entirely. Coleridge saw no meaning whatsoever in the discussion of
the traditional proofs, and simply abandoned them to the limbo of all things
pointless and confusing. Tulloch is no less critical of any attempt to
Studies in The Christian Doctrine of Sin seem not to have modified his
view in the least, for the later critical works—represented in the
quotations cited above (supra, pp. 133, 136ff)—state the position of
Theism with even greater confidence in the clear manifestation of God
through His image in man.
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»prove" God by induction from data systematically held at aims' length
from inner consciousness. This has been sufficiently shown. Yet, his
view of the a posteriori proofs is more conciliatory. The perennial
strength of Naturalism is interpreted as concrete evidence of the claims
nature holds over human imagination. The systematic objectivity of science,
while not in any sense equivalent to Naturalism, is to be recognized as the
only legitimate method of dealing with a nature against which the human
spirit must constantly assert its freedom in order to realize itself. This
being so, no philosophy of religion can be comprehensively true if it does
not seek to show how nature and spirit are to be reconciled in thought. It
is precisely this reconciliation that is the legitimate aim of the "proofs."
Hence, Tulloch's theistic syllogism, whose major premise takes as its clue
that reconciliation of nature and spirit that is actual within the unity
of human life. In man, spirit and nature meet—but on spirit's terms. The
proofs merely show, point out, demonstrate, that nature is illuminated only
by rationally self-determining spirit. "The soul is infinitely higher than
all nature, and validly, therefore, brings all nature within its sphere,
and finds its own reflection everywhere in it. Matter is only glorified
in the light of Spirit. Nature is only beautiful—only, in fact, intelligible
—in the mirror of EV3RLIVXNG MIND."1
1* Theism, p. 72.
-164-
GHAPTER V
HISTORY AS NATURAL THEOLOGY?
THE THEISM OF ROBERT FLINT
Natural theology in Scotland, anthropocentric from the beginning,
considering its problem as one primarily concerning man rather than the
non-human order of nature, was perhaps inevitably thrown back upon history.
Hume's switch from philosophy to historical study—the observation of man
clothed with time and circumstance—was not, as some have thought, a retreat
from high intellectual aspiration, but a consistent consequence of the
Treatise of Human Nature. Similarly, the tendency to confirm or refute
propositions of concern to the natural theologian by measuring their truth
against the historical evidence is clearly traceable in Scottish thinking,
even from the time of Halyburton* Only in Tulloch's age, however, did it
come to full self-consciousness in the form of a persistent method. Yet
even in Tulloch's theistic antiropocentrism, a critical presupposition
common to Halyburton, Reid, and Chalmers is essentially unchanged: that is,
beneath all the vagaries and "accidents" of history, amid the infinite
variety of personal idiosyncrasy, Man is substantially the same. The concept
of"human nature," from its inception among the ancient Stoics, monumentalized
the assumption that in every age and circumstance, "a man's a Man, for a'
that." Even Hume, Who attacked with vigor the rationalistic "idea" of the
substantial self—which owed a great deal to the Stoics—had no intention
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of dismissing the term "human nature," Had he been the consistent sceptic
he is usually pictured as being, it is difficult to see why he did not.
Yet it was he who most accurately described the assumption prevailing down
to the time of Tulloch:
It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity
among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human
nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations,.,.
Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life
of the Greeks and Romans? Study well the temper and actions of
the French and English: you cannot be much mistaken in transfer¬
ring to the former most of the observations which you have made
with regard to the latter. Mankind are so much the same, in all
times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or
strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover
the constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing
men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnish¬
ing us with materials from which we may form our observations and
become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and
behavior.1
This was in fact the use to which he put history in the Natural History
of Religion. So also, it was the use to which Tulloch put history and
historical opinions, laboring among a great diversity of doctrine to
vindicate the theistic view as he saw it. Yet, in Tulloch's life-time, a
remarkable change took place which is duly noted in his later writings,
but which had no such profound effect upon his thinking as on that of his
younger contemporary, Robert Flint.^ The change may be designated as the
gradual triumph of the view that Man not only lives amidst historical
change, but is himself subject to that change; and in so far as the change
has a discernible direction, affecting man's most essential being, human
nature is said to develop historically. Robert Flint began his academic
career as a student of the "philosophy of history"--a discipline intimately
Enquiry Cnncarm'ng Human Understanding. Section VIII, Part I, p.
2, Tulloch was born in 1823 and died in 1886; Flint lived from 1838 to
19100--Tulloch uses the terras "historical development" and "evolution"
frequently in Modern Theories and Movements of Religions Thought.
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associated with the idea that a continuous growth and direction are
evident in the story of man through the ages. Flint's own conclusions
as to the character of this growth and direction are of decisive importance
in determining his later conclusions as to the possibility of a natural
theology. He is a worthy representative of the next decisive stage in the
course of demonstrative theism in Scotland.
Robert Flint stood in the forefront of European scholarship during
the last two decades of the nineteenth century. His reputation as a student
of the philosophy of history and of theistic philosophy extended far beyond
the borders of Scotland, Several of his works were translated into French
and Italian-—a tribute, surely, to the exceptional ability and broad
erudition for which he was well known in his own land.-*- He was a scholar,
addressing himself primarily to a scholarly audience, though not without
2
ability on occasion to state his conclusions with remarkable simplicity.
The manner in which he conceived his theological task was not of a sort,
however, that lends itself to easily comprehensible "popularizations." While
Flint may easily be said to agree with his predecessors that natural theology
is possible, and its end is a "proof" that "God is, and is a rewarder of
them that seek Him," his conception of what would constitute adequate proof
is staggering:
1. Tributes to Flint's ability as scholar and theologian have been collected
in Donald Macmillan's biography, The Life of Robert Flint. P.P., LL.D.
(London, 1914): cf. pp. 240-1, 308-10, 348-9. This book with its supplemen¬
tary contributions by students and associates of Flint, provides invaluable
material for an appraisal of the man and his work.
Theism and Anti—Theistic Theories were published in the lecture—form
given them when delivered as the Baird Lectures of 1876 and 1877, but are
provided with exhaustive appendices which carry much of the weight of Flint's
argument. The Agnosticism of 1903 is more representative of his powers,
being a thorough revision of his Croall Lectures for 1887 in accordance with
his own exacting standards of scholarship.
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. the evidences or proofs of God's existence are countless.
They are to be found in all the forces, laws, and arrangements
of nature—in every material object, every organism, every in¬
tellect and heart. At the same time, they concur and coalesce
into a single all-comprehensive argument, which is just the sum
of indications of God given by the physical universe, the minds
of men. and human history. Nothing short of that is the full
proof.
A more comprehensive proof could hardly be imagined. Flint recognized
that its perfect realization is beyond possibility. What is significant
in this conception of the task is the intention of arriving at a "single,
all-comprehensive argument" that will synthesize the evidence gleaned from
"the physical universe, the minds of men, and human history." A comprehensive
argument in this sense could only be realized by a large grasp of the most
diverse kinds of knowledge. Few could match Flint's almost encyclopedic
range. But the possibility of this range is surely dependent upon the prior
conviction that the sheer mass of evidence is comprehensible, and capable
of an intelligible organization: this is the universally recognized con¬
dition of rational knowledge. Flint's most significant addition to theistic
argument is what he takes to be the rational evidence and meaning of human
history.
All of Flint's predecessors may he said to have attempted proofs
founded upon "indications" of God-given by the "physical universe" and the
"minds of men"—most decisively by the latter. Moreover, they used history
to illustrate the universal characteristics of the mind of Man. Flint's
intention, however, is an argument that will take in "history" or "historical
development" as an added dimension. Man is a creature of historyj his know¬
ledge of God, "historical," as is evidenced by every "historical religion."
The numerical multiplicity of religions and their diversity of belief are
Theism (8th edition, revised: Edinburgh & London, 1891), pp. 62-3.
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data of inevitable concern to anyone who would prove the truth of theistic
conviction. Moreover, the relations of historical faiths to the growth
and aspirations of mankind must also be taken into account, if only because
knowledge of physical nature and human nature have themselves developed
historically in societies, the character and quality of whose intellectual
aspirations have been affected by historical religion. Flint maintains,
therefore, that the historical dimension is of the utmost importance to any
serious pursuit of knowledge, and of theistic knowledge above all. "The
development of the idea of God and the course of the history of man are so
dependent on each other that without a full recognition of the importance
of either, the other must be unintelligible."
The most persistent criticism Flint makes of the theistic doctrines
of his predecessors is simply that they cannot square with the facts of
history and historical development. He specifically rejects, for example,
any view maintaining that knowledge of God is "by immediate intuition."
This would undoubtedly include Tulloch's. Flint contends that the facts
of historical religion do not justify the contention that the soul of man
is "united to the objectivity" of God, even as sense is to the objectivity
of nature.
The history of religion, which is what ought to yield the clearest
confirmation of the alleged intuition, appears to be from beginning
to end a conspicuous contradiction of it. If all men have the
spiritual power of directly beholding their Creator—have an im¬
mediate vision of God—how happens it that whole nations believe
in the most absurd and monstrous gods? that millions of men are
ignorant whether there be one god or thousands? that even a people
like the Greeks could suppose the highest of their deities to have
been bom, to have a body, and to have committed the vilest actions?2
1* Agnosticism (New York, 1903), p. 420.
2. Theism, p. 32.
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What the facts of history indicate is that there has been considerable
change, alteration, and development, in man's knowledge of God. An in¬
tuitional theory which, like Tulloch's, specifically likens the appre¬
hension of God to the immediate perceptions of physical nature cannot
adequately account for such facts .■*■
A true power of intuition is little susceptible of growth, and
its testimonies vary within narrow limits; any development of
which it admits is only slightly due to external conditions, and
mainly the necessary consequence of internal activity, of in¬
herent expansibility. It is thus, for example, with the senses
of sight and hearing, in so far as they are intuitive. But it
is manifestly very different with the religious nature.2
An adequate proof of God's sovereign existence must give a satisfactory
account of man's religious past with its mixture of darkness and light,
confusion and order. Confidence in the present state of religious knowledge
must be tempered by the facts of its past historical genesis. These are
convictions everywhere written large upon Flint's thinking, and are of the
greatest importance in estimating the exact character of his conclusions.
The interpretation of Flint's encyclopedic argument must take into account
the formation of his ideas concerning the character and meaning of history,
and specifically the fact that his study of the "philosophy of history"
preceded his work in natural theology, and was regarded as an introduction
to the later study? Before treating his theistic conclusions in detail, it
will be essential to consider pertinent facts of Flint's own intellectual
history, and of his connection with current doctrines of "evolution," "de¬
velopment," and "progress," which radically reshaped European thought in
the second half of the nineteenth century.
"*•' Of. sunra. p. 144f especially footnote 1.
Theism, pp. 82-3*
Cf. Macmillan, pp. 182-4.
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In I864. Flint was appointed to the Chair of Moral Philosophy
at St. Andrews, previously occupied by Thomas Chalmers.1 It was in ful¬
fillment of the responsibilities of this office that he undertook the
study of the Philosophy of History. The relevance of the study is obvious
in the light of Flint's notion of Moral Philosophy: "I define it...as the
Philosophy of Man's Moral Nature, Moral Relations, and Moral History."^
Like Tulloch, Flint uses the tern "moral" in its widest sense as designating
all data arising from, or centering in, the personal life of man, whether
individually or in society. For Flint, history and moral phenomena are
roughly coextensive. Their interdependence is the most basic conviction
brought away from his studies in the philosophy of history.3 An explicit
statement of his personal conclusions in the matter is given in the follow¬
ing appreciation of Charles Renouvier, whose views along with many others
Flint causes to pass in review. Renouvier's historical doctrine, he writes,
...is one to which, in all its fundamental principles and
positions, I assent.... He has shown...the closeness of the
connection between history and morality; that neither is in¬
telligible or realisable without the other; that history is
an ethical formation and morality an historical production.
He has made apparent by critical analysis of the historical
process itself that it is in the exercise of rational freedom
that societies, as well as individuals, have risen or sunk,
1* Flint also followed Chalmers in transferring to the Chair of Divinity
in the University of Edinburgh, in 1876. His successful candidacy for the
Chair of Moral Philosophy in St. Andrews was signalized by the fact that he
was appointed over two rivals, one of whom was the distinguished Hegelian
T. H. Greene. He thereby became a colleague of Principal Tulloch, whose
intimacy he enjoyed, but to whose works he rarely refers.
Quoted from his Inaugural Lecture on assuming the chair, in Macmillan,
p. 152.
3» The Phi1oflophy of History in Europe. Volume I, appeared in 1874. It had
on a second title-page, "The Philosophy of History in France and Germany."
Flint's intention was to do an exhaustive work, dealing with the contributions
of each of the European countries. The enterprise was interrupted by his
transferal to the Chair of Divinity in Edinburgh—as it turned out, per¬
manently. The History of the Philosophy of History, with the subtitle,
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elevated or debased themselves.... He has refuted...those
theories which represent history as a mechanically necessitated
product, or an inevitable dialectic movement, or a simple organic
growth, or the natural consequence of a struggle for existence
between individuals and societies, or a fundamental economic
evolution. He has proved it to be, on the contrary, an essen¬
tially ethical creation, the formation of the world of humanity
by free individual wills, always conscious of moral law, while
always working in given conditions of time and space, or heredity
and solidarity, and always influenced by interests and passions,
by physical and spiritual surroundings .•*•
Whatever the merits or validity of this philosophical view of history, the
clear correlation of moral and historical reality adds a dimension to
Moral Philosophy not previously recognized, by Chalmers for example, Flint' s
predecessor in the chair by forty years. Nor had Tulloch, for that matter,
who had not only made "freedom" or "free will" the primary category of his
theistic outlook, but had explicitly recognized the indebtedness of the
theologian or philosopher to past history. The reason for the transition
from Tulloch to Flint is, of course, that Flint was in a position to assimi¬
late more completely the notions of "evolution," "development," and "progress,"
the full impact of which was not felt in Britain until the last three decades
of the centuryWhile Flint's Philosophy of History repudiates conclusions
to which much contemporary thinking along developmental and evolutionary
lines had come, it shares with them a common impulse—to show the relevance
3
of these notions to every possible aspect of reality. It is, in fact, to
a right understanding of historical development that the philosophical study
of history is directed. Flint asserts unequivocally that it is a moral
development.
"Historical Philosophy in France and French Belgium and Switzerland," ap¬
peared in 1893* It was a revision and expansion of only a part of the
earlier work.
1. History of the Philosophy of History (Edinburgh & London, 1893), p. 671.
2. Three works which contributed much to the triumph of "developmental"
thinking were published five to ten years after Tulloch's Theism: Darwin's
The Origin of Species, in 1859? Herbert Spencer's First Principles, in
1862? and Hutchison Stirling's The Secret of Hegel, in 1865*
3* A considerable stir of British opinion greeted the Origin of Species.
The ideas which he designates as indispensihle for a proper
understanding of the Philosophy of History are vital not only in that
context, but are in fact the presuppositions of his later effort to con¬
struct a monumental "system of natural theology." They are three: progress.
unity, and freedom. "The growth of history towards a scientific stage has
been partly the consequence and partly the cause of the growth" of these
ideas, "without a firm and comprehensive grasp of which no philosophical
study or conception of history is possible.""*" Flint's phraseology here
clearly indicates his intention. He is bent on a scientific knowledge of
history. These fundamental ideas, properly defined in relation to the multi¬
plicity of human events, are the principles in accordance with which history
is to be ordered to form a rational and meaningful whole. The scientific
study of history is "partly the consequence" of these three notions.
Historically, they first appeared as undemonstrated beliefs. rooted in
because, as is generally recognized, the British mind has not been prepared
for its somewhat revolutionary principles of evolution and natural selection.
The notion of evolution was hailed by Darwin's more enthusiastic British
contemporaries as a triumph of pure scientific research: his enormous in¬
dustry in collecting empirical data and classifying it did much to create
that impression. It was not generally recognized that "evolution" had deep
historical roots in developmental and progressivist philosophies stemming
from Germany, France, and Italy. Flint's work in the Philosophy of History
brought him into direct contact with "original sources."—The notion of
"natural selection" suggested to Darwin by the population theories of Malthus
was responsible for the Naturalistic turn taken by much "evolutionary"
thinking. The principle seemed to make easily applicable to morphological,
psychological, and social sciences, the same mechanistic principles which
had met with considerable success in the physical sciences. As to the
philosophical merits of the principle, Lord Balfour has observed, "Though
the fact of selection does not make it harder to believe in design, it makes
it easier to believe in accident." (Theism and Humanism, p. 35.)
"*"• The Philosophy of History in Europe, p. 27. In this work, only the ideas
of "progress" and "unity" are treated at length. "Freedom" is fully discussed
in the revised volume, pp. 124.-135•
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diverse contexts and traditions. Flint provides a cursory history of
each of the three notions. That of progress is traced to Hebrew-Christian
origins. The conviction that unity binds all human events and all reality
into one meaningful whole is recognized as the great contribution of Graeco-
Roman culture. The notion of freedom is represented as being the unique
contribution of recent thought: Hegel's philosophy of history exemplifies
the high importance accorded this "idea" in modern philosophy. In con¬
junction, these beliefs suggest the possibility of a scientific knowledge
of history. Its realization is brought about, however, only when their
crudely historical form is reduced to a serviceable precision, when as
clearly conceived hypotheses they are systematically refined by being con¬
fronted with the raw material of historical fact. It is Flint's conviction
that beliefs, which came into being as plausible interpretations of human
experience, may be employed as working hypotheses in the same way that the
physical scientist would crudely formulate, then test, and gradually refine
a hypothesis describing the "behavior" of matter. So it is that the
scientific study of history is not only a "consequence" of the three leading
ideas, but is also "partly the cause" of their development. In being
systematically refined against the .actualities of history, they approach
!• Canvassing Oriental and Graeco-Roman cultures, Flint finds occasional
notices of belief in the meaningful development of history, but no clear
conviction that is not overshadowed by cyclical, determinist, and pessi¬
mistic views. The Christian doctrine of Providence, supplemented by the
Renaissance recognition of human agency, is accorded final responsibility
for originating the notion of "progress." Cf. History of the Philosophy
of History, pp. 88-103. For history of the idea of "unity," cf. pp. 104-
123; of the idea of "freedom," pp. 124-135.
2. "Freedom" is defined as "a state in which humanity fully realises all
its powers, or, in other words, a state in which there are no other limits
to the exercise of its powers than the very conditions of their complete
and proper exercise,—the laws of nature, rationality, and morality."
Ibid., p. 126.
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more and more to the ideal of demonstrated knowledge. To read Flint's
studies in the Philosophy of History is to come face to face with the con¬
viction that intellectual and moral progress, growth toward a comprehensive
unity of human life and thought, and the slow realization of human freedom
are the inherent "laws" of history. If not completely demonstrated, they
are yet accepted as the rules of tendency resulting from centuries of moral
struggle and spiritual aspiration.
These comprehensive "ideas" have direct bearing upon Flint's con¬
ception of natural theology, and can be shown to modify theistic argument
in important ways. This in itself is an obvious increment of theistic
doctrine in Scotland derived chiefly from external influence. But an even
more significant development is the method by which Flint would bring
historical beliefs—and in particular beliefs concerning moral and spiritual
reality—into relation with exact scientific knowledge. The Philosophy of
History is to be a demonstrative science whose principles or laws will stand
on equal footing with Newton's gravitational principle, or with Darwin's
"law" of natural selection. They will have whatever of final validity
scientific truths may be said to have. Scientific certainty is Flint's
ultimate aim; his proximate goal is to achieve a place for the Philosophy
of History in the esteem which his contemporaries accorded not only to the
physical, but also to the biological sciences.The high estate of con¬
temporary science is the "touchstone" by which his thinking is measured
and regulated. This is plain in such a statement as, "It is chiefly through
1» That is to say, Flint is thoroughly a representative of the scientific
era through which he lived, which Professor Whitehead has somewhere described
as an "age of scientific orthodoxy, undisturbed by much thought beyond the
conventions." While Flint's critical mind did not acquiesce easily in con¬
venient over-simplifications, he did not escape the limitations imposed by
the prevailing temper of the scientific mind.
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the growth of physical science that the notion of law in human development
has arisen, and chiefly through it also that the path which leads to the
discovery of law has been opened up."^- To this may be added Hint's summary
appraisal of the progress made toward the scientific study of history down
to his own time:
That a practical belief in scientific law and method is the dis¬
tinctive characteristic of the representative historians of the
nineteenth century will, I think, be questioned by no competently
informed personj and, if acknowledged, I may perhaps have said
enough to establish my thesis that historical art has been
spontaneously and surely, although slowly, leading up to historical
science.2
Flint does not say that the detailed study of history, or the comprehensive
Philosophy of History, is a science—a body of exact and verified knowledge.
He contends only that it is on the way to being suchj and that progress
toward that end is achieved by a fruitful interdependence between a "practi¬
cal belief" in its being attained, and the logical methods of verification
employed in other sciences already developed to a high degree. The belief
and the scientific method are necessarily correlative if progress toward
final knowledge of man's moral development in history is to be continuous.
Flint does not hesitate to speculate as to what that knowledge will be:
The ultimate and greatest triumph of historical philosophy will
really be neither more nor less than the full proof of providence,
the discovery by the processes of scientific method of the divine
plan which unites and harmonises the apparent chaos of human
actions contained in history into a cosmos.
But this in itself is merely a belief, which only the progress of historical
science can transform into knowledge.
It is now possible to show how Flint's studies of the Philosophy
Philosophy of History in Europe, p. 25.
2* Ibid., p. 27.
3. Ibid., p. 22.
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of History, undertaken during the St. Andrews' professorship, determined
the character of his theistic doctrine. When Flint transferred to the
Chair of Divinity at Edinburgh, a new project more in keeping with the
duties of his office came into view—a comprehensive System of Natural
Theology that would culminate in a conclusive proof that God is as theistic
belief depicts Him. This System, work on which prevented his earlier in¬
tention of doing an exhaustive study of the "History of the Philosophy of
History," was itself never completed. Any final appraisal of Flint's
argument must keep in mind that it remains only a torso.-*- As proposed,
the completed System would consist of four principal divisions, (l) It
would "exhibit what evidence there is for belief in the existence of God."2
(2) It would undertake to "refute antitheistic theories,—atheism,
materialism, positivism, secularism, pessimism, pantheism, and agnosticism."
(3) It would then proceed to "delineate the character of God as disclosed
by nature, mind, and history, and to show what light the truth thus ascer¬
tained casts upon man's duty and destiny." (4) Finally, and as a summation
of the entire system, it would "trace the rise and development of the idea
of God and the history of theistic speculation." Of this comprehensive
and unified plan, only the first and second parts were executed with thorough¬
ness in Flint's Baird and Croall Lectures. The remaining two—which would
have been the decisive stages of the argument—are dealt with very im¬
perfectly. An article on "Theism" in the Ninth Edition of the Encyclopedia
-*■• Professor Alfred Caldecott, in The Philosophy of Religion in England
and America (New York, 1901j p. 122ff) criticized Flint's Theism for being
a one-sided and imperfect presentation of theistic argument. In the con¬
cluding section of Agnosticism, published somewhat later, Flint replies
that the task attempted in Theism was but the first part of a projected
four-part System, and must be judged accordingly.
2. This and the following quotations are taken from Agnosticism. p. 64-0.
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Britarmlca touch upon them in a cursory way, and are some indication as
to how he would have concluded the System had he been able to give his
Gifford Lectures in 1906-7.1 Illness prevented him, and he died in 1910.
A certain amount of reconstruction is necessary, therefore, in order to
approximate Flint's view of the completed argument. By his own express
statement, Theism has no more ambitious object than to "exhibit the evidence"
for belief in God: that is, bring together the relevant data, from which a
comprehensive System may be developed. Anti-Theistic Theories and Ag¬
nosticism examine the historical alternatives to theism, with a sharp eye
to discern their defects. But the final task of vindicating theistic con¬
cepts, definitions, principles, and of synthesizing or systematizing these,
was never completed. The all-too-brief encyclopedia article and the work
completed on the Philosophy of History must fill in the large gap.^
The conspicuous addition of the historical dimension to the
theistic argument appears plainly at each of the four stages of Flint's
System, and gives a new latitude to the whole. Psychological analysis of
the individual consciousness had been the method of earlier Scottish
natural theologians, providing them with a view of human nature from which
to elaborate the theistic case. Flint's aim is an exhaustive analysis of
the historical consciousness—or rather, of the spiritual consciousness
of mankind as evidenced in and through the history of the race. It is
It was more than fitting that Flint should have been asked to de¬
liver the Gifford Lectures, for his biographer records that Lord Gifford's
original intention was to endow a Chair on Natural Theology for Flint.
His refusal to accept it was thus in a way responsible for the founding
of the Trust, which annually brings distinguished thinkers to Scottish
universities to discuss questions of natural theology. Cf. Macmillan,
pp. 426-7.
2. The encyclopedia article is reproduced in Agnosticism, pp. 640-664.
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of the highest importance that Flint conceives the fourth and final
stage of his SSystem to be the appraisal of results obtained at the pre¬
vious three stages in the context of historical development. It is the
history of the race, the growth of religions, their progress toward the
realization of God's moral perfections, the advance of historically con¬
ditioned thinking toward a unified religious world-view, and the tendency
of the higher faiths to implement the freedom and perfection of the human
spirit—it is this all-embracing history that is the foundation and con¬
summation of Flint's theistic argument. Not only so, but the argument
itself is a thing of history. It is not the creation of a detached intellect,
of a philosopher speculating in isolation from the life and faith of his
kind. Nor is theism a philosophy that eschews every connection with
historical religious beliefs. While theistic philosophy is not identical
with any historic religion, it has no content or reality apart from the
beliefs and inferences originating in historic religions.
The individual man left to himself is very weak. He is strong
only when he can avail himself of the strength of many others,
of the stores of power accumulated by generations of his prede¬
cessors, of the combined forces of a multitude of his con¬
temporaries.... It is...an indisputable historical fact that
we owe our theism in great part to our Christianity,—that
natural religion has had no real existence prior to or apart
from what has claimed to be revealed religion—and that the
independence which it now assumes is that of one who has grown
ashamed of his origin.
In general, Flint affirms that theistic doctrine is subject to historical
development because of increasingly scientific insight into the Providence
revealing itself in concrete facts and events, and also because of the
involvement of the inquiring mind in history. To put it another way, the
content and the rational form of theistic proof both have a historical
dimension.
"*"* Theism, pp. 20-1.
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Moreover, this dimension of religious knowledge is essentially
a moral dimension. The development of religious knowledge, like the de¬
velopment of the Philosophy of History, is in its own way coextensive with
the moral development of man. This is a belief with which Flint's System
begins? it is broadly enunciated in the introductory chapters of Theism.
Religion, of which theology is the appropriate science, is defined in a
general way as "man's communion.. .with what he believes to be a god or
gods j his sense of relationship to, and dependence on, a higher mysterious
agency, with all the thoughts, emotions, and actions which proceed there¬
from. Belief in Deity or deities, which on Flint's view constitutes a
religion, has an indissoluble connection with human life and conduct, and
is to be known by its fruits. He does not hesitate, therefore, to discuss
and evaluate religious thought in terns of its moral consequences. He is
in entire agreement with Tulloch's teaching that "religion is a pervading
element of human nature." It is the response of the whole human spirit
to the Divine.
Religion belongs exclusively to no one part or province, no one
disposition or faculty of the soul, but embraces the whole mind,
the whole man. Its seat is the centre of human nature, and its
circumference is the utmost limit of all the energies and
capacities of that nature. At the lowest it has something alike
of intellect, affection, and practical obedience in it. At its
best, it should include all the highest exercises of reason, all
the purest and deepest emotions and affections, and the noblest
kind of conduct.2
This, however, is a "developed idea" of religion, and one that is intimately
connected with theistic belief. Less developed religions are on a lower
plane simply because the professed revelations of God which they represent
Ibid.. p. 32 Gp. Anti-Theistic Theories (Edinburgh & London, 1885),
pp. 258-9.
2. Ibid., pp. 36-7. If due exception be made for Chalmers, this is the
prevailing view of Scottish religious psychology from the time of
Halyburton (supra, p. 43).
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do not make their appeal to the whole man. The degree of development to
be attributed to any professed revelation or religious belief is to be
measured by the moral development manifest in its disciples—by the result¬
ing efflorescence of their spiritual powers. In this sense, Flint's argu¬
ment may be said to proceed upon a homo religiosus mensura principle."*"
Only a religion which admits of full communion of the reason,
affection, and will of the worshipper with the object of his
worship—only a religion which presents an object of worship
capable of eliciting the entire devotion of the worshipper's
nature, and at the same time of ennobling, enlarging, refining,
and satisfying that nature—fully realizes the idea of religion,
or, in other words, can claim to be a perfect religion.2
Polytheistic, pantheistic, and deistic conceptions of God are defective
in so far as they fail to do justice to the intellectual, ethical, or
emotional requirements of man's moral nature. The theistic idea of God
consummates the religious development, because—as Flint contends—the God
of theism requires the service of the whole man. "The highest possible
form of religion must be a theistic religion—a religion in which the one
personal and perfect God is the object of worship."-^ "God, as the presup¬
position of all elevating ideals, and the object of all ennobling desires,
is the primary source and the ultimate explanation of all progress."^
Moreover, the problem of relating belief to knowledge. which came
into view in connection with Flint's studies in the Philosophy of History,
did not become less acute when he turned to the System of Natural Theology.
The assumption that belief has a proper and necessary connection with any
1. The "homo mensura principle" is the cardinal notion of Professor Campbell
Fraser's Philosophy of Theism. Flint's view differs only in that it keeps
more steadily in view the facts of man's religious, as well as his philo¬
sophical, history.
Theism, pp. 37-8. Constant reference is made to this principle in the
criticisms pressed against the anti—theistic theories which Flint examines
at the second stage of his comprehensive System. E.G., cf. Anti—Theistic
Theories, pp. 19-27, 173, 332-3, 395-409.
3. Theism, p. 50.
4. Ibid.. p. 58. Cp. Agnosticism, pp. 573-77, 659-64.
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sclentific knowledge of reality is latent throughout Flint's exposition
of theism; but only in Agnosticism is it treated systematically as a
cardinal concern of general, and of religious, epistemology,-5- In its
widest sense, "belief" is said to be simply "an assent to judgments of
knowledge and existence,"—an assent involving the intellect, but no less
the imagination, the feelings, the will, and in fact the whole of human
nature. It is the direct, unanalyzed response of man's whole being, affirm¬
ing that something is and is known, with whatever consequence to himself .2
But belief may be assent to falsehood, or assent given without accurate
perception of its object, "Knowledge," on the other hand, is belief duly
analyzed, from which error and falsehood have been systematically eliminated.
Belief is often—what knowledge never is—a holding for true
that which is false, a mistaking for accurate perceptions
those which are erroneous, for correct judgments such as are
incorrect, and for legitimate processes of reasoning more or
less manifest fallacies. Knowledge is always the holding for
true what is true; and the true is that which is the expression
of external and internal, physical or spiritual, reality, which
is valid, not for one mind only, but for all sane minds.--
Religious belief is a species of general belief, and knowledge in this
sphere is to be reached by analysis of the appropriate beliefs. Belief
in God is whatever assent is given to His existence as a result of an im¬
mediate and unanalyzed apprehension of His Presence. In any significantly
religious form, it is a momentous assent to God's reality, affecting every
side of human personality.^* Yet, as the history of religions bears ample
witness, religious belief is subject to grave errors and perversions.
Belief in God must therefore be refined in such a way as to become knowl¬
edge of God. True beliefs must be vindicated by showing that they conform
1. Cf. Agnosticism, pp. 4-57-60.
2. I have tried to summarize the thought of pp. 4-60-78.
3. Ibid.. pp. 522-3.
4-. Cf. ibid., pp. 4-86-7.
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to evidence. That is to say, Flint holds that religious beliefs are
capable of demonstration—in the same way that "beliefs" or "hypotheses"
of natural science are demonstrated—by the method of inductive and de¬
ductive investigation, by the analysis and synthesis of appropriate
evidence."1" Anyone concerned with religious truth, who recognizes the
errors and excesses into which many are betrayed by their beliefs, must
welcome the aid of scientific study. The task of religious science is
simply to determine whether beliefs conform to properly apprehended and
articulated evidence: in other words, whether they conform to the conditions
of scientific knowledge.
The transformation of belief in God into an exact and compre¬
hensive knowledge is, according to Flint, the primary characteristic of
religious progress. A System of Natural Theology will be adequate to the
task of "proving" the sovereign existence of God only if it recognizes the
historical conditions which religious thought—and all thought, for that
matter—cannot evade. To recognize the primacy of belief is not to abandon
the attempt to arrive at a thoroughly rational account of religion, but to
give history its due, to see and understand reason concretely embodied in
the course and direction of historical development. In Flint's thinking,
This point is developed most fully in Flint's article on "Theology,"
contributed to the Ninth Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica (Edin¬
burgh, 1888), Vol. XXIII, pp. 260-76. Questions of theological method are
discussed in great detail. Theology in all its branches is, ideally, a
science, and—along with astronomy, chemistry, biology, history—a depart¬
ment of Philosophy, which Flint regards as the Scientia Scientiarum. (Cf.
his last-published work entitled Philosophy as Scientia Scientiarum: Edin¬
burgh & London, 1904.) Theological method is said to be primarily inductive.
The terms essential to the science are to be reached by induction from all
recognizable manifestations of religionj and when its principles are duly
formulated, they must be "proved by a process of apologetic and critical
reasoning which is in the main inductive." (Ibid,, p. 265.) Flint hazards
the remark that Mill's canons of inductive method—agreement, difference,
concomitant variation, residues—are as applicable in theological science
as in any other. How precisely, or to what extent when experimentation is
all but impossible, he does not say.
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the Philosophy of HLstoxy and the System of Natural Theology are fused
together, and presuppose one another. This may be indicated in a summary
way by the following passage:
Humanity as a whole has continued steadily in the faith that
more is to be known of Deity than has been known at any given
timej and that faith has been a continuous source not merely
of religious progress but of all progress. The idea of God
accepted in the present day as its chief ruling idea is only
explicable by the whole religious history of man which has pre¬
ceded it and the whole religious nature of man which underlies
that history,-*-
Natural Theology is simply the scientific treatment of that "whole religious
history," without uncritical reliance on the dogmas of any particular re¬
ligion, and with a view to a final, all-comprehending science, or philosophy.
It is to seek a conclusive proof of the Divine Reality by relying entirely
upon the inherent rationality of historical development connecting the
present state of belief and knowledge with the past. In this sense, Flint
regards history itself as a natural theology, and his theological method
professes only to unfold its evidence.
It is now possible to look more closely at the argument developed
in the parts of the System that were completed, and to indicate significant
details that presage what the completed system might have been. The re¬
maining analysis may best be undertaken in four stages. (A) The self-
styled "rationalism" underlying Flint's entire System must first be recog¬
nized and understood—particularly in view of long-established Scottish
opposition to any form of rationalism. Then (B) the precise belief, the
religious "hypothesis" to be proved, must be outlined. These considerations
are necessarily preliminary to (C) a study of the use Flint makes of the
"four proofs" or general lines of proof which "concur and coalesce into a
!* Agnosticism, p. 576.
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single all-comprehensive argument." Finally, (D) it will be possible to
indicate Flint's relation to the previous theistic development in Scotland.
(A) In commenting upon Flint's thought, Professor W. P. Paterson
has termed it a "rationalistic supernaturalism," and Dr. James Lindsay, a
"demonstrative rationalism. "•*• This is in keeping with Flint's character¬
ization of himself. "If to hold that belief to be legitimate must be
regulated by and conformed to reason is to be a rationalist, undoubtedly I
am a rationalist—an unblushing and impenitent rationalist—who considers
those who do not thus far agree with him to be irrationalistsOf all
Scottish thinkers considered thus far, Flint undoubtedly comes closest to
the position taken by Locke and English natural theology in the eighteenth
century—the insistence that the bases of religion may and must be demon¬
strated by reason. Flint's system stands upon the assumption that theistic
belief can be proved by reason. It can be proved, but not by argument
which depends upon the finality of syllogistic reasoningI The proof Flint
has in mind is to be cut to the measure of a very different form of "reason."^
What Flint means by the term "reason" and what Locke, Hume, or
Kant meant by it are very different matters. As Flint employs the term, it
1. Of. Macmillan, pp. 295 & 349. Paterson contributed a chapter on "Flint's
Doctrinal System" and Lindsay on "His Gontributon to Theism" to Macmillan's
biography. Both are helpful and suggestive. The present interpretation of
Flint's contribution to Theism will be found to differ from that of Lindsay,
who is prone to oversimplify in terms of his own "Progressivist" thesis.
(Cp. his Recent Advances In Theistio Philosophy of Religion.)
2. Agnosticism, p. 513.
3. Failure to determine the exact nature of Flint's "rationalism" has been
responsible for the very different views taken of his argument. Professor
Caldecott criticized Flint's Theism on the score that it is insufficiently
confident of the powers of reason: "There is an acquiescence in the possi¬
bility that the reasoning power of ordinary minds must not be taken to be
adequate to establish Personal Theism as a matter of course." (Op. cit..
p. 125.) On the other hand, Professor John Dickie in his Fifty Years of
British Theology (Edinburgh, 1932) criticizes Flint's overconfidence in the
power of "reason" to prove the theistic belief, (p. 63ff.)
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is not pure intellect, disengaged on the one hand from the will, the
"passions," and other psychic functions, or on the other from Kant's
"sensibility" and the content of knowledge provided by the senses. Rather,
in the context of theistic argument it is "reason in the ordinary and
popular sense in which we all speak of those who have become insane and
morally irresponsible as having 'lost their reason. It is the rationally
integrated self in its entirety.
It is not reason divorced from any inherent power or legitimate
affection of the human mind, but reason conjoined with them all,
with sense, perception, and conception, with intuition, judgment,
and inference, with imagination, with appetites and desires, with
moral and spiritual susceptibilities and aspirations. It is the
entire rational self, regulating all and not dispensing with any
of the principles and powers of human nature so far as they can
be rationally controlled, made 'subservient to moral purposes,"
and 'auxiliar to Divine.
It is reason in Tulloch's sense, in abstraction from nothing that is
essential to the whole of human personality. It is by reason, in this
sense, that the truth or falsity of religious belief is to be judged. When
this doctrine is thus faced squarely, it would seem to be only a more em¬
phatic reaffirmation of the anthropocentric point of view, which has been
seen to characterize Scottish thought from the beginning, although in some¬
what varied forms. The development has passed from Halyburton's apologetic
^problem concerning man" to Hume's sceptical view of human nature, to Reid's
mediating argument K<XT areputrov, to Chalmers' theology of conscience, to
Tulloch's Nullus 3piritus. Nullus Deus, and now to Flint.
The mental process in virtue of which we have the idea of God
comprehends and concentrates all that is most essential in
human nature. It is through bearing the image of God that we
are alone able to apprehend God. Take any essential feature of
that image out of a human soul, and to apprehend God is made
thereby impossible to it. All that is divine in us meets, unites,
Agnosticism, p. 514.
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co-operates, to lay hold of what is divine without us. Hence
the fuller and clearer the divine image is in any man, the
fuller and clearer will be his perception of the divine original."'"
This passage might have been taken from any of Tulloch's writings. Unlike
Tulloch, however, Flint hesitates to allow the theistic argument to be
cast in syllogistic form—as though it were sufficiently simple and final
2
to be so represented. Growth of rational powers, either on the intel¬
lectual or on the ethical side, and growth in the understanding of these
powers carries with it the promise of a larger and more profound appre¬
hension of God's true nature. "The thoughts of men as to God are neces¬
sarily enlarged by increase of insight into the conditions of their own
3
thinking." Greater self-knowledge is the key to greater understanding
of nature and history, which also makes possible a greater knowledge of
God. "The greatness, the power, the wisdom, the goodness of the God of
creation and providence must be increasingly apprehended in the measure
that nature and its course, humanity and its history, are apprehended;
and that measure is given us in the stage of development attained by the
3
sciences." Finally, God's moral, or ethical, perfections are discerned
more clearly as man himself increases in moral stature. "The apprehension
of God and the sense of moral distinctions and moral obligations condition
each other and correspond to each other..,. Thus the knowledge of God is
conditioned and influenced by the course of man's moral experience."^- In
general, as man increases in rationality, in intellectual and moral stature,
his ability to know God must also increase.
(B) What then is the belief, the religious hypothesis, which
"reason" in Flint's broad sense must establish? It is that theism, or a
1' Theism, pp. 68-9; cp. Agnosticism, pp. 314-5.
2. Theism, pp. 71-75; also, Agnosticism, p. 651f.
3. Ibid., p. 661.
Ibid., p. 662.
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thelstic conception of God, provides the only adequate explanation of
reality as disclosed in mind, nature, and history. That is, the facts
of experience, taken comprehensively, all serve to establish the certainty
that "the universe owes its existence, and continuance in existence, to
the reason and will of a self-existent Being, who is infinitely powerful,
wise, and good."^- The task of reason in transforming the belief into
knowledge is simply to show that the evidence confronting it occasions the
theistic belief which, when tested by the inductive and deductive procedures
of scientific investigation, is found to fit closely to the facts.
Insisting on the primacy of belief, Flint avoids a great deal
of logical wrangling as to whether inference can be validly made—after
Reid's or Chalmers* fashion, for example—frem man as part and center of
the natural order to God who is conceived to be above and outside of it.
Theism is a factual belief standing at the end of a long historical de¬
velopment. It is either true or it is false. Man is either confronted
by an Infinite Person who has set the marks of creative Wisdom, Power, Good¬
ness upon all His works, or he is not. The belief must simply be measured
against the evidence claimed to justify it.
The proofs of God's existence must be, in fact, simply His own
manifestations j the ways in which He makes Himself known; the
phenomena on which His power and character are imprinted. They
can neither be, properly speaking, our reasonings, nor our
analyses of the principles involved in our reasonings. Our
reasonings are worth nothing except in so far as they are ex¬
positions of God's modes of manifestation; and even when our
reasonings are correct, our analyses of them, supposing we attempt
to analyse them, may be erroneous.2
Belief in a God who is infinitely powerful, wise, and good is belief in an
infinite Person who is able to create and sustain in ordered unity the life
of man, nature, and history. It is not to be expected, therefore, that the
Theism, p. 18.
2* Theism, p. 61.
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proof will depend 3olely upon the logical powers of the finite human
reason. The infinite Mind will not be wholly comprehensible to the finite
mind, nor will human knowledge of God be absolute, in the sense of knowing
what He is "in Himself." Knowledge of infinite Personality must in fact
depend primarily upon God's ability to make Himself known to finite
creatures. In one of the most illuminating passages in the work on Ag¬
nosticism. Flint affirms:
We are not to assume that we can have an apprehension of God in¬
dependent of His own manifestation of Himself to us.... Our
knowledge of Him is derived from Himself, and hence to know Him
shows not so much the power of the finite to reach the Infinite
as the power of the Infinite to reach the finite.1
That is to say, the argument which is to vindicate the theistic belief
concerning God's being and powers cannot begin by ruling out any and every
notion of Divine activity underlying the process of religious knowledge—
that is, a Self-disclosure from God to men, a revelation by the Supra-
natural. If there is a God, an infinite Person as theism portrays Him,
then revelation is to be expected, and the progress of religious knowledge
will depend upon the fact of His disclosing Himself in a way somehow made
comprehensible to the finite mind. For this reason Flint holds that a
conception of supranaturai revelation is not incompatible with the aims of
natural theology: it must only be shown to be in accord with the evidence.
The theistic hypothesis is, then, that man apprehends an infinite
Being, an infinite Person, from Whom, in Whom, and to Whom, all things have
their being—nature, man, and history—Who reveals Himself to the finite
reason. But is this belief rational? Can it be known to be true? To
vindicate it in detail is the purpose- of the four proofs.
(C) Seven of the ten chapters of Theism are devoted to the theistic
1- Pp. 582-3.
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proofs which Flint, following Kant, distinguishes as the "cosmologieal,"
the "teleological," the "moral," and the "ontological."^ But his debt
to Kant is terminological only. He dismisses the view that the four
proofs are, or can be regarded as, each self-contained and self-sufficient,
and that only the moral proof can be said to have any rational validity.
Flint insists, to the contrary, that all are valid as far as they go, and
that they are mutually interdependent—each contributing to the cumulative
argument. They are "but stages in a single rational process," which moves
when ordered "naturally" from the cosmological proof, to the teleological,
to the moral, and finally to a consummation in the ontological proofIt
is probably needless to point out that Flint proceeds upon assumptions very
different from Kant's. There is no question of the proofs being "theoretic-
dogmatic" demonstrations of Pure Beason. They are intended rather to be a
systematic anatomy of the apprehension of God, which, in the unanalyzed
form of its appearance in historic religion, is belief. Each deals with
an aspect of the most comprehensive form of belief, which is theistic. The
proofs
...are perceived to constitute an organic whole of argument, each
of them establishing its separate element, and thus contributing
to the general result—confirmatory evidence that God is, and
complementary evidence as to what God is. The explanation of this
doubtless is that the apprehension of God is itself an organic
whole, a complex and harmonious process, involving all that is
essential in the human mind, yet all the constituents of which
are so connected that they may be embraced in a single act and
coalesce into one grand issue.3
H While Tulloch had a superficial knowledge of German thought, Flint
belongs to a period of intense research by British scholars into German
philosophic and theological speculation. It was the period that produced
Edward. Gaird's A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant—the first
thorough and accurate analysis of Kantian doctrines to appear in English
(1877). Prior to this, natural theologians in Scotland had been content
with the general distinction of theistic proofs as either a priori or a
posteriori. Tulloch, of course, was among them.
2. Theism, pp. 71-5.
3. Agnosticism, p. 6l5f.
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To put the matter more simply, theistic argument must be "according to
reason": that is, shown in its relation to human reason, which is on
Flint's view the rational personality. The proofs are simply the various
ways in which God manifests Himself, and by which man is enabled—in
virtue of his rational nature—to apprehend Him, Thus, the mind is able
to apprehend God as Supreme Cause in virtue of its knowledge of itself as
effective will: this is the sphere of cosmological proof. The mind is
able to apprehend God as Supreme Intellect in virtue of its own intellectual
and logical powers: this is the sphere of the teleological proof. The
mind is able to apprehend God as Morally Perfect Being in virtue of its
traffic with conscience: this is the sphere of the moral proof. Finally,
the mind is able to apprehend God as Absolute and Infinite Being in virtue
of its speculative powers: this is the sphere of the ontological proof.
No one of the proofs by itself is able to carry the weight of refutation
that Kant had heaped upon them individually—excepting the moral proof, to
be sure," But together, Flint holds that they spell out man's total
response to God's total revelation in Nature, Mind, and History, The compre¬
hensive belief when analyzed and systematically confronted with the facts
is freed from falsehood and error, and thereby transformed into knowledge.
In this sense, it is demonstrated,
Flint's treatment of each of the proofs can be indicated only in
a summary way. His reasoning is not unfamiliar, however, for it has been
encountered in the Scottish development traced thus far. It should be
1* Flint undertakes a detailed refutation of Kant's celebrated refutations
in Agnosticism, pp, 216-235, In general, Flint objects to the distinction
between Pure and Practical Reason as being too sharply drawn, maintains that
the moral proof on which Kant relied is subject to the same criticisms as
the "speculative proofs," and asserts that belief cannot be summarily cut
off from knowledge.
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apparent that, for all its vast range, Flint's mind has the stamp of the
Scottish tradition upon it,
(i) The cosmological proof would validate the belief that "Nature
is but the name of an effect whose cause is God,"^ It is in essence an
argument a contingentia mundi. The world is demonstrably not a self-
existent fact, but gives every appearance—to scientific reason, at least—
of being an effect. It must therefore have had a cause; and only a free,
rational Will, commensurate with the cosmic effect, answers adequately to
the notion of a "cause." "Reason, if honest and consistent, cannot in its
pursuit of causes stop short of a rational will. That alone answers to and
2
satisfies the notion of a cause." This latter phase of the proof corre¬
sponds in all essentials to Tulloch's doctrine of efficient causation and
his reasoning on its behalf. It may therefore be passed over without
further analysis. But Flint's us© of contemporary science in connection
with this proof throws important light upon the ultimate premises of the
argument as a whole.
Flint's notions of science belong to a period that witnessed the
beginnings of modern atomic and nuclear physics, which have made naturalism
in the form that Tulloch knew it less and less tenable. Flint cites con¬
temporary speculation as evidence to establish that the material order has
had a beginning which cannot be explained by a materialistic hypothesis
that the ultimate reality is simply matter in motion. For example, he
singles out for particular emphasis certain corollaries drawn from the so-
called "second law of thermodynamics" as formulated by Lord Kelvin,—from
whom he had received his scientific training at the University of Glasgow
Cf. Theism. Chapter IV, and Appendices XI & XII; also, Agnosticism.
P. 652f.
2« Theism, p. 130.
3. ibid., pp. 117-8, 359-64. Flint referred to Kelvin as "the greatest
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If proven beyond all doubt, this "law" would seem to point not only to
the eventual dissipation of energy and the cessation of all movement at
a determinate though remote point in time; but, the same mathematical
reasoning would indicate an antecedent time when there was "an initial
distribution of heat which could not have resulted, according to the known
laws of nature, from any previous distribution. The inference drawn is
that the world must be regarded as sin effect, pointing to a cause beyond
itself. A materialistic hypotheis on which the older naturalism had re¬
lied leaves unexplained the radical transition from an original insistent
chaos to the present substantial cosmos. Chaos in transit is not equivalent
to a cosmos. Therefore, the universe is an effect,—Its cause can only be
an all-powerful Will.
Flint relies unreservedly upon the progress of science to advance
theistic proof—upon further discoveries concerning "the ultimate consti¬
tution of matter, the conservation of energy, cosmic evolution, the age and
duration of the present physical system."^ He asserts that truly scientific
knowledge, from which all error and falsehood have been eliminated, is both
possible and actual. Thus, in connection with the argument from Kelvin's
law, he repudiates an attempt to escape certain aspects of the scientific
theory by recourse to hypotheses of the German mathematician, Riemann, and
others as to a space of n dimensions. Flint's appraisal of the attempt is
revealing, particularly in the light.of subsequent scientific development
in the present century:
of his teachers" (Macmillari, p. 39), and was undoubtedly more indebted to
him than to any of the others. While he did not follow in the line of
Kelvin's specialty—molecular and atomic physics—his determination to
raise the study of history to the plane of science probably owed something
to Kelvin's spirit.
■*" Agnosticism, p. 652.
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It is to be hoped that few persons in full possession of their
intellects will ever accept a view like this. The imaginary
geometry may be thoroughly sound reasoning, but it is reasoning
from erroneous premises, and it can be useful so long as it is
remembered that its premises are erroneous. They have only to
be assumed to be true to experience and reality, and all science
must be set aside in favour of nonsense. Logic ought not, how¬
ever, to be confounded with truth.
Flint's categorical repudiation of Riamann's speculation, his equation
of Euclidean categories with truth, his concomitant reliance upon the
physical concepts of Newton, are all measures of his scientific outlook.
Us/
In this respect, Flint as a theologian is no different ihan'the majority
of his scientific contemporaries, who constitute what Professor Whitehead
has described as the "age of successful scientific orthodoxy, undisturbed
by much thought beyond the conventions." In claiming the support of con¬
temporary science, Flint unwittingly accepts its limitations« Only a few
of his contemporaries—A. J. Balfour among others, whose Defense of Phil¬
osophic Doubt he regards as unduly sceptical—question the scientific
"gnosticism" which, if unchallenged, would have precluded the scientific
development of the present century.
(ii) The teleological proof would validate the belief that
cosmic order is "a manifestation of, and consequently a ground for believ¬
ing in, Supreme Mind." Or, to state the matter more precisely, "...
Order, the proof of which is the grand achievement of science, universally
implies mind; ... all relations of order—all laws and uniformities—are
3
evidences of an intelligent cause." The similarity of this hypothesis
to Tulloch's formulation of the theistic syllogism is of no help here,
3-* Theism, pp. 362-3.
2. Ibid,, p. 131. Flint deals with the teleological proof at length on
pp. 65-6, 131-209, 367-397; also in Agnosticism, pp. 227-32, 653, and in
various connections throughout his treatment of Anti-theistic Theories.
Of the four proofs, he accords this the fullest treatment.
3» Theism, p. 132.
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for it must be remembered that Flint rejects intuitive philosophies,
mainly as not being consonent with historical development of thought con¬
cerning God. A proof more in keeping with the evidence is therefore re¬
quired.
Flint gives an ungrudging assent to the proposition that "the
proof of order is the grand achievement of science." In the current debate
between those who would accord, and those who would deny, "continuity" and
"development" the status of scientific principles in biological and
historical studies, Flint is entirely on the side of the former. He wel¬
comes conclusions in both of these fields as significant contributions to
the proof of an all-pervasive cosmic order. He has no part in the contempo¬
rary "debate between science and religion," and is entirely out of sympathy
with it.
The theory of evolution has not shaken the principle or lessened
the force of the (teleological) argument, while it has widened
its scope and opened up vistas of grander design, but it has so
changed its mode of presentation that already the Bridgewater
Treatises and similar works are to a considerable extent anti¬
quated .3-
Biological conceptions of evolutionary development suggest that the realm
of organic life manifests order of a most profound and comprehensive kind.
Flint holds that order characterizes the moral life of man in history also,
and is developmental in character. This has perhaps been sufficiently ex¬
pounded in dealing with his Philosophy of History. He does not hesitate,
as had Tulloch, to bring even man's precious "freedom" within the scope of
scientific generalization. The study of history is affirmed to be a science.
Agnosticism, p. 653. Flint analyzes Darwin's biological theory in some
detail. His general conclusions if proven, a biological theory of evo¬
lution would indicate a comprehensive and sustained creativity rather than
the separate and piecemeal acts of Divine creation envisltflfed, for example,
in Chalmers' Bridgewater Treatise. Of. Theism, pp. 189-&09.
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or potentially a science, at least, in the fullest sense of the word..
Like any other, it gives knowledge prospectively of a system containing
and governing a vast area of human experience. All sciences in conjunction
gradually uncover the rational framework of the world—system upon system
interrelated in a unified cosmic system, an orderly universe.
There is...everywhere, both in the physical and moral worlds,
order and adaptation, proportion and co-ordination, and there
is very widely present progress—order which advances in a
certain direction to a certain end, which is until realised
only an ideal. This is the state of things which science dis¬
closes. The question is, Is this state of things intelligible
on any other supposition than that of a designing mind?-*-
The teleological inference is that "order universally implies
mind." If so, what is the nature of the inference? Flint denies that it
is grounded in the intuition of an infinite Reason or Personality, as
Tulloch would have it. More than that, he denies that the inference is
analogical, as Chalmers would have it. The supposition that the individual
mind has a direct knowledge of other human intelligences—enabling in¬
ference from the ordered world to God, analagous to inference from human
contrivance to a human contriver—is challenged.
We have no direct or immediate knowledge—no intuitive- or a
priori knowledge—of the intelligence of our fellow-creatures,
any more than we have of the intelligence of our Creatorj but
we have a direct personal consciousness of intelligence in our¬
selves which enables us confidently to infer that the works both
of God and of men can only have originated in intelligences.2
That is to say, knowledge of fellow-intelligences is mediated by the
evidences of intelligent, ordered activity in and through "external nature."
Character or personality "cannot be heard with the ear, or looked upon with
the eye, or touched with the finger," but is inferred from phenomena ex-
«e-
perienced through one or more of the senses. Ordered sounds, acts,
1* Ibid., p. 152. Flint holds that science is possible only where there
is bftlief in an all—pervading order. Its achievement is to trace out
this belief in detail, thus transforming belief into knowledge.
2* Ibid.. p. 77; cf. also pp. 156-8.
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occasion the belief and the knowledge that the perceiving mind is con¬
fronted with other minds like itself. This, Flint argues, is the logic
of personal relations within the microcosm of human society. Knowledge
of God in the macrocosm of an ordered universe is said to be had by an
identical inferential process. In regard to the rational process, "our
knowledge of God is obtained as simply and naturally as our knowledge of
our fellow-men."^ In regard to the vast universe of actual and possible
experience confronting human reason, the inference makes large demarris upon
its powers of attention and reflection.
In general, Flint's teleological proof infers that the Sovereign
Will which is the Cause of the world-order is necessarily possessed of
wisdom commensurate with the intricate adjustment and system of the universe:
He is Sovereign Intelligence, revealing Himself through the media of Nature
A* y
in the same way that man reveals himself through the media of his own
£
nature. In the last analysis, whether the logic of the inference is properly
called analogical or not, the ultimate question involved has to do with
the character of communication between intelligences. Flint is contending
that the fact of cosmic order and the developments through which it expresses
itself are the communications of a Divine Mind. Proof of the belief can
only be had by studying and comprehending the mediated thoughts of God in
the same way that one would seek to comprehend thoughts presented by fellow
men, in expectation of intelligent meaning. It is for this reason that the
teleological proof is made to turn upon a particular psychological doctrine
which has one outstanding merit: it can be reconciled with the fact of a
developing knowledge of God in history.
Ibid.. p. 76.
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(lii) The moral proof which is the third step of the compre¬
hensive theistis argument would validate the belief that conscience and
the moral order of the world manifest God's sovereign Righteousness, What
Flint has to say concerning conscience and its witness to God is substantially
the same argument already met in Chalmers* theology of conscience. That
is, he rejects Tulloch's intuitive morality as not consonent with historical
evidence, and reverts to Chalmers' doctrine of moral autonomy. The moral
proof begins with conscience as a fact—an inherent voice of authority
having rightful control over every spiritual activity of man. This moral
fact is indispensible to theistic proof; "There is probably no living
practical belief in God which does not begin with the conscience."**• Flint's
views in this respect parallel Chalmers' closely. Where he differs is only
in refusing to allow moral reasoning to take precedence over other
scientific considerations. "Living practical belief" is of the essence of
theistic conviction, but it does not overshadow the necessity of full
rational assent, as Chalmers contended, nor displace it in Kantian fashion.
Flint quotes from Chalmers extensively and with approval. Further elabora¬
tion of the argument from conscience is therefore unnecessary.
It is, however, the addition of a historical dimension to con¬
science that results in Flint's doctrine of the moral world. If conscience
declares the de jure authority of moral law, what has been its de facto
power in the life of mankind? What light does this shed upon theistic
belief? Chalmers, for one, had hesitated to pursue such questions, being
impressed by the inadequacy of attempts to measure the relative power of
2.
good and evil, right and wrong, in the history of mankind. Paley, for
Ibid., pp. 211-2. The italics have been added to the text.
Of. his Natural Theology. Bk. IV, Chap. VI.
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example—and others even earlier in the eighteenth century—had constructed
a crude balance of evidence for and against the notion that goodness pre¬
ponderates in the over-all sweep of history. Deciding in its favor, he
gave currency to a momentous conclusion which undoubtedly contributed
much to the "doctrine of progress"—perhaps more than has generally been
recognized, Flint, well over a century later, expounds a "scientific" view
of history which is not blind to the evil, the suffering, the sin, that mar
the record of mankind in every age, let, he concludes that the story is
one of moral progress, growth toward a comprehensive unity of human under¬
standing and endeavor, and the slow realization of human freedcm, These
are the "laws" which the Philosophy of History vindicate.
If we examine history as a whole, we cannot but recognize that it
has been in the main a process of moral progress, of moral growth.
Men may be now as guilty, as willful sinners against what they
know to be right, as ever they werej^in that sense there may be no
moral progress; but of this there can be, I think, no reasonable
doubt in the mind of any impartial student of history, that the
thoughts of men have been surely, if slowly, widened as to liberty,
chastity, justice, benevolence, piety—and that their feelings have
been correspondingly modified, their manners refined, and their
laws and institutions improved,,,. Age is linked to age, and in
the struggle of good and evil which pervades all ages, victory is
seen slowly but steadily declaring itself for the good,,,. Now,
whatever be the means by which moral progress is brought about,
the testimony which it involves as to the moral character of God
is none the less certain.
.
The evidence of the moral world is that God is Righteous and on the side
of righteousness. The Being whose Will creates and sustains the universe,
whose Wisdom guides its orderly operations, is not indifferent to moral
values, but manifests His righteous purpose in the providential direction
of human history.
Flint's criticism of a "moral theology" such as Kant's—which
finds theistic belief rooted ultimately inc" •. " '
-*-<> Theism, pp. 230-1; cf. also pp. 258-9.
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ethical deliverances, and in these alone—belabors the impossibility of
separating one undoubted facet of consciousness from the whole. He con¬
tends that belief in a moral universe and belief in a rationally ordered
universe are on equal footing: the one is as subject to doubt and dis¬
belief as the other.-*• While the evidence of conscience and of moral
progress in history contribute much that is essential and indispensible
to theistic conviction, it is also a fact that theistic conviction gives
necessary support to conscience when its voice is all but drowned out by
the strident confusion of suffering and moral evil in the world. "Faith
in duty helps us to faith in God: faith in God helps us to faith in
2
duty." It is the conviction of this interrelation between belief in con¬
science and belief in a God of inviolable providences that ultimately
explains Flint's view of history. While he is obviously influenced by-
current doctrines of progress and evolutionary development, he carefully
distinguishes his own view from "those theories which represent history as
a mechanically necessitated product, or an inevitable dialectic movement,
or a simple organic growth, or the natural consequence of a struggle for
existence between individuals and societies, or a fundamental economic
evolution.History is an "ethical creation," the free response of moral
beings within the bounds of an all-containing Providence. It is a progress
compatible with moral freedom and trust, with moral failure and triumph.
(iv) The ontologfcal proof, finally, would validate the belief
that God is "infinite, eternal, absolute in being and perfection." The
1* For Flint's criticism of Kant's moral proof, cf. Agnosticism, p. 230.
His own view is set down on p. 653, and at length in Theism, pp. 210-63,
397-423.
2. Ibid., p. 263.
3. Supra, p. 171.
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argument as a whole culminates here, drawing together the strains of the
previous proofs, molding them into a final conclusion.
We have ascertained that there is a God, the First Cause of the
Universe, the powerful, wise, good and righteous Author of all
things. We are conscious, also, that we have ideas of infinity,
eternity, necessary existence, perfection, etc.... Having them,
no matter how or whence we have obtained them, and knowing that
God is, as also in a measure what He is, the remaining question
for us is, Mast these ideas apply to God or not? Mist the First
Cause be thought of as eternal or not—as infinite or finite, as
perfect or imperfect?-'-
Flint's conclusion is that it must, else the powers of reason to know
reality, and to know it truly, in any degree, will be involved in hopeless
contradiction. In general, Flint's ontological proof appears to be the
crowning reassertion of the "rationalism" with which his theistic view
begins and ends.
It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to do justice to the
argument at this point without going into great detail. Since that is im¬
possible, within available limits, and since Flint himself leaves the
reader to determine his precise view from cursory remarks on various his¬
torical presentations of the ontological proof, a few general indications
of its bearing will perhaps suffice. Quite significantly, Flint insists
in answer to Kant and Kantians that this proof is not logically first among
the four proofs, for it has to do with the ultimate possibilities of know¬
ing which are reached and explored only as a climax of the comprehensive
processes of human knowledge. The cosmological, teleological, and moral
Theism, pp. 265-6. Flint deals with the proof at length on pp. 264.-301,
423-437; also, in Agnosticism, pp. 220-3, 653-4•
2« in the encyclopedia article on "Theism," Flint carefully points out that
this proof "has passed from a stage in which it was present in particular
ontological foims into one in which it is set forth in a general epistemo-
logical form." (Agnosticism, p. 654*) His presentation of the proof sum¬
marizes his epistemology. As he understands it, the task of this philo¬
sophical science is to outline precisely what the mind actually knows. It
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proofs marshall the evidence to show that a Being of extraordinary power,
wisdom, and righteousness manifests Himself through the media of an
orderly and moral universe. There remains to be proven the contention
that in and with all knowledge of the finite and temporal—knowledge of
nature, man, and history, notions of "infinity" and "eternity" are implied
necessarily, Flint does not speculate about the exact genesis of these
ideas in the human mind. He maintains only that they are present, that
they cannot be referred to the mediating cosmos which has presumably been
shown by the cosmological proof to be a contingent effect, that they must
in consequence be referred to God. This statement of the ontological
proof is to be described as "a priori inasmuch as it rests on necessary
ideas, but a posteriori inasmuch as it proceeds from these ideas upwards
to God in a manner which is essentially analytic and inductive. Only when
God—the principle of principles—is reached, can it become synthetic and
deductive."-*- This much, at least, is plain: Flint has not here abandoned
his objection to theories of intuition and of direct insight into the inner¬
most nature of God. The final theistic problem has to do with the relation
of the human mind and its mediated knowledge to ultimate reality.
Flint's view is probably to be interpreted in this way. Either
reason is capable of knowing the ultimately real which can only be con¬
ceived as existing everywhere and at all times, giving unity to the whole,
therefore stands at the end of philosophical inquiry, not at its beginning.
Kant's Critical Philosophy, according to Flint, errs in attempting to
define the limits of knowledge before taking into account what the sciences
actually validate as knowledge. The sciences must first reach their
synthetic judgments, each within its appropriate and limited sphere, before
philosophy can adequately investigate the grounds upon which a priori
knowledge is to be had. Cf. his Philosophy As Saientia Scientiarum.
1. Theism, p. 271.
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or it is not. To say that it is not is to admit scepticism at the start,
and to involve the quest for knowledge, truth, reality, in destructive
self-contradiction. But if reason is to be justified in seeking even
partial and limited knowledge, it can only be in the confidence that reality
in its fullest extent manifests a power, wisdom and goodness that allow of
no final contradiction. On this belief, a rational philosophy is at least
possiblej on a contrary belief, it is impossible from the outset, "It is
only by the apprehension of a Being who passeth knowledge that knowledge
can be rendered self-consistent; only by the admission that all existence
is not included within the conditions of the finite that thought can escape
1
self-destruction." This is Flint's contention, defended against the
criticisms of Kant, and others such as Hamilton, Mansel, and Spencer who
gave full assent to Kant's celebrated refutation. He argues that reason
demands that God be conceived as infinite and eternal for reasons parallel¬
ing those given by Kant himself in expounding a moral theology. There is
Kantian insight in this passage by Flint:
The heart can find no secure rest except on an infinite God.
If less than omnipotent, He may be unable to help us in the
hour of sorest need. If less than omniscient, He may overlook
us. If less than perfectly just, we cannot unreservedly "trust
Him, If less than perfectly benevolent, we cannot fully love
Him. The whole soul can only be devoted to One who is believed
to be absolutely good.~
This is the ontological proof in its ethical aspectI The proof is com¬
pleted, however, only when the demands of reason in its fullest sense are
given their due.
The ontological proof is undertaken in virtue of the speculative
powers with which the human mind is endowed. By speculative powers, Flint
evidently means reason enquiring after the Ultimate Reality which becomes
known only gradually as belief is refined and brought within an integrated
and comprehensive view. Reason is speculative to the extent that it must
believe more than it can at present know by scientific demonstration, in-
order that its apprehension of the oneness and wholeness of reality may
not be violated. The ontological proof is speculative to the extent that
it must conceive an infinite and eternal God to be the ultimate or "s-bsolute"
reality—ever and everywhere manifest in the life of nature, man, and
history, yet without being able to give final precision and clarity to
its idea of Him. Flint's unified argument concludes by envisioning the
speculative task. Even if he had lived to complete the third and fourth
stages of the System of Natural Theology, it is clear that he would not
have claimed to have exhausted the possibilities of theistic proof: the
speculative task would remain—the task of refining the idea of God so as
to accord with the progress of science. On Flint's view, theism is not-
merely "the ennobling complement of all human studies" as TuLloch con¬
ceived it; it is a growing synthesis by which the relation of the idea of
God to the categories interpreting nature, man, and history are determined
with increasing precision. The idea of God is to be "the most compre¬
hensive of ideas, inclusive of all categories of thought and implicative
of their harmonious synthesis and perfect realization."^ Flint's final
1. Both quotations are from the Encyclopedia article on "Theism," appended
to Agnosticism: cf. pp. 659-60. Critics of Flint's doctrine among his con¬
temporaries urged that his manner of presenting the proofs in Theism seemed
to bring him to an outmoded deistic idea of God as a completely transcendent
Being. (Cf. Macmillan, p. 351ffj also, A.S. Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of
God (New York, 1920), pp. 299-303.) Because it has been necessary to rely
mainly on the statement of the proofs in Theism, the foregoing exposition
will perhaps seem to indicate this as an inevitable result. This impression
of Flint's thought should be corrected by reference to the Encyclopedia
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view is, therefore, that
... all thought and experience must of its very nature tend to
lead onwards to a fuller knowledge of God. For the knowledge
of God, on this view consists in no mere inference reached
through a process of theological argumentation, but in an ever¬
growing apprehension of an everadvancing self-revelation of God:
and all philosophy, science, experience and history must neces¬
sarily work together to promote it.-*-
With the ontological proof, the fourfold theistic argument is concluded.
But it must be remembered that Flint's System of Natural Theology is to
be completed only when the results of formal discussion have been restored
to the context of historical development.
(D) It now remains to establish Flint's relation to the
previous development of demonstrative theism in Scotland. He was an extra¬
ordinary scholar, whose theological and philosophical erudition has rarely
L
been equaled or surpassed in Scotland or elsewhere. In this regard, he
stands apart with Sir William Hamilton as an exemplar of Scottish learn¬
ing. But while the content of his theistic philosophy gives ample evidence
of wide knowledge and intellectual sympathies, it is plain that Flint's
roots were deep in the theological and philosophical tradition of his own
country. It is true that his doctrines evidence a tendency to move closer
to an essentially rationalistic theism than the views of any of his prede¬
cessors. He believes that the task of natural theology is a conclusive
demonstration of God's infinite and eternal Presence—sovereign over nature,
man, and history—revealing Himself everywhere and in every age. But
Flint rarely loses sight of the fact that this is a belief, and that
article in which he observes that the tendency of theistic speculation is
"to remove or correct extreme and exaggerated conceptions of the Divine
transcendence and to produce a true appreciation of the Divine immanence,
—to set aside deism and to enrich theism with what is good in pantheism."
(Agnosticism., p. 654.) Clearly, Flint was not entirely untouched by the
rising tide of Idealistic speculation in Scotland, but he was critical of
it: cf. his remarks concerning John Caird's Philosophy of Religion in
Theism, pp. 435-7.
See Footnote, p. 203.
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between the belief entertained by man's finite reason and its final
demonstration stands the massive fact of an orderly and moral universe.
The ability of men to apprehend the true meaning of the cosmic revelation
depends upon the extent to which their moral and rational powers have been
developed in history. It must now suffice to show briefly that the rational
foundations of Flint's view are essentially the principles of Common Sense.
Consider the doctrine that is central to Flint's epistemology—■
the primacy of belief, and its relation to scientific knowledge. What
Flint terms "beliefs" are roughly equivalent to what Reid had designs.ted
as the "first principles" of Common Sense, or alternatively the "judgments"
or "beliefs" of Common Sense. They are original and ultimate apprehensions
in accordance with which man finds his entire rational nature related to the
vast reality about him. It is true, of course, that Flint makes a good
bit more of the possibility of error being associated with primary beliefs,
and urges the necessity of refining them in a systematic way. But it
should be remembered that Reid made allowance for the distortion of beliefs
in minds swayed "by education, by authority, by party zeal, or by some
other of the common causes of error"; he also realized the need to refine
ultimate beliefs in accordance with more exact knowledge. Above all, he
counseled "candor and humility" in the whole discussion of first principles.
Flint seems not to have called this last bit of wisdom into question.
Rather, he sees the refining process and the requisite intellectual virtues
as rooted in the gradual and progressive development of history. Reid's
philosophy reflects the static, Newtonian world of the mid-eighteenth
century; Flint's philosophy reflects the developing world of the late
nineteenth.
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Moreover, as has already been pointed out, Flint's doctrine
of "reason" reasserts the anthropocentric outlook of Scottish Common
Sense. In adding a historical dimension to theistic reasonings, his
System of Natural Theology is intended to do greater justice to the di¬
versity of postive religions and of religious thought$ but this does not
alter the perenniel Common Sense view that natural theology is inevitably
grounded in the personal reality of the human spirit. According to Flint,
history is primarily the moral unfolding of human nature through the
exercise of freedom—now in opposition to, now in cooperation with, the
material and psychic laws of the universe.-*- When this doctrine of history
is kept clearly in mind, the addition of a "historical dimension" to
theistic reasonings appears to be only an extension of Common Sense premises,
not their abandonment. This seems to be bom<out amply in the following
statement concerning the study of history and its place within the all-
embracing system of human knowledge.
Man, just because man, is capable of knowing more that truly
deserves the name of knowledge about human nature and human
history than about what is merely material and animal.... He
has to interpret nature by himself, not himself by nature. The
human mind and its history are in themselves more intelligible
than the physical world and its evolution, and may be expected
when scientifically studied and philosophically interpreted to
contribute more to knowledge in general and to religious
knowledge in particular.2
While this statement comes close to being the Idealistic contention that
nature and mind are related as the "outer" and "inner" of thought. Flint
in all probability intends no more by it than any of his Common Sense
predecessors intended when they affirmed that reason's fundamental problem
is the "problem concerning man"—that the highest philosophy or science
• Flint does not perpetuate Tulloch's sharp distinction between nature
and spirit, invariable order and freedom.
2. Agnosticism, pp. 321-2.
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must begin, if at all, with the one who seeks philosophical or
scientific knowledge.
Moreover, while Flint calls his natural theology "rationalistic,"
it is not rationalistic in Locke's fashion. It knows no second way to
knowledge of God that is entirely independent of revelation and can be
constituted a standard for judging all that professes to be revelation.
Flint is quite clear on this point: a so-called "scientific religion"
divorced from the sources of belief in historical religions might claim
to depend solely on reason. Indeed, it might succeed in doing so. But
like a seed out of soil, it would remain alone—groundless and fruitless,
if not corapletely lifeless. This, Flint asserts, is the indubitable
witness of history. The concluding chapter of Theism argues from the
failures of the past—in ancient Greece and in more modern times—that
historical beliefs will not be displaced by any purely rational creed.
A professed revelation rooted in history will overwhelm even a theistic
philosophy that undertakes to divorce itself from, or set itself in contra¬
diction to, the evidence of history.Flint reaffirms, therefore,—-the
consistent view of Scottish natural theologians—that from the standpoint
of natural theology, revelation must be given its due. If historical
religions have taught that knowledge of God is the result of a believing
response to God's self-revelation, it is not for reason to say that it
must be otherwise. Reason can only seek to understand the evidence, and
to know according to the light that is given. This it can do, and this
it must do. Even the Confessionalist Halyburton could hardly disagree
that man must know God, and that revelation which does not permit knowledge
"can never with any rational man be allowed sufficient to direct men in
1* Cf. Theism, p. 303ff; 314.
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religion." It must be said, however, that Flint—agreeing with John
Tulloch as against those more directly under the influence of Scottish
Gonfessionalism—is not content that the relation between "natural
light," which is reason, and the "light from heaven," which is revelation,
should remain indeterminate. Flint's rationalistic premises require that
this relation also should be rationalesed—and in this respect he goes
considerably beyond his Scottish predecessors, Tulloch included.
Flint's advance beyond earlier Common Sense views is best
illustrated by his reconciliation of the projected System of Natural
Theology with the Christian revelation. Little has been said of Flint's
distinctively Christian convictions, because as a natural theologian he
is obliged to be as objective as possible in appraising the particular
historical revelation which is Christianity. Its unique evidences—the
person of Jesus Christ and the witness of the Scriptures and the Church-
are to be considered by the natural theologian in the same light as the
credentials of any other religion or fact of history. This is in the
interest of science. Yet Flint is perfectly aware that Christian belief
concerning these evidences demands more than detached appraisal of them.
Christian belief
... is not mere belief, nor mere belief in religious truth,
nor mere belief in Christian truth. It is a self-surrendering
acceptance of Christ as of God made wisdom, righteousness,
sanctifiestion, and redemption unto us; a supreme trust in
Christ based on a distinctive conviction as to His character
and His relationship alike to God and man,-*-
0ns might well ask whether such a view of Christianity, taken in all
seriousness, can be reconciled with a System of Natural Theology whose
avowed aim is to transform all belief into knowledge by the inductive
-*-• .agnosticism, p. 4-S7. Gf. also Theism, pp. 317-19.
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and deductive procedures of scientific method? Moreover, can an ac¬
ceptance of Christ "as of God made wisdom, righteousness, sanctification,
and redemption unto us" be reconciled with the teaching that history has
been and will continue to be a progress in the knowledge of God, approxi¬
mating completely demonstrated truth—that all thought and experience,
all new understanding of nature, man, and history, "must of its very
nature tend to lead onwards to a fuller knowledge of God." In the per¬
spective of time, it will seem apparent to many that Flint did not realize
all the issues raised by his projected theistic synthesis, based upon an
optimistic doctrine of providence, and on an optimistic appraisal of
natural science and historical science. But it is important to realize
that Flint did rationalize the relation of Natural Theology to Christian
revelation, to his own satisfaction at least.
In the concluding chapter of Theism. Flint argues that "mere
theism is insufficient"—a theme worthy of a Halyburton. But this is not
taken to mean that the System of Natural Theology is to culminate in any¬
thing less than real knowledge of the real God. Indeed, it is to be a
scientifically conclusive knowledge of God as far as it goes, but never¬
theless an external knowledge which does not reveal the "heart of God."
As a Being of infinite power, wisdom, and righteousness, He is manifest
via naturae—in the ongoing life of nature, man, and history. But the
Divine heart of mercy and sacrificial love, the Father's heart which sinful
men need most to know, Is revealed only in the life and sacrifice of Christ.
God, in the unspeakable gift of His Son, shows us a power of
sacrifice infinitely above anything known among men—an intensity
of tenderest fatherly affection of which the strongest fatherly
affection on earth is but a pale and feeble reflection; and
Christ in His incarnation, life, sufferings, and death, reveals
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to us not merely the power, and wisdom, and goodness of God,
but the very depths, if we may so speak, of His heart as a
Father, enabling us to feel without a doubt that now indeed
are we the sons of God. Nothing but a special revelation,
however, could thu3 unveil and disclose God.-
Natural theology culminates in a knowledge of God as Sovereign; Christi¬
anity reveals the Fatherhood of God. On Flint's view, even a final
demonstration of the one form of knowledge does not eliminate the
necessity for the other. It might justly be said—seriously and with
due respect—that there is in his thinking a tacit distinction between
knowledge of God in his public capacity as Sovereign over the universe
and history, and knowledge of God in His private capacity as Father of
spirits and Friend of sinners. If Flint was thus influenced at the
highest level of theological speculation by the somewhat paradoxical way
in which personality manifests itself on the plane of human relations,
the anthropomorphism would be understandable: it would constitute a
further extension of Common Sense thinking. But this is merely speculation
concerning Flint's speculation, which was the concluding task upon which he
never fully entered. What is plain is that while the distinction between
the idea of God known to the natural theologian and the idea of God known
to the Christian is never lost, Flint moves with ease from one to the
other with no apparent sense of contradiction, or of paradox more painful





JOHN GAIRD'S PHILOSOPHY OF RKT.Tr/mN
There are excellent reasons for maintaining that John Caird
does not belong to the general development of Scottish theistic demon¬
stration traced thus far, and could well be omitted from this study.
There are other reasons, perhaps less oogent when taken only at face
value, for holding that Caird was not so completely free from the influence
of distinctively Scottish thought as he himself could have wished. But
it is not primarily to argue the merits of this issue that he stands at
the end of this study. Caird's reputation as an "Idealistic" or "Hegelian"
theologian will hardly be questioned by anyone, or the fact that his
writings are pervaded by a spirit and by doctrines that spring directly
or indirectly from the fountain-head of German Idealism. It is as the
representative of the movement that largely displaced the indigenous
development of Scottish religious philosophy that he is important here.
A consideration of his Philosophy of Religion will serve much the same
purpose at the end of this study as did the discussion of Locke*s religious
teachings at its beginning: that is, it will help) to set in relief the
distinctive characteristics of that development that has already been
considered.
This study was begun by considering the essentially rational¬
istic assumptions that informed the natural theology of John Locke and
\
his disciples in the eighteenth century, during the time of the celebrated
Deistic Controversy* It was shown that in Scotland there was nothing
comparable to that movement, but rather, that the whole development of
natural theology north of the Scottish border was conditioned and largely
determined by a separate tradition of thought. The central problem around
which this Scottish natural theology developed was not the question of the
napodieticn demonstrations of reason; it was human nature—the implications
and ramifications of being human, of knowing and acting as men who are
part and center of nature, yet, who cannot do justice to the most essential
elements of human experience without looking beyond nature to Something or
Someone whose power, wisdom, and righteousness underly it. In studying
this development in Scotland, the traditional theistic "proofs" have been
shown to be transformed as the fundamental conceptions of human nature have
been altered; and the demonstrative force attached to the proofs has
variously reflected the confidence with which human nature and the human
spirit have seemed to involve, or be involved in, a Divine order of things.
In every instance, it is the doctrine of man that governs the use of the
proofs in theistic argument; it is not the proofs that determine what is
or is not theistic argument, and consequently what man can or cannot know
about himself and his place in the Divinely ordered world. It is human
nature and human history that provide the critical evidence upon which
theistic belief is founded, if at all. There is a characteristic hesitancy
in Scottish natural theology to affirm that the idea of God reached by
theistie argument, or within the reach of such argument at any conceivable
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point in the future, is conclusive beyond all reasonable doubt. It is
characteristic that Flint should conclude his destructive critique of
e
Agnosticism with what amounts to an apology for continued doubt, not
withstanding his own arguments to the contrary. Professor Campbell
Fraser, whose Philosophy of Theism has many important affinities with
Flint's doctrine, insists even more emphatically upon the necessity of
recurring scepticism to further the progress of knowledge.1 These are
but indications of the Common Sense view which from its beginnings with
Thomas Reid maintained a mediate course between an undue scepticism on
the one hand, and an undue "gnosticism" on the other. But, being pre¬
occupied with the profound and penetrating scepticism of David Hume and
with the Naturalism that resulted from an inadequate appraisal of Hume's
real intention, Scottish thought moved slowly toward the opposite extreme
•—a rationalism with which Locke might conceivably have allied himself had
he lived two centuries after his own time. The frigid intellectualism
of Locke's religious philosophy had been dissolved by the heat and passion
of Romantic reaction, but the assumption of a practically limitless scope
and competence for human reason—now roughly the equivalent of rational
personality—was gradually asserting itself, not only in England but also
in Scotland. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century—indeed,
until the time of the First World War—the "most living and active" school
of thought in Scotland inculcated doctrines reached at the climax of the
rationalistic development in Germany. In some of its representatives at
least, Scottish Idealism was nourished partly by its antipathy to the
"timid psychologizing" and "unphiiosophical results" of Common Sense
Cf. his Philosophy of Theism (2nd edition; Edinburgh & London, 1899);
and his earlier Essavs in Philosophy (Edinburgh, 1856), especially those
dealing with Hamilton and Raid, and with Calderwood's philosophy.
thinking. John Caird, the contemporary of Flint and somewhat older than
he,"*" was trained in the tradition of Reid, Dugald Stewart, and Chalmers,
but having passed through a time of disenchantment in regard to the aims
and achievements of Common Sense, he was instrumental in bringing about
the rapid and remarkable growth of an Idealistic theology and philosophy
in Scotland.
Caird's knowledge of German Idealism was chiefly the fruit of
independent research: it owed nothing to his academic training at the
University of Glasgow, and probably very little to published works in
English. Such works were few in number when he turned aside from the
usual course of Scottish philosophy and theology, to investigage Hegel*s
massive system. German Idealism first made incursions into the Scottish
mind through a number of scattered and independent studies like Caird's.
Apart from the diffused Idealism of Romantic literature which was alive
to philosophic developments in Germany long before academic philosophy
in Britain, there were a few significant attempts to understand Kant and
the post-Kantian development culminating in the work of Hegel. J. D.
Morell's Speculative PMloaonhv of Europe provided the earliest history
of the movement. Professor James Ferrier of St. Andrews—colleague and
warm friend of Tulloch—*ras a student of German philosophy before the publi¬
cation of his Institutes of Metaphysics in 1854-. Though considerable
Caird was born in 1820 and died in 1898. The first work in which the
strong Hegelian or Idealistic influence appeared was his Introduction to
the Philosophy of Religion, the Croall Lectures for 1878-9, published in
1880. Though older than Flint, Caird's work belongs in chronological
sequence after Flint's early writings on the Philospphy of History and
on Theism. For this reason, he fittingly represents the concluding de¬
velopment of religious thought in Scotland in the nineteenth century,
although it is not his representative character that is to beanphasized
in this chapter.
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Hegelian influence has been suspected, and the Institutes were the first
instance of Idealistic philosophy in Scotland in the last century,
Ferrier maintained a critical attitude toward Hegel, and described his
own philosophy as being "Scottish to the core."1 Be this as it may, the
credit for putting Hegelianism in full view of the British public belongs
to another Scotsman, James Hutchison Stirling. His Secret of Hegel ap¬
peared in 1865, and marks the real beginning of the development of an
Idealistic movement in Scotland. It was at this time that Caird's interest
in German speculative philosophy was taking form. He had previously been
familiarizing himself with the literature of German theology and philoso¬
phy, and the lecture delivered on the occasion of his induction to the
Chair of Divinity at Glasgow in 1862 illustrates the trend of his mind
-t&u
toward an idealistic way of thinking.^ All the major works in which Caird
provides himself with the reputation of being an Idealistic theologian
appeared much later, after he resigned the Chair of Divinity to become
Cfo the Lectures on Greek Philosophy and Other Philosophical Remains
of James Ferrier (ed. by Grant & Lushingtonj Edinburgh & London, 1866),
Vol. I, (B) "Papers Supplementary to the Institutes of Metaphysic." Ferrier
wrote, "lifer philosophy is Scottish to the very core; I disclaim for it the
paternity of Germany or Holland; I assert that in every fibre it is of home
growth and national texture." (p. 487) There is perhaps more justice in
this claim than has generally been allowed, although in arguing for it,
Ferrier shows a remarkable knowledge of Hegelian thought.
2* Cf. Edward Caird,s "Memoir of Princip^ Caird," prefacing the post-
humous edition of John Caird's Gifford Lectures, The Fundamental Ideas of
Christianity. Vol. I., pp. lii-lx. All details concerning John Caird's
general and intellectual biography are drawn from this source. Edward
Caird asserts that his brother did not undertake his philosophical studies
until after his reputation as a preacher was well established; and that
when he did, it was in order "to make faith intelligent and intelligible."
(p. Ixvi.) During a pastorate at Errol in Perthshire, he began a program
of independent study in literature, theology, and philosophy. Garlyle and
Ruskin exerted a profound influence, as did the literature centering around
the Oxford Movement in England and discussing the relation of "Reason and
Authority." But his most fruitful undertaking was the mastery of German
language and literature; and then the study of German theology and phi¬




Principle and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Glasgow, They are
evidently a systematic enlargement of ideas worked out during the period
of active teaching. Lectures delivered annually at convocations of the
University from 1874 onward are collected in a volume published post¬
humously as University Addresses. They indicate all-important general
conclusions as to the interrelations of science, history, theology, phi¬
losophy, and art."*" In 1880, Caird himself published An Introduction to
JTJ
the Philosophy of Religion, which contained the substance of his Croall
Lecture for 1878-9, Here he works out in an abstract way the fundamental
"idea of religion" and the Idealistic principles to be applied in the
study of religion. This volume professes to be nothing more than an intro¬
duction however. The final statement of his thought is to be found in his
Gifford Lectures, j^fsb posthumously published as "The Fundamental Ideas of
Gh-Hati flirt tv. These lectures »,given under the auspices of a Foundation
dedicated to the study of natural theology',deal with the primary tenets
of the Christian faith, and are indicative of the new integration of phi¬
losophy and revelation to which Caird's Idealism is dedicated. On the
whole, the germinal ideas of Hegel aire developed by Caird with considerable
originality,^ and his progress in becoming a "Hegelian theologian" is an
index of the growing force which a loosely-knit group of "Scottish Idealists"
exerted in their own country, and, indeed, far beyond its borders. In its
finally Hegel, This research and the later intimate association with his
brother Edward, who had been introduced to Idealism at Oxford, led to the
full development of his views, Cf. pp, xxii-xxvii, lxiv-lxvii.
!• Caird is the only one of the four representative theologians considered
in this study who displays a lively interest in the significance of art and
the nature of aesthetic truth. Even Tulloch, who had a wide acquaintance
with contemporary authors and belles-lettres, seems to have given little
thought to the "philosophy of art."
2, Cf. the judgment of T. H, Green, quoted in Edward Caird's "Memoir":
op. clt.. p. cxx. There will be ample occasion to substantiate this
judgment.
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distlnctly philosophical aspect, Scottish Idealism was represented by
Hutchison Sterling and Edward Gaird, S. S. Laurie, and Andrew Seth
Pringle-Pattison; in its theological aspect, by students trained under
John Caird for the ministry of the Church,^ and by others such as James
Lindsay, a student of Robert Flint whose theistic thinking moved with the
current away from the Common Sense outlook toward a full-fledged Idealism.
The force and prominence to which Idealism attained in a steady-
succession of Scottish writings implied, more often than expressed, a
criticism of the limitations hitherto accepted by the proponents of a
Common Sense theism, who had characteristically shunned speculative heights
and failed to bring the whole of their philosophy and science within a
single comprehensive system. The appearance of the Idealistic movement
in itself raises a question concerning the circumstances that conditioned
the transition from the old to the new. Is Scottish Idealism a new and
more satisfactory beginning, with Hegel and German Idealism as guides, or
is it a further develonaent of doctrines and ideas that had arisen as an
ultimate consequence of Common Sense thinking? Is it an abandonment of
the traditional point of view from which Common Sense had chosen to survey
reality, or a more daring attempt to attain to the outermost reaches of
reality from essentially the same standpoint? On this matter, there has
been considerable difference of opinion. Edward Caird attributed his
brother's departure from the Common Sense tradition not so much to unin¬
spired teaching during his University course as to the inherent inadequacy
of the tradition itself.
Cf. ibid.. pp. lxix-lxxiii.
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The years during which he was at the University were, on the
whole, years of philosophical barrenness. Hume had awakened
Kant from his dogmatic slumbers, but had been less successful
in his native land, where a philosophy of 1Common Sense1 pro¬
tected men from unsettling thoughts, and, as it were, consecrated
the status quo.1
This was undoubtedly John Caird's judgment also—an indictment of the
use Reid and his disciples had made of "belief" and the cumulating con¬
clusions of the individual sciences, particularly in the matter of theistic
proof. The note of disdain in Edward Caird's remark is reminiscent of
the way in which philosophers and historians in Germany had habitually
regarded the teachings of "the Scottish School."^ Thirty years earlier,
Chalmers had boasted of the self-contained character of Scottish philo¬
sophical and religious doctrine, while deploring the obscure speculations
coming out of Germany. With the Cairds, the outlook is reversed:
Scottish philosophy is barren and Scottish religious thought dogmatic in
the bad sense. Inspiration and guidance in matters of higher thought are
to be had from Germany. On this view, there is little point in asking
3
whether Common Sense and the new Idealism have any deep-lying affinities.
Yet the opposite possibility that the new Idealism might in some sense be
the proper destination of the Common Sense development was early recognized.
Professor Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison), himself deeply influenced by
Ibid., p. xxv.
2. Cf. supra, p. 5.
3* In compiling his Bibliography of David Hume and of Scottish Philosophy.
Professor T. E. Jessop has included none of the representatives of Scottish
Idealism, on the grounds that this movement, "introduced straight from
Germany by Stirling," was "not distinctively Scottish," and being "closely
fused with the like movement in England," should be considered in that con¬
nection, In the interest of limiting the bibliography, the reasons are
entirely adequate. But the indicated divorce of Idealism in Scotland from
"Scottish Philosophy0 probably reflects a judgment such as Edward Caird's
which not everyone, Idealists included, would accept.
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Idealism, concluded a survey of Scottish Philosophy by considering its
pronouncements on the possibility of "philosophy as system.'1 His find¬
ing was that while the main body of purely philosophical doctrine is woe¬
fully silent about this matter central to German thought, there is no
hostility in principle to an attempt to "embrace all the elements of
existence in a final synthesis.""'" He suggested that the alliance of a
strong Idealistic concern for system with the principled moderateness of
Common Sense procedure would be both possible and desirable.2 Professor
Campbell Fraser, who could speak with greater propriety for "the Scottish
School" as one more intimately associated with it, concluded a study of
Reid's thought and influence with the judgment that
... a humanised Hegelianism, which seeks to restore or retain
the often dormant faith in the perfectly good God, and thus in
the future of man, may even be taken as in line with Reid,
tinder the altered intellectual conditions at the end of the
nineteenth century. It virtually appeals at last to moral
faith.^
It must be recognized, of course, that in qualifying "Hegelianism," Pro¬
fessor Fraser was recommending that it be seen in a particular light, or
rather from a particular vantage point. Then, and only then, could it be
regarded as in line with Common Sense convictions.
If it were necessary to choose between Caird's view that Ideal¬
ism meant the condemnation of Common Sense, and the view of Prlngle-
Pattison and Fraser that a moderate, humanised, and moralised Idealism
■ 1 1 1 " 1 ' |
I* Scottish Philosophy, p. 194-ff • The point on which German and Scottish
philosophy differ is said to be one of logical procedure. Speaking on be¬
half of Scottish Common Sense, he writes: "The ultimate unity of things
is what we stretch forward to, what we divine, but what we never fully
attain. It is our tarm-inns ad quern: it is never so fully within our grasp
that we can make it in turn our tarminns a quo, and, placing ourselves, as
it were, at the crisis of creation, proceed to deduce step by step the
characteristics of actual existence in nature and in man." (p. 219)
2* Ibid., p. 217ff.
3. Thomas Reid. pp. 158-9.
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might be the destination of Common Sense, the latter would seem to do
greater Justice to the actual aims and achievements of Scottish Idealists
generally,"'" But the choice is not actually necessary. The fact is that
Idealism—at least in the form of "Hegelianism"—is an imponderable that
has meant many things to many men, and even many things to the same man.
The possibility of its being at odds with alternative philosophies, in¬
dividually or collectively, is therefore great; but so is the possibility
of finding elements of fundamental agreement. It is the question of agree¬
ment and disagreement that is of Importance to this study. It is as a
criticism of Common Sense theism that John Caird's "Hegelianism"^ is now
to be regarded—a criticism implied rather than expressed. It is the
criticism of one who turned to Hegel for illumination on critical issues—
an illumination which he felt could not be found in the religious phi¬
losophy of his own country. In general, Caird's Philosophy of Religion
sets in relief the failure of Common Sense theism to be fully systematic
and speculative, or—from another point of view—its reluctance to agree
that man's relation to God and ultimate reality is determinable by specu¬
lative philosophy. Common Seme theism stops short of the assertion -that
The philosophy of S, S, Laurie is an interesting attempt to begin with
the "dualism" or "realism" asserted by the Common Sense doctrine of per¬
ception (sunra. p, 77) and to end with a completely unified and synthetic
view, on the Idealistic pattern. (Cf, his Metaphysics Nova et Vetusta:
a Return to Dnalism and his Gifford Lectures in Synthetica. Vol. II.) Pro¬
fessor Pringle-Pattison attempted a similar reconciliation. He also de¬
fended against Absolutists another conviction essential to the Conmon Sense
outlook: "Man's final conception of God is the truth of God for man: it
represents the universe as it ought to be seen, and as it was intended to
be seen, at the human point of view." (Man's Place in the Cosmos and Other
Essays, p. 243; cf. also his Gifford Lectures, The Idea of God, esp.
Lectures XIII to XVI.) Other instances might be argued.
2* The question of whether John Caird was a full-fledged "Hegelian" is
discussed by Edward Caird in the "Memoir": op. cit., p. lxxvii-lxxviii.
He points out that his brother rarely quotes from Hegel. It might also be
added that the only work of Hegel to which he acknowledges direct obligation
is the PMiftflnpMft Per Religion: cf. Prefatory Note to An Introduction to
the Philosophy of Religion.
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reason must, in a priori fashion, give "form" to the "infinite content"
which is the interrelated life of man, nature, and God.
From the study of the development traced from Reid to Flint,
it should he apparent that the hostility that characterized Reid's attitude
toward "speculative philosophies" was gradually abated, and by Flint's
time the traditional insistence on an inductive and scientific method for
philosophy was not construed to mean that speculative thinking is simply
groundless conjecture. To Reid, "speculation" had meant thinking in teraas
of hypotheses, and he professed to abhor hypotheses with the vigor of a
Newton. The plight of philosophy was simply that its endless speculations
had ended in chaos, out of which scientific induction seemed to indicate
the only sure way; and an inductive philosophy of the mind and its powers
seemed the obvious place to begin. Chalmers shared this view largely.
But he found a place for speculation. He was drawn to Leibnitz' doctrines,
not because they were cogently argued and true, but because, as speculations,
they provided a plausible answer to Hume's antitheistic speculations. While
the one neutralized the other, inductive philosophy could proceed un¬
hampered to establish certainties. All honor was given to the soundness
of the method so persuasively embodied in Newtonian science. Tulloch, for
his part, did not doubt the solidity of scientific procedure; but the faet
that spiritual "freedom" could not be worked into a thoroughly scientific
"explanation" of reality seemed to offer the surest and soundest defense
against an expanding Naturalism. To give unity to the resulting picture
in which "nature" and "spirit" tend to exclude one another, he resorted
to devices of Coleridge, and from Coleridge learned respect for speculative
philosophy. It remained for Flint, however, to teach that speculation is
necessary to complete even a consistently inductive philosophy. This
conviction has been dealt with perhaps recently enough not to need further
elaboration. But while Flint never fully undertook the speculative task
he envisioned, John Caird gave his mind to it almost exclusively.
Superficially, Caird's Philosophy of Religion might well appear
to be a continuation of Flint's System of Natural Theology, Indeed, it
would be completely in line with Flint's thought were it offered un¬
equivocally as a hypothesis-—an extremely complex hypothesis intended to
complete a unified and scientific account of reality, but as such capable
of acceptance or rejection, in part or in whole, upon the basis of irre¬
ducible evidence. Like Flint, Caird assumes the prior development of the
several sciences, each isolating its particular aspect of reality and
probing the secrets of its structure. Like Flint, he assumes a science
of history among the rest, and with it a historical science of religions.
Like Flint, he teaches that the goal of philosophy is a completed system,
that its task is to point out in a convincing way—to demonstrate—the
unity within which man is related to his fellow-men, to Nature, and to
God, But these points of similarity are in contrast to a large and
fundamental diaatwt.la-rt tva it is Caird's view that in order to form an
idea of the prospective unity, the ordinary analytic and synthetic pro¬
cedure of natural science which is the touchstone of Flint's thinking
must be abandoned. For the speculative task, philosophy requires a new
approach whereby it can divine the innermost principle upon which the
whole of reality is "formed." It must be able to bring into view the
skeletal structure of relations predetermining the matured unity, Caird,
of course, uses the terms "system" and "unity" in a quite definite sense.
They are conceived on the analogy of the system or unity of an organism,
which is commonly defined as a unified structure within which parts stand
related to one another and to the whole as being mutually interdependent--
in the Kantian phrase, "mutually means and ends.® It is in this light
that the speculative aim of Caird's Philosophy of Religion is to be under¬
stood. On the second page of his Introduction, he writes of this, and of
"rational philosophy" in general:
It does not confine itself to finite things, or content itself
with observing and classifying physical phenomena, or with em¬
pirical generalisations as to the nature and life of man. Its
vocation is to trace the presence and the organic movement or
process of reason in nature, in the human mind, in all social
institutions, in the history of nations, and in the progressive
advancement of the world. ... In all provinces of investigation
it seeks as its peculiar employment to penetrate beneath the
surface show of things, beneath empirical appearances and ac¬
cidents, and to find the ultimate meaning and essence. Its aim
is to discover, not what seems, but what is, and why it is:
to bind together objects and events in the links of necessary
thought, and to find their last ground and reason in that which
comprehends and transcends all—the nature of God Himself.
The notion of organic mrffa is clearly a controlling factor—if not the
controlling factor—in such a philosophy, the application of which to the
study of religion and religious ideas gives premise of a System rational
throughout. But it is a System from which Flint's Common Sense System
is clearly distinguishable, or at least one to which the preliminary stages
of his Natural Theology could hardly be thought to lead.
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, pp. 2-3. (All page
citations are from the New York edition of 1880.) The phrase "philosophy
of religion" appeared in works previous to the period of predominant
Idealism in Scotland. The general sense it bore is perhaps sufficiently
indicated by Thomas Dick's book published around 1847 and entitled, The
Philosophy of Religion: 0£, An Illustration of the Morftl Lgwg of the Unlyers?.
J. D. Morell, the historian of speculative philosophy on the continent,
published a book in 1849 entitled, The Philosophy of Religion. That Gaird
uses the phrase in a consistently Hegelian sense should be increasingly
plain in the course of the present chapter.
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To set in a concluding perspective not only Flints doctrines,
but also those of Common Sense generally, a few contrasting notions and
principles from Caird's Philosophy of Religion must now be considered. By
this means it will be possible to indicate the underlying rationale of the
natural theology that has been traced to a culmination in Flint's work,
Caird's doctrine of history, his epistemologyf his conception of reason
and of the traditional proofs, and finally his rendering of the relation
of the Philosophy of Religion to Christian Revelation-—all indicate critical
points where Common Sense thought refused on principle to follow the
promptings of what Professor Campbell Fraser has termed an unsupportable
"gnosticism,"
i) A scientific study of history is indispensible to Caird's
view, as to Flint's, because, as he insists in an illuminating discussion
of the "Relation of the Philosophy to the History of Religion," what¬
ever philosophy may contribute to the explanation of history, it is still
on history it rests, its highest function is to follow history and to dis¬
cern its real significance."^ While an a priori element must be present
in a system whose aim is to demonstrate religious truth, or show that it
is somehow necessary for thought, Caird iterates constantly that it cannot
be introduced at the expense of history. The record of what men have
believed concerning God and the manner in which they have worshipped him
point out the way that reason must take in order to discover what unity
and truth there is in the religions of mankind. "The religious experience
of the world is, in one point of view, the philosophy of religion ready-
made."2 With this line of thought, Common Sense is naturally in complete
Introduction, p. 311. Cf. the whole of Chapter X.
2. Ibid., p. 310.
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agreament. Moreover, when Gaird speaks of history—in general or in
its specifically religious aspect—he thinks constantly in terms of
progress, developing unity, and a gradual realization of human freedom.
Flint, for one, could hardly take exception to such usage.
Yet, when closer attention is given to Caird's use of history
and his understanding of the historical process, a significant distinction
comes into view, which is essentially different from the distinction
between "belief" and "knowledge" underlying Flint's philosophy of history.
j,
Caird speaks an "empirical knowledge" or "experience" of historical events
in the time series, and contrasts this with a "speculative knowledge" of
history. A "speculative" or "rational knowledge" of history is an under¬
standing of its process as basically an organic development, wherein the
i
"series of facts and events which constitute its outward form" is trans¬
muted and reinterpreted. The particulars and "differences" of which the
record of history is composed belie to some extent the underlying reality—
at least in so far as they appear to be distinct, independent, or anomalous
events in the time-series and consequently conceal the "organic filaments"
that make reality one. "Experience" in itself gives only an "empirical"
knowledge which fails to penetrate deeply enough behind the phenomena of
temporal succession. But for all this, Gaird holds that an empirical
knowledge of history is useful and necessary: it does justice to the
actual "content" formed by the organic process. Though in the pursuit of
knowledge philosophy may
...finally translate an evolution in time into a process of
thought which transcends time and of which the former (i.e.,
empirical history) is but the outward expression or symbol,
it is only by beginning, not with any audacious attempt to
spin a philosophy out of subjective thoughts and reasonings,
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but by an exhaustive study of the data of history, that a
true philosophy of religion can be constructed.!
Gaird is concerned with the data of religious history, but intends to go
beyond them—to translate them into a media more suitable to reason's
notion of organic unity. ?
It is quite plain, on the whole, that Flint's, philosophy of
history moves entirely on the level of what Gaird would call an "empirical
knowledge" of history. This is what is strongly implied in the insistence
that the study of history be "scientific,"-—given place beside the natural
sciences and required to test its own distinctive hypotheses by the measure
of "evidence." The differences and particulars of which history is composed
are to be themselves the criteria for testing and verifying any theoretical
notion of unity that might be brought to them. This is insisted upon,
especially in view of the fact that for Flint the data comprising "history"
center in the spiritual being of man: "History is an ethical formation."
The rationale of his scientific Philosophy of History becomes clearer in
contrast to the current trend of Idealistic thought represented by Caird.
In determining that his own study of history be "scientific"—whether he
succeeded in making it so or not, Flint sought to ensure on the one hand
that the data of man's ethical experience be given their due—that their
fflfrkmiH -hy be respected in the face of arbitrary demands made by pre¬
maturely speculative theories; he sought to ensure on the other hand that
4
man *8 moral experience be place^ in proper perspective beside other sciences
of fact—that it should not be given more than its due and itself become
the occasion for dissolving other indubitable facts, or of forcing them
1# Ibid., p. 311.
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to fit into a particular unifying scheme. Common Sense thought is open
to the possibility that history can be meaningful to man, that it can
contribute to a synthetic philosophy illuminating the whole of reality.
But Common Sense refuses to prejudge the issue, or to pronounce in a
priori fashion what that unity must be. Rather, it looks to the moral
development of man—to the further proliferation of rational and ethical
powers—as the means to a more adequate comprehension of the meaning
written upon the tablet of history. The integrity of the text is to be
preserved in anticipation of the further enlightenment of man.
Caird's Philosophy of Religion makes free use of the historical
data. History in its temporal sequence does not show a single, indubitable
pattern of organic development through which positive religions emerge from
more primitive forms, eventually to be merged again with higher forms of
worship and belief, Caird can assume without much argument, and does so,
that the history of religions is a body of loosely connected cults and
beliefs which conceal rather than reveal obvious rational meaning. Were
it otherwise, to "follow history," would be to find philosophy ready-made
simply in the record of temporal sequence. The task of philosophy is to
discover an organic unity which lies—as it were—beneath the surface.
Consequently, Caird holds it a very real prospect that the evolution of
religions in time—Flint's moral progress toward a demonstrative knowledge
of God—may be translated into a "process of thought which transcends
time," This inevitably Involves a certain amount of editing of the
historical text, and the re-forming of its contents. The nature of this
editing and re-forming will be indicated in connection with Caird's use
of the proofs, by which Pantheism, Deism, and Christianity are brought
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into organic connection with one another. But something must first be
said concerning the Idealistic viewpoint presupposed.
ii) How, it may be asked, is Caird's frank equation of "system"
with "organic unity" to be explained? How is this point of view justified?
What light does it throw upon the Common Sense approach to the question of
forming a "system" of religious knowledge? Caird's Philosophy of Religion
is a prolonged discourse upon the Hegelian theme that "The truth is the
whole!" This well-known phrase he interprets to mean that the "only ade¬
quate form of knowledge" is one
... in which the constituent elements of knowledge are appre¬
hended not as isolated and independent terms or notions,
accepted each on its own evidence, but as related to or flowing
out of each other, so that, one being given, the others follow,
and the whole body of knowledge constitutes an organic system.
For religious philosophy, this amounts to the doctrine that the only system
in which the sovereign reality of God, the spiritual life and history of
mankind, and the elements of Nature can be brought together into a con¬
ceivable unity is the organic system of Idealism. This particular system
is said to be necessitated at the human point of view by the character of
thought itself.
Caird argues that some such system as that of Hegel1s Idealism
is made necessary by the inability of thought based upon "ordinary con¬
sciousness" to reach anything like a system. In pressing this point, he
evidently has Common Sense thinking primarily in mind. "Ordinary con¬
sciousness" and "ordinary thinking" are said to be in terms of generalised
images whose material or sensuous origin still cling to them. Such think¬
ing is wholly inadequate when it is applied to the realm of mind or spirit,
where the clear-cut "differences" of the "outward and phenomenal world" do
Ibid., p. 216.
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not apply. Formal logic, by consecrating the bias of "ordinary think¬
ing," makes a rational system of reality impossible.
It begins by so disintegrating the universe that it can never
restore its scattered elements to unity. It postulates for all
things and beings a self-identity, a reciprocal exclusiveness,
which by no ingenious machinery of external relations it can
ever overcome so as to bring them together again in one rational
system or whole.1
After disintegrating the vital oneness of reality, thought bound by formal
logic must resort to artificial expedients to replace the lost unity. It
seeks generalized concepts, which in the nature of the case must exclude
the particular and the individual, thereby withdrawing from reality.
"Generalization, so far from apprehending reality, is a process which takes
us away from it, and the further it advances, the more abstract our thought
becomes, the farther we recede from the real, objective truth of things,"^
As a criticism of the Common Sense approach to "system," there
is fundamental truth in what Caird here asserts. It has been shown, par¬
ticularly in dealing with Reld and Tulloch, that the term "Common Sense"
implies a certain analogy to the manner in which the "outward and phenomenal
world" is apprehended, and the "principles" or "beliefs" of Common Sen3e
share certain characteristics of the perceptions of the bodily senses.^
The consequence in Raid's case, for instance, was a philosophy founded
upon a number of disconnected first principles, which had a somewhat
agglomerate character within the vaguely conceived unity of human nature.
But Common Sense itself was to find this view unsatisfactory, and in the
name of the rational oneness and wholeness of the human spirit undertook
1. Ibid., p. 217; cf. also pp. 210ff, 227-30. In dealing with this
question of logic, Caird touches upon the problem central to Hegel's phi¬
losophy. He seems not to have studied Hegel's Science of Logic or his
Phenomenology of the Spirit at first hand, relying entirely upon his
interpreters: cf. "Prefatory Note" to the Introduction.
2. Ibid., p. 229
3. Sunra. p.
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to give greater oneness and wholeness to man's view of the total reality,
within which he finds himself. The method chosen to achieve this unity
was not to assume the partial falsehood of the data presented to the
rational mind, or rather the falsehood of their appearing as genuine differ¬
ences in the structure of reality. Rather, Common Sense is content to
hold that human reason does make premature judgments as to the rational
structure of reality, and will continue to do so. But for all that, it
is still ideally fitted for the philosophical task. As part and center
of nature, the mysteries of natural diversity and order are its fundamental
concern. As free spiritual reason, it is bound to explore the mysteries
of which moral and religious experience give evidence. In endeavoring to
give a unified picture of reality as a whole, Common Sense may misinterpret
and misjudge the evidence: but this is to be recognized only by further
recourse to the evidence. Consequently, with Flint, Scottish thought
issues in the position that the rational system of philosophy must be
thought and rethought, formulated and reformulated, to conform with man's
evezvgrowing ability to understand the evidence aright* Common Sense, in
short, calls for a systematic rethinking of "system" at each new stage of
human development*
Caird's criticism of Common Sense presupposes as an alternative
that the form which the ultimate system or unity must take is determined
for rational thought by its own transparent nature. As Caird interprets
Hegel, the logic of Idealism is to characterize the nature and movements
of thought—manifesting itself originally in human self-consciousness, and
then seen "reflected" in all reality presented to consciousness. Thought
is said to find in itself an organic unity, binding together differences
and opposites in such a way that the very opposition contributes to the
4
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vital and developing oneness of the whole* Thought proceeds with its
task by showing in detail that all reality is formed in its own image*
In every matter for scientific reflection, the function of the higher
logic is simply the function of thought itself: to show that the truth
is the whole. Speculative knowledge is no less than "truth grasped in
its absolute necessity and coherence as an organic system or process
The method of logic is to retrace in thought the organic development under¬
lying whatever "things or beings" it contemplates. If the part finds its
life in the whole, the idea of it must indicate not only its individuality,
but also its articulation within the organism of truth.
The highest proof of the reality of an idea is that in which
reason grasps the inner, genetic nature of its object, enters
into the very process of its formation, and so recreates it for
thought. When we have thus proved a truth, not by the mediation
of other and arbitrarily selected notions, but simply, so to
speak, by looking on and following the path which thought takes
in its own necessary movement, then the result we reach is grasped
with a clearness and certitude which it is impossible to exceed;
for this is a process in which the intelligence identifies itself,
so to speak, with the very object to be known; or in which the
process by which we reach the truth is, at the same time, the
proof that it is the truth.2
On this view, a particular idea of religion or of God can be thought
necessary if and when its place in the organic unity of thought can be
shown with precision; or, in more Hegelian terminology, if and when it
is shown to be a constituent "moment of the universal system." A Phi¬
losophy of Religion is in essence a genetic account of the way in which
the idea of religion and of God has been developed in historical revelations,
from their most primitive manifestations to their highest expression, which
Gaird finds in Christianity.—From the Common Sense point of view, there is
no a priori reason to rule out a genetic approach to religion, and through
1. Introduction, p. 175.
2. Ibid., pp. 309-10.
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it to the \lltimate system of reality, if its hypothetical character is
borne in mind. That is, the evidence of the positive religions themselves
must be allowed to be the final standard of judgment for this or any suc¬
ceeding attempt to view the religious experience and convictions of man¬
kind within an intelligible universe of meaning.
iii) There is evidence to show, however, that Gaird would not
allow the Philosophy of Religion to be regarded as in the same categoiy
with a Common Sense hypothesis, or belief, concerning the ultimate system
of reality. The evidence is Caird's doctrine of reason, which expounds
another celebrated epigram of Hegels "Whatever is real is rational.By
this he understands in general that, whatever the end of the cosmic de¬
velopment within which the human spirit is related to God, to nature, and
to history, it must conform in final structure to the structure of reason
manifest in human self-consciousness. The consequent rationalism, when
viewed in some detail, throws important light upon the contrasting aims
of Common Sense "rationalism."
It is Caird's teaching that the task of reason on entering the
sphere of historical religions and beliefs is "to purify (their) intuitions
2
from foreign or spurious admixture." This is to assume that the evidence
of the religious consciousness of mankind is of inevitable importance to
3
any iMlosqphic consideration of the truth of religion, as has already
been indicated. Caird characterizes religious consciousness as a spontaneous
1* Cf. Introduction, p. 2.
2. The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity (Glasgow, 1899), Vol. I., p. 46.
The second of Caird's Gifford Lectures, entitled "Faith and Reason," states
in a summary way the doctrine of reason argued at length in the Introduction.
Chapters I to III.
3. it will be shown in connection with the "proofs" that Caird's rational¬
ism is by no means equivalent to the eighteenth century rationalism which
asserted that the truth of religion and religious ideas must be judged on
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faith, belief, "intuition," resulting in a certain idea of God with which
not only the intellect but the entire personality of the believer is in-
volved. But, it is argued, the spontaneity and intensity of religious
consciousness do not in themselves guarantee that the idea of God formed
in this connection, and the related ideas of man's spiritual being and well-
being, are adequate to the reality upon which they depend for meaning. In
fact, strongly held beliefs concerning God's Being and man's well-being
appear to stand in the sharpest contradiction. The task of reason is there¬
fore to judge and to "justify faith in so far as possible, "To infuse,,.
into the spontaneous and unsifted conceptions of religious experience, the
objective clearness, necessity, and organic unity of thought—this in
2
religion as elsewhere is the aim of science." In such statements as this,
Caird strongly suggests that reason is able to elicit from religious ex¬
perience characteristics that are not carried upon the face of it. Faith
somehow conceals its own true meaning, but reason from the standpoint of
surer thought can bring it to light.
Philosophy seeks to lead us to a higher point of view, from which
the seeming contradictions (of faith) vanish, from which reason,
following in the wake of faith, grasps the great conception that
the religious life is a life at once human and divine—. „ .that the
finite rests on, and realizes itself in, the Infinite? and that it
is not the annihilation, but the realization of our highest freedom,
in every movement of our thought, in every pulsation of our.will,
to be the organ and expression of the mind and will of God.
the basis of considerations remote from the actual deliverances of religious
experience: in faet, the proofs of eighteenth century religious philosophy,
of whatever party, are adjudged "deistic" and forthwith dismissed.
1. Cf. Fundamental Ideas. I, pp. 39-4-3? also, in more detail, Introduction.
p. 39-79.
2. Fnnrimnantal Ideas. I, p. 4-3. The underlining has been added to the text.
3. ibid., p. 54-. The underlining has been added to the text.
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In short, reason brings to religious experience its own organic conception
of reality, and interprets experience accordingly.
But, it must be asked, what right has reason to do this? Caird
maintains that it is simply the right of reason to think in accordance with
the requirements of its own nature. "The mind demands9 is a phrase re¬
curring again and again, and the requirement expressed each time is that
the diverse elements of experience—the 9differences" that obtrude them¬
selves upon the unreflective consciousness—be viewed in the same light as
the differences which together compose the unity of self-consciousness.
That is to say, Caird's philosophical outlook is grounded in a particular
view of rational self-consciousness in man. "Reason9 in this context is
once more the entire rational self—as Flint and Tulloch conceived it,
"regulating all and not dispensing with any of the principles and powers
of human nature": specifically, it embraces the "moral powers" as well as
the "intellectual" and "speculative powers," "practical reason" as well as
"pure reason."^ But it i3 the rational self viewed primarily as a
4* This deserves emphasis here because the limitations of this thesis make
it difficult to do justice to the moral or ethical undertone informing all
of Gaird,s thinking. Edward Caird wrote of his brother that "...it was
always the ethical bearings of principles that most strongly interested him,
and on these he spoke with most force and originality. He was drawn to
Hegel, therefore, most of all, because he seemed to find as the basis of
all Hegel1s speculation a close and living perception of the facts of the
moral and spiritual life." ("Memoir," p. lxxv.) This judgment is amply
borne out in the Fundamental Ideas of Christianity, where the ethical bear¬
ing of speculative doctrine is carefully indicated in relation to specifically
Christian ideas. The Introduction, however, which gives the clearest and
fullest statement of Caird's philosophical premises, would hardly indicate
that its author was "most strongly interested" in the ethical import of the
system outlined. Only Chapter IX on "The Religious Life: Relation of
Morality and Religion" shows clearly that the organic and dialectical
character of speculative reason has its counterpart, mutatis mutandis, in
the life of morel consciousness: "Morality or the moral life may be de¬
scribed as that solution of the contradiction between man*s higher and lower
nature which is accomplished by the transformation of the lower into the
organ or expression of the higher." (p. 275.)
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differentiated unity. It is a developing organism of thought in which
the self-as-subject is set over against the self-as-object, yet both are
reunited in the larger selfhood of the whole.
Self-consciousness is not a simple notion or one which can be
thought of as excluding from itself all difference. It in¬
cludes in it of necessity two elements, a self which is conscious
and a self which is the object of consciousness, a self which
thinks and a self which is thought of; and these two not added
to each other or in external contiguity, but in inseparable cor¬
relation.
Reason, then, is the rational 3elf, differentiated yet one, to which the
fragmentary and diffuse conceptions arising out of religious experience
are brought for assimilation into the organic structure of thought. Caird
argues at length that this structure of reason is the necessary key to a
true and adequate philosophical system. Thought and existence, mind and
matter, finite mind and Infinite Mind, for all their profound differences,
are united by an even more profound unity, just as the subjective self is
distinct from, yet bound to, the objective self within the organic life of
2
self-consciousness.
There can be little doubt that the view of 11 reason" expounded by
Caird is on the face of it an extension of the rationalistic trend that has
been traced down to the time of Flint, but that it is nevertheless funda¬
mentally alien to the Common Sense view of "reason." Debate about the
competence of man's rational powers to enter into the sphere of religious
reality and judge of its verities is, of course, the nerve-center of the
problem of natural theology, or very close to it. Scottish treatments of
this question have been placed primarily against the background of a fairly
distinct heritage of thought. In Confessional1st times, the sphere illumi¬
nated by "natural light" was seventy limited: though a rational and
1. Introduction, p. 223f.
2. For a fuller statement of Caird's Idealistic argument in summary form,
of. Introduction, p. 205.
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responsible creature, man is a being whose reason is distorted by sin,
with the consequence that it is utterly incapable of reaching a signifi¬
cant and saving knowledge of God without a powerfully transforming
revelation. Some taught that at best, natural reason can discover for
itself its own inability to find out God as He truly is, and in discover¬
ing this will presumably turn to the dear revelation freely offered in
Scripture, But this view gave rise to difficulties, Hume's incisive logic
convinced many that a proved inadequacy of reason would be tantamount to
scepticism, Hume also indicated, by life as well as by thought, that one
who fully allowed for such inadequacy would not inevitably come to reve¬
lation in humility and expectancy to learn of God's sovereign reality and
gracious purposes, but might just as readily assume the n^n of polite de-
tachment—even hearty indifference—to anything but the passing show of
nature and time. Few Scotsmen since seem to have been able to forget the
lessons taught so forcefully by Hume, whommay—even of the most devout-
have regarded as the nation's greatest philosopher. While a determined
"rationalist" such as Flint could jettison the "agnostic" teachings of Hume,
he appears not to have been tempted to blink the fact of Hume the man, who
with great personal integrity could repudiate truths indispensible to Flint
himself, Scottish religious thought from Beid onwards has been shown to be
a developing reaction to the consequences of Hume's "passional," amoral,
and basically irreligious outlook on the human spirit. In the nineteenth
century, Chalmers, Tulloeh, and Flint, each in turn expanded the "franchise"
of the rational spirit of man?—of his conscience as well as of his intel¬
lect—thereby widening his sphere of competence for acquiring real knowl¬
edge of the real God. This development is well described as a growing
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enfranchisement of reason: it was conceived by Common Sense thinkers
to be a responsible freedom enjoyed by reason for the service of Truth,
but subject always to the final determinations of reality itself—not
excluding the disclosures of a Divine Revelation, This contrasts with
Caird's teaching concerning the speculative powers of reason. On his view,
reality must somehow be made to fit into the ongoing process of organic
self-consciousness. On the Common Sense view, though there is a strong
reliance upon reason, there is still room to hold that it is man himself
who must become fit—in mind and also "in heart"—to apprehend the true
meaning of nature, history, and the Eternal revealing Himself through nature
and history. So also, within the framework of Common Sense thinking, there
is room to believe, as did Flint, that there are truths dimly manifest,
which to man in his immaturity can only appear to be "above reason." There
is room to believe, as did Tulloch, that there are other truths which to
man in his moral rebellion and perversity can only appear to be irrational
surds "contrary to reason," Caird challenged both distinctions—truths
"above reason" and truths "contrary to reason"—as being incompatible with
his own thought,1 and no doubt they are. His Idealistic doctrine requires
2
implicit confidence in the omnicompetence of reason. While Common Sense
is constrained to believe that reality patiently awaits the maturity of man
as a rational spirit, the Idealist forecasts—rather impatiently—the
maturity of reality, so that the capability of reason may be undisputed.
1. Cf, Introduction, pp. 64-79,
2. of the claim that the powers of reason may be inadequate to the specu¬
lative ideal, Caird writes: "It may be answered, in general, that the only
way in which philosophy can prove its rights is by philosophising. The
capacity or incapacity of reason to deal with any object or class of objects
cannot be determined by a preliminary inquiry, for this, if for no other
reason, that the inquiry could only be conducted by the faculty which is
impugned," (Ibid., p. 4.)
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iv) It is in the use of the proofs. and in the interpretation
given to them, that the contrast between Caird's Philosophy of Religion
and the Common Sense approach to religious truth come into clearest focus.
Caird's observations upon the proofs-'- afford a useful basis for comparison
with the views already discussed. He agrees emphatically that the proofs
in the form they had received at the hands of Locke and the eighteenth
century do not, and in the nature of the case cannot, amount to a rational
demonstration of God,s reality. Caird simply endorses the Kantian criticism
of the "theoretic-dogmatic" form in which they had been cast. But further
inspection leads him to the conclusion that the cosmological, teleological,
and ontological proofs—in that order, and without any mention of a "moral
proof"—embody deeper rational meaning than is apparent on this superficial
view. They designate three necessary moments in the organic development of
religion in the individual consciousness, and also in human history.
"Viewed as an analysis of the unconscious or implicit logic of religion, as
tracing the steps of the process by which the human spirit rises to the
knowledge of God and finds therein the fulfillment of its own highest nature,
2
these proofs possess great value." If elaborated by exhaustive psycho¬
logical and historical analysis, the somewhat abstract form given the proofs
in the Introduction would presumably establish the necessity of religion in
general, and of the highest form of religious thought, which for Caird is
Christianity. The cosmologieal proof, or argument "from the contingency of
the world," translated out of its abstract form is said to be
... simply the expression of the fact that the first dawn of
religious feeling may be traced to the impression which our ex¬
perience of life forces upon us of the transitory, unsubstantial,
1. Of. Tnt-radn<rhionT chapter V, and Fundamental Ideas. lectures IV to VI.
2. Introduction, p. 133.
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evanescent character of the world on which we look and of
which we form a part.^
It gives rise to an essentially pantheistic view of God and His relation
to the world, and accordingly indicates that the earliest religious con-
sciousnass-^rhether in the individual or in the race—is a form of Pantheism.
But the seed of reaction lies in the heart of a belief that allows all
finitude and difference to be absorbed into the undifferentiated life of
Deity. The teleological proof, or argument from the experience of finite
freedom, represents the recoil of the rational spirit in man from the all-
engulfing abyss of Pantheism and the assertion of an opposite and equally
inadequate view: that of Deism.
The transition to this idea is explained by the need which the
mind feels to get beyond the alternatives of Contingent and
Necessary as in the cosmological proof, and the first effort to
satisfy this need is expressed by the notion of a necessity which
is not conditioned by the contingent, which is complete in itself
and self-determined. In the idea of an all-wise Creator or
Designer we have the conception of a cause which is not merely
the correlate of an effect outside of itself, but which is self-
conscious and self-contained, who freely, or of His own will and
pleasure, creates and works out certain purposes or ends in the
worldj and as these ends indicate skill, contrivance, plan, we
infer in Him not only infinite power, but also infinite wisdom
or forethought.2
!• Ibid., p. 135J cp» Fundamental Ideas, p. 88ff. The core of Caird's
argument is contained in the following passage: "It is not the reality,
but idle unreality, of the finite world that gives rise to the conscious¬
ness of God. It is not from the affirmation, but from the negation, of
the finite that the human spirit rises to the conception of the infinite
• ••• The very consciousness of a limit is the proof that we are already
beyond it. God is not the conclusion of a syllogism from the finite world,
but idie prius or presupposition which reveals its presence in the very
sense of our finitude and that of the world to which we belong." (This
passage is taken from Caird's study of Spinoza: Edinburgh & London, 1888,
pp. 22-3.)
2* Introduction. p. 141. It is a revealing fact that the Mteleological
proof" receives no further justification in Caird's scheme than the ex¬
planation that it is a reaction to the error of the Pantheistic view.
Rather than defend the "truth" of Deism, as he does for Pantheism, he uses
his logical vigor to expose the inadequacy of the Deistic "dualism" in
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The teleological proof is here bound to an analogical form. Caird sub¬
jects it to the criticism that the idea of a Divine "Creator11 Implies the
crude anthropomorphism of forming the Infinite in the Image of the finite—
of picturing God as an artist shaping matter that is external to Himself,
with which He is only temporarily concerned. A view so obviously excep¬
tionable must give way to a higher, which is the essence of the ontological
proof: it is the doctrine that God is "Absolute Spirit" who "manifests
Himself in the differences of the finite world, and in these differences
returns upon or realises Himself."1 Here the Pantheistic and the Deistic
insights are fused in organic unity. The finite world—the realm of nature,
human nature, and history—has no life of its own apart from God, but is an
intelligible system of meaning when it is conceived as bound in organic
relation to the Infinite Mind, whose objective manifestation it is. God,
on the other side of the relation, so to speak, must be conceived as
"realizing Himself" in and through the life of His "creation." From the
human point of view, to explore the inner workings of finite self-con¬
sciousness is to discover an idea of God "whose absolute objective reality
which it issues—the "externality" and "arbitrariness" that characterize
its conception of God and His relation to the world. This seems to be
tacit recognition that the Deistic Movement, and indeed the entire develop¬
ment of eighteenth century rational theology, can have no positive sig¬
nificance within an essentially monistic system of religious thought. (Of.
ibid.. pp. 141-53.
1. Ibid.. p. 255. The reasoning behind this doctrine is contained in the
following passage: "There is involved...in man's spiritual nature a con¬
sciousness which goes beyond his consciousness of himself and things with¬
out—an absolute self-consciousness which is the unity of all thought and
being. It is of the very essence of man as a spiritual, self-conscious
being to transcend the finite, to rise above the world of inner and outer
experience, seeing that neither would have any meaning or reality if they
did not rest on and imply a consciousness deeper than the consciousness of
the individual self, deeper than the consciousness of Nature, a universal
Mnd or Intelligence which is the prius and the unity of both." (Ibid.,
pp. 320-1.)
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is so fundamental to thought, that to doubt it implies the subversion
of all thought and all existence alikeThe idea of God thus reached
shows Him to be Infinite Self-Consciousness "whose very nature it is to
reveal Himself in and to (finite minds)." The ontological proof is the
climax of the movement of religious thought, yielding a "conception of
the nature of God and of the nature of man which makes religion necessary
by making it, in one sense, the highest realisation of both."^ This,Caird
asserts, is the Christian view in essence.3
In contrast to this closely-knit development, the Common Sense
use of the proofs—whether by a Reid or a Flint—appears to be an assemblage
of arguments which defy the "necessary movement" of religious thought out¬
lined by Caird. It cannot be worked into the scheme of the triadic proof.
Quite apart from objections based upon a more or less scientific study of
religious psychology and history,^" there is a deep-seated resistance in
the Common Sense tradition to a view that knowledge of God is an organic
growth within the all-embracing Self-Consciousness of the Infinite—the
"unconscious or implicit logic" of whose "process" is brought to light by
Introduction, p. 158.
2. Ibid., p. 159.
3. Cf. Fundamental Ideas. Lecture VI. Caird's indebtedness to Hegel's
Philosophie der Religion is perhaps obvious enough in this account of the
"proofs" and of the historical relation of Pantheism, Deism, and
Christianity: it will not be emphasized further. Edward Caird's Evolution
of Religion follows a somewhat different triadic pattern, tracing the de¬
velopment of religion from the "objective forms" of the earliest, through
later subjective forms, to an ultimate reconciliation of the two in
Christianity. Accordingly, religion is defined as a "more or less developed
consciousness of that infinite unity which is beyond all the divisions of
the finite—particularly the division of subject and object." (Evolution
of Religion. Vol. I, p. 82.)
4. Caird would in all probability have replied by pointing out that any
account of religious development that would satisfy the usual conception
of scientific study would be nothing more than an "empirical knowledge" of
religious experience unless rendered fully scientific by translation into
the organic system of reason.
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an Idealistic Philosophy that must revise the data of "ordinary con¬
sciousness" to do so« This resistence is in spite of the fact that Common
Sense at its later stages would endorse Caird's judgment against much that
had passed for theistic demonstration—from which Held and Chalmers, for
example, had not entirely disengaged their thinking®
Genuine religious conviction can never be the result of a balancing
of logical arguments: it cannot be a belief produced by a series
of external proofs, which implies no relation of the spirit of man
to the thing believed. The proof of religion cannot be separated
from its essence. You can no more argue a man into a belief in
religion than into a belief in art or morality,1
But Common Sense thinkers, beginning at the standpoint of religious con¬
sciousness, pursued a significantly different course. One side of their
argument had been to insist increasingly that only that be deemed knowledge
of the Infinite which enables man to know wholly—that is, with the assent
and commitment of his entire being, and never in violation of any essential
element of his rational nature. He dare not believe with his mind, for
example, what his conscience declares false—nor again believe "with his
heart" what his "head" knows to be false. Personality is one, a living
center of diverse experience, ever seeking to "see life clearly and see
it whole," In this sense, and in the degree that it can be said to know
anything, the human spirit "demands"—indeed, cannot help "demanding"—
a system of reality that is consonant with its own rational being. This
is the burden of the Common Sense reasonings whose developing "inwardness"
has been shown to dominate and give form to all "demonstrations" of
natural theology. In this view, Common Sense seems to be incorrigibly
"rationalistic," This rationalism expresses itself typically in its
opposition to a Kantian dichotomy between the religious determinations of
University Addresses (Glasgow, 1898), p« 221.
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"pure" and "practical reason": such opposition is grounded—vaguely by
Chalmers, specifically hy Tulloch and Flint—in the unity and oneness of
man,s rational being. The boldly theistic conception of God as Infinite
Personality reflects a concomitant rational "demand" that the Ultimate be
in no case less than a Being able to create, sustain, and where necessary
reform, the moral and rational spirit of man. But the other side of this
same Common Sense doctrine is the recognition that such an approach to a
systematic philosophy of religion is bound to the standpoint of finite
reason. Any reasoning that begins, as does Caird's "cosmological proof,"
by undermining the profound differences between the finite and the Infinites-
that continues, as in Caird's "teleological proof," by discounting these
differences further, is subject to radical error. On the Common Sense view,
there is room for error—for the possibility of irreligion, false religion,
irresponsible religion, and of an improper synthesis that dissolves
spiritual contradictions which man has no right to dissolve. All this is
short-circuited by an argument which insists on making the human spirit
organic to that of God, which "justifies" all manifestations of religion
as being "necessary stages" in tie process of religious development. Common
Sense religious philosophy is in principle bound to such manifestations of
God as are given to the reason of a finite spirit, and is therefore opposed
to a system bent upon organic unity without final recourse to such evidence
as has been given to the finite spirit in the course of man,s religious
history.
v) It is indicative of the force Caird attributes to his organic
system of reason that he does not hesitate to employ it as the means of
rendering Christianity "intelligent and intelligible." His Gifford Lectures
are professedly a detailed elaboration of the idea of God and religion
indicated abstractly in the "ontological proof." Three principles
enunciated to show the essence of Christian doctrine illustrate his in¬
tention."^ (a) According to the first, Christianity asserts that God is
Infinite Mind or Intelligence "which constitutes the reality of the world,
not simply as its external Creator but as the inward Spirit in and through
which all things live and move and have their being." This Caird takes to
be a distinctive mark of the Christian idea of God, and the essence of the
doctrine of the Trinitys the Divine Self-consciousness has the same dif¬
ferentiated character as the human—embracing difference within infinite
unity in order to realize itself fully, (b) Further, Christianity is
said to assert that "...by its very nature, Infinite Mind or Spirit has
in it a principle of self-revelation—a necessity of self-manifestation
to and in a world of finite beings." This "necessity of manifestation"
is the truth which the doctrines of the Logos, of Incarnation, and of
Atonement, are intended to body forth. Christ revealed supremely the God
who must realise His own nature in acts of Self-giving love, even toward a
recalcitrant humanity, for this is the means of His own Self-fulfilment,
(c) Finally, Christianity is said to affirm the reality and dignity of
the finite spirit of man because "...the infinitude of God..., so far from
involving the negation or suppression of the finite world, is rather the
principle of the individuality and independence of nature and man."2
Against this background Caird projects the Christian doctrines of man, sin
and redemption, and everlasting life. In time and eternity, the finite
enjoys its own well-assured life, not in spite of, but because of its being
Fundamental Ideas. Vol. I, pp. 143-Aff.
2. This is a principle strongly asserted in the broader philosophical con¬
text by most Scottish Idealists, against radical Hegelians who would sacri¬
fice the individuality of finite spirits to the dialectic of the Absolute,
Cf. esp. Professor Pringle-Pattison's Hegelianism and Personality (Edin¬
burgh & London, 1887)•
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grounded in the all-embracing life of the Infinite. The final result
of Caird's interpretation is a Christianity that is thoroughly system¬
atized. Its "mysteries" are to a large extent rationalized and rendered
intelligible. Its "economy of redemption" is seen to be the "highest
realisation" of the nature of man and of God. This completed system of
Christian thought, with its definite conceptions of the relation within
which man is related to God, to nature, and to history, is said to be
necessary for thought because it follows out most completely the logic
implicit in the structure of rational self-consciousness.
The development of a natural theology or rational theism in
Scotland—which it has been the task of this study to trace—began under
the dominating shadow of the theological system embodied in the Westminster
Confession. The situation is now reversed, for in Caird's Philosophy of
Religion Christian doctrine receives its "form" from an Idealistic system.
Or perhaps, with greater fairness to Caird, it should be said that he made
a resolute effort to graft together the religious essence of historical
Christianity and the organic system of a modified Hegelianism. There is
some reason to believe that he was not entirely satisfied with the success
of his undertaking—that in his handling of Christian doctrines relating
to the facts of sin and evil, for example, he recognized certain inade¬
quacies and limitations of the system outlined in the Introduction.But
to the end, Caird seems not to have sensed any radical incompatibility in
1* E.g., the Introduction recognizes a "discord in man's being, of which
morality is the partial, religion the perfect solution." (p. 264.) This
discord is handled in simplified "dialectical" fashion as a conflict be¬
tween the "animal nature" and the "universal element" in man, which is
partially resolved in moral endeavor and "perfectly resolved" in religion,
through the "elevation of the finite to the infinite" which makes man "the
actual partaker of a divine or infinite life." (p. 294.) In four lectures
of his Gifford Series (VIII-XI) dealing with "The Origin and Nature of
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the attempt to give an idealistic "form" to the "content" of Christian
faith.1 Theology and philosophy, ideally, are to be fused together, in
which event there is no longer room for such a distinction as that drawn
between "natural theology41 on the one hand, and a "theology of revelation'4
on the other. For Common Sense thought, however, this distinction is never
completely lost although a Flint may envision an ever greater approximation
of scientific thought to an adequate knowledge of God's sovereign reality
above nature and history. Confessionalist theologians had at the outset
distinguished sharply the truth and "sufficiency" of their own Christian
creed from the error and insufficiency of all non-Christian creeds. But,
as has been shown, the process of refinement which began with Hume led to
a considerable modification of this distinction, in the direction of
attributing a measure of truth and genuine insight to religious views
other than the Christian, and more especially to those thought through
with philosophic or scientific precision. Accordingly, "natural theology"
came to be regarded by Flint as a thoroughly scientific approach to re¬
ligion and to the ultimate realities with which all religions are in seme
way concerned—God, the human spirit, nature and that which is beyond
nature, time and eternity. The wide realm of human religion, including
also scientific thought concerning religious verities, are to be his
evidence—from which Christianity as a historical phenomenon is not to be
excluded. But Flint, remaining true to the tradition of Common Sense,
Evil," Caird wrestles with much harder statements of the facts involved,
gives a large measure of assent to Augustinian theories, points out the
inadequacy of his earlier thought on the matter (Fundamental Ideas. II,
pp. 42-52), and indicates a profound sensitiveness to the essential ir¬
rationality of evil and sin.
Edward Caird remarks in tie "Msmoir" of his brother, "Perhaps he did
not realise...how great must be the transformation of the creed of
Christendom, before, in the language of Goethe's well—known tale, the
hut of the fisherman can be transformed into the altar of the great Temple
of Humanity." p. Ixvii.
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continued to distinguish this general procedure and its results from
Christianity regarded as a special revelation#
If there be a certain amount of knowledge about God and
spiritual things to be derived from nature—from data fur¬
nished by perception and consciousness, and accessible to the
whole race,—while there is also a certain knowledge about
Him which can only have been communicated through a special
illumination or manifestation—through prophecy, or miracle,
or incarnation—the distinction must be retained.^
As a real Person, confronting all men in and through His works, God is
known to a greater or lesser degree. This is the truth that renders in¬
telligible the history of religions and of religious philosophy in every
age—so diverse in their understanding of the attributes of the Divine
Reality, yet all witnessing to the Eternal Presence in the midst of nature
and history. The responsive growth of mankind in spiritual maturity is
characterized by an increasing capacity of mind and heart to apprehend
the power, wisdom, and goodness of God. His real Presence is never com¬
pletely hidden—except from those who have inflicted spiritual blindness
upon themselves;^ and within limits, every man is free to apprehend God
as he can, in accordance with the rational and ethical development of his
own spirit. But to establish this is to regard religion and religious
truths only from an external vantage-point—impersonally, in a manner
alien to vital religion. As a real Person, God for His part is free to
reveal His heart and His purposes in whatever way He wills. It is the
corresponding part of human science to recognize the Divine prerogative
in this matter, and to insist that however God chooses to manifest Himself
most completely and decisively, man allow the evidence to determine the
Divine mean-i ng and not be overhasty in imposing a conveniently intelligible
1» Theism, p. 327. Cf. the entire passage from which this is taken,
pp. 323-9.
2* This is Flint's "agnostic."
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"form" upon it0 On this point, the spirit of science and the spirit
of religion are at one: if there is any respect in which scientific
philosophy may be said to "justify" religion, this is it0 Christian
theology is to be regarded, from the Common Sense point of view, as the
science of a special revelation, a unique Self-disclosure of God in Jesus
Christ, "made wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption for
us," and manifest to spirits prepared in repentenee, faith, and love, to
receive it."*" While natural theology seeks a knowledge of God in breadth,
so to speak, Christian theology aspires to a knowledge of God in the
unique depth that is possible only when Personality reveals its inmost
heart in concrete evidences of life and sacrifice to those with "eyes to
see and ears to hear."
The fundamental contrast between Caird's Philosophy of Religion
and the theistic development culminating in Flint1 s System of Natural
Theology can not here be investigated further. It must be admitted that
the use to which Caird,s thought has been put does not do full justice to
the force and originality of his mind: when Caird's paramount debt to
Hegel is remembered, lucidity is in itself a feat of originality. But the
very appearance of a strong Idealistic movement in Scotland—of which
Caird was the outstanding theological representative—raised questions of
a most basic sort concerning the rational foundations of Scottish "demonstra¬
tive theism." A. passage from Professor Campbell Fraser's study of Thomas
Reid, published in 1898, may be cited to indicate in a summary way just
what those questions were at the turn of the century:
Cf. Theism, pp. 317-20.
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Can Reid's 1common sense' be sublimated into the universal con¬
sciousness of Hegelian dialectic, and does this translation of
faith-'- into absolute science constitute the true ideal of Scot¬
tish common sense philosophy at the end of the nineteenth century?
Is common knowledge, and scientific knowledge in special sciences,
only knowledge 'in part,' while the true philosopher may aspire
to know even as God knows? Must man thus claim omniscience as the
only fit ground of his protest against sceptical nescience? Or,
must his interpretation of the experience through which he is
passing be, even in the end, only an inspired faith-venture, in¬
stead of the omniscience which elevates the common sense into
itself?^
Flint's term here is "belief."
2. Thomas Reid. pp« 157-3„ Professor Fraser's statement shows clearly
the ethical aspect of the questions involved0
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C0H0LUSI0N
The general characteristics of Scottish theistlc development
have now been drawn. It remains only to state, by way of conclusion,
the bearing these results have upon the historical problem that is in¬
volved, and to indicate in general the solution of the underlying theo¬
logical problem toward which Scottish thought evidently moves. What place
do the writings of demonstrative theists in nineteenth century Scotland
occupy in the broad history of efforts to "prove" God's existence and
attributes? Is demonstration of religious truths or realities possible
apart from the special revelation to which Christianity gives witness?
It is clear that Scottish theistic literature must be read and
understood in its own chosen light, and in accordance with its own ultimate
standards, before it is subjected to favorable or unfavorable criticism.
It is wrong, obviously, to dismiss the development of natural theology in
Scotland as an insignificant backwash of the English deistic controversy
when Scotsmen by deep-rooted tradition, if not by temperament, had little
sympathy with the effort to measure all truths—including truths indis-
pensible to religion—by the "apodictic" demonstrations of reason. If the
reading of Hume's thought that has been offered is right, the evidence of
Scotland's foremost philosophic mind indicates an orientation of thought
very different from that of English rationalism. But, of course, Scottish
theists adjudged Hume's philosophical premises sceptical and false to the
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rational nature of man. They replaced them with the premises of a
•♦mediating philosophy."
Scottish demonstrative theism is characterized by the acceptance
of the principles of Common Sense Philosophy. Fundamental to this phi¬
losophy is the insistence that all of the great problems with which theism
is concerned must be viewed at the human point of view, which is one neither
of total ignorance necessitating scepticism, nor of "gnostic" certainty
dispelling all doubt and dispensing with the need for intellectual candor
and humility in pressing for theistic conviction. Man is capable of knowl¬
edge, but knows only as man, whose best guarantee against the errors of
blind subjectivity is to know in community with fellow men who share his
rational nature. Theistic proof is possible, and in a way necessary, with¬
in this sphere of Common Sense. For the knowledge of one must somehow be
capable of becoming the knowledge of all. Rational discussion thus de¬
termined is in no way intended to compel anyone by means of a thoroughly
objective, abstract, and irrefragable logic to accept as true something
that lies beyond the ordinary grasp of human reason. The logic assiduously
developed by Common Sense Philosophy is, most simply, that domestic virtue
of the mind by which an orderly and knowledgeable arrangement is given to
all that experience brings home to anyone who attentively considers what
is being presented. "Demonstration" here signifies calling for closer
attention to the profoundest elements of living experience: it is "point¬
ing out" what others in seeing may have failed to see, or have inadequately
construed. It is in this light that Chalmers' "Theology of Conscience" is
to be read and understood, as also Tulloch's argument expressed in the
aphorism, "Nnllus spiritus. nullus Deus." and, of course, Flint's System
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of Natural Theology, Even John Caird, who disparaged "Common Sense"
for the most part, seems to have speculated within the shadow of its
influence—as is evidenced by the number of respects in which his
Hegelianism is noticeably more "humanised" than some forms given to
Hegel's thought in England and on the continent, Scottish theistic de¬
velopment on the whole was largely independent of comparable developments
either in England or elsewhere, and in matters of rational principle
relied primarily upon Scottish philosophical results. This is the
historical conclusion to which this study has come.
But what is the theological result toward which the development
of "demonstrative theism" in Scotland has come? Is there an assured
knowledge of the living God apart from "special revelation"—which in
Scotland could only mean, apart from Christian revelation? None of the
Scottish thinkers here considered, with the probable exception of Hume,
questioned the ultimacy and final truth of the revelation given in Jesus
Christ, The four who have represented the broad span of the nineteenth
century were theologians within the Church of Scotland, it is true; but
there can be little doubt that they taught Christian doctrine only in
accordance with deepest personal convictions, and without reservations
tantamount to hypocrisy. Yet all affirmed, as a matter of sober fact,
that beside the knowledge of God made possible by the unique revelation
given in Jesus Christ, there is a knowledge of Him which gives substance
to "Natural Theology,"
To the question, Can man by the use of his reason know that
there is a personal God?, the increasingly assured answer of Scottish
theistic writers is "Yes," To the further question, How can man know
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that God is and what He is?, the reply is most simply, "By knowing Godi"—
which is to say by knowing Him as He manifests Himself in the manifold
life of nature and history, above all by considering the actions of His
Spirit upon the conscience, the intellect, and the maturing personality
of mankind from the dawn of history to the latest "present moment." Such
knowledge is at first a very general "apprehension" to which the mind may
feel itself impelled by the force of moral consciousness and of irrepressible
intellect. In this general form, knowledge is belief--lacking in precision,
confused in particulars, erroneous in discerning "differences" and details
of the first importance. It is imperfect knowledge, but knowledge never¬
theless. In learning to see wholly—that is, out of every window of human
personality—and in striving to see reality whole—that is, without con¬
centrating upon one facet to the exclusion or disparagement of others—
the mind is able increasingly to see belief transformed into "scientific
knowledge." While at the stage of belief the impetus to this scientific
process seems to spring from within the human spirit, it becomes in¬
creasingly apparent that the process is evoked by the Presence of the all-
powerful, "all-methodical," and all-righteous Spirit, who is the parent
Fact of all facthood, the Sovereign Reality confronting men at every turn,
the living God.
But, this which gives substance to "natural theology" or
"rational theism" is seen—by Common Sense theists at least—to be knowl¬
edge of God only in His "public capacity" as Sovereign of a world in which
men are free to revolt, and have in fact revolted, against the Person and
purposes of the Eternal. From the beginning, the sombre and irrational
character of sin and of evil were never discounted entirely. Even Flint's
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rather optimistic doctrine of progress could not wholly offset the
darker side of human experience to which Confessionalism had given
vigorous witness. If Caird was ever led to doubt the adequacy of his
Idealistic system, it was probably at the point where Idealism tended
to justify rebellion against God as a necessary reaction, or "negation,"
within the ongoing dialectical process. Scottish theists were disposed
to take seriously what Tulloch called "the insurrection of the human will
against the Divine." They also recognized the need for a profounder
knowledge of God—a knowledge that behind His righteousness, His power,
and His orderliness, there is a love that seeks to reconcile sinful men
to Himself. This knowledge, made plain only at great cost to God, is
given in Jesus Christ, to be received in the privacy of Christian belief
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